AZIZ CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT IN SECURITY SERVICES --

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000777 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC MR SUBJECT: AZIZ CONSOLIDATING SUPPORT IN SECURITY SERVICES -- FRICTION REPORTED ON THE RISE Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) In the past ten days we have seen signs of continued efforts by General Aziz to reposition his supporters in lower levels of the administration. Four governors were reassigned a week ago. Over the weekend senior police officials were reassigned and it is understood changes in the military commands were attempted. Senior LES report these changes are generating friction within the military and security forces. ¶2. (C) Our senior RSO FSN reported that the Chief of the Nouakchott Central Police, Col. Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Moutaly, was demoted to become the head of the police contingent for the Nouakchott airport. The transfer came with a number of other transfers that Moutaly said were all political -- based on the officers' perceived personal loyalty to General Aziz. Moutaly accepted the transfer but is livid -- no replacement has yet been named. Also demoted was the Director of the Judicial/Public Security Police Col. Mohamed Abdellahi Taleb Abeidi who has been shifted to be an "advisor" for the Minister of Interior (a typical Mauritanian method of "parking" someone on the outs with the political leadership. Col. Abeidi has been a key contact for the Mission as he has overall responsibility for security of diplomatic missions. RSO, who meets frequently with Abeidi, noted that he became much more guarded in discussions in recent weeks saying he would have to refer to his superiors responses to security questions. Abeidi, who has a good reputation, is very upset with his demotion. ¶3. (C) Our senior democracy and development FSN heard from a government official with clandestine ties to Ould Daddah's RFD party (strongly negative about President Abdallahi but equally keen to see the military out) that General Aziz tried to remove Sixth Military District (covering the Nouakchott capital region and Trarza province) Commander Col. Mohamed Cheikh Bourour on or about December 27. We have no independent confirmation of this report but our FSN is usually very accurate in his reports. Bourour was reportedly offered a "promotion" onto the High State Council but would have lost his command. He declined the offer and, reportedly, when Aziz insisted threatened back that if he was removed he ould "burn everything from Toujounine (the Distrct where the military commend is headquartere)(t your palace." As the capt a aarrssnn hh ixth Military District is coni(e e the best equipped second only to Aziz' own Presidential Security Battalion (BASEP). Aziz reportedly backed off and is said to have sent a peace emissary to Bourour yesterday. (Comment: DATT will look for confirmation of this report but was aware that Col. Bourour is among the senior military leaders who have been less than supportive of General Aziz and his coup). ¶4. (C) Comment: President Abdallahi's political strategy is to see political, economic, diplomatic and security pressures build on Aziz until a tipping point is reached leading to a counter-coup. Abdallahi believes Aziz will prove his own worse enemy by his own style of management that blatantly seeks to consolidate power. These three changes (two confirmed and one rumored) seem to confirm Aziz is rapidly building military and security enemies. End Comment. HANKINS