A PENSIVE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000779 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: A PENSIVE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir is pleased with the results of his extensive round of African contacts leading to a tough policy line by the Peace and Security Council. He praises the U.S. position while he worries about the Europeans. Ould Boulkheir was pleasantly surprised by the decision of the High Constitutional Council that thwarted efforts to remove him from his position but is ill at ease with the current "cohabitation" with the members of his own chamber. The Assembly President sees nothing useful coming from the National Dialogue on Democracy but voices frustration with President Abdallahi's lack of an alternative option. End Summary ¶2. (C) Diplomatic Mission: Charge met with President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir on December 31 at Ould Boulkheir's Assembly office. Charge congratulated Ould Boulkheir on the success of his extensive diplomatic mission on behalf of President Abdallahi. Ould Boulkheir took the opportunity to thank the U.S. for its extensive support to his delegation during his trip highlighting particularly his meetings with Ambassador Simon at USAU and DCM LaLime in Pretoria.. Ould Boulkheir said he had found a consistent strong message of support throughout his mission and he had succeeded in getting the PSC to accept two of his main objectives -- getting the AU to invite President Abdallahi to appoint his own representative and getting AU support to pass the Mauritanian dossier to the UN Security Council. Ould Boulkheir said he had noted the effectiveness of the U.S. position (as well as direct interventions) throughout his trip. He worried that the French position remained "vague" but noted that AU Chairman Kikwete told him he had discussed Mauritania with President Sarkozy at the Doha Summit and had found the French Presidential position to be unwavering. Ould Boulkheir noted some confusion over the German position since the Germans had previously been strong supporters of Mauritania's democracy under President Abdallahi and now seemed the regime's most vocal supporters -- more so than the Spanish who Ould Boulkheir saw motivated by their own sense of security and commercial interests. He was particularly concerned since the German Ambassador will now represent the European Union on behalf of the Czech EU Presidency. ¶3. (C) Constitutional Contortions: Ould Boulkheir was surprised that the High Constitutional Council had rejected changes pushed through by General Aziz' "Parliamentary Battalion" in the Assembly that would have forced him out of his office. That said, he said, "I'm not at all comfortable with this current arrangement of 'cohabitation'" noting he was sitting in his office at the Assembly while the combined Congress was being convened -- illegally so -- at the National Dialogue for Democracy. Ould Boulkheir saw nothing useful coming from the Dialogue noting, first and foremost, that it had been convened and managed by an "illegitimate president" and his "illegal government." The Dialogue itself had no standing to convene the Congress as a sub-set of the conference. Recognizing that some political parties against the coup had decided to try to change things from within, Ould Boulkheir said they were already complaining that the participation in the Dialogue was so weighed in favor of traditional "notables" that the political parties were being pushed aside. Ould Boulkheir asserted that, regardless of how open the debate might be, the results of the Dialogue will have no legal standing adding, "The military would have made life much easier for themselves by just launching a traditional coup. This affair of trying to pretend that all other aspects of constitutional order remain in place doesn't work because the changes they are trying to force are inherently unconstitutional." ¶4. (C) Time For A Strategy: Ould Boulkheir noted he had not gone to Lemden to brief President Abdallahi on his diplomatic mission because "I thought he would be back in town by now -- now I understand he won't come back until after the Dialogue is over." He noted that bringing the President back to Nouakchott poses some very difficult administrative and security challenges for the FNDD but saw that it is difficult NOUAKCHOTT 00000779 002 OF 002 to demonstrate that Abdallahi's liberation is not "unconditional" if it remains untested. He is uncomfortable with the emerging long-term strategy of the FNDD and said, "it's time for the President to table some specific plan for a resolution to the problem" since the Aziz "National Dialogue" effort was the only thing out there for now. Ould Boulkheir said the basic tenets of his earlier proposal -- for the President to announce he will schedule early elections as soon as the military leave and he is returned to office -- remains the most viable. He allowed that short of actually giving up his mandate, the President had to at least put it at risk through a referendum or early parliamentary elections. Ould Boulkheir said international pressure remains vital but saw that, eventually, something has to be done internally. ¶5. (C) Comment: Ould Boulkheir continues to impress with his commitment to principle coupled with a sincere effort to find some negotiating room. He is not without political ambition, of course. Many Mauritanians see Ould Boulkheir's leadership of the FNDD African diplomatic mission as burnishing his own credentials as a future president -- building his credibility to, as some Mauritanians put it, "do an Obama" of having a black Mauritanian elected President. While still a crucial element of the FNDD coalition, Ould Boulkheir is the most outspoken in his willingness to have Abdallahi give up his position once he is returned to office and constitutional order is re-established. End Comment. HANKINS