RISK OF ETHNIC-BASED ARMED RESISTANCE?

S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000739 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC MR SUBJECT: RISK OF ETHNIC-BASED ARMED RESISTANCE? REF: NOUAKCHOTT 582 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Charge met December 15 with the pro-Abdallahi senator of Mbout in Gorgol Province, Youssouf Tijani Sylla, who renewed his October warning (REFTEL) that Afro-Mauritanians were prepared to take up arms against the coup. Sylla, who is half White Moor and half Sonnike who presents himself as a champion of Black Moor Haratines and Afro-Mauritanians. Sylla told Charge, "we are prepared to wait six months (i.e. until early February) and, if the military is still in power, we will take up arms." He confidently said an armed uprising would be quick and effective saying, "this isn't a real army. Once two shots are fired they'll hide their weapons, take off their uniforms, and run away." Sylla said he had already met with the Malians and would meet with the Algerian ambassador later in the day and that he was confident those countries would support an armed uprising. Sylla, who in October said he was in contact with FLAM in Senegal, said he could not count on Senegalese support because of President Wade's apparent acceptance of the coup. ¶2. (C) As in October, Charge firmly told Sylla the U.S. did not support any idea of armed resistance. Sylla's concept that an uprising would be fast and effective seemed a fantasy -- particularly if largely White Moor military leaders saw this as a black versus white conflict. Charge ran through the various international, domestic and economic pressures on the regime that made the departure of Aziz a real possibility. Even if Aziz stays on, Charge warned that a strategy to remove him based on violence was fraught with risks and uncertainty -- risks that could end up in a situation far worse than before. ¶3. (S) Comment: The two meetings with Sylla are the only two open indications of any possible planning for ethnic-based armed resistance. We sent a Mission delegation for a week-long run through the largely Afro-Mauritanian provinces along the Senegal River looking for signs of bubbling ethnic tensions and found none. That said, there are clear baathist sentiments among many of the junta's leaders that would tend to shift Mauritania back to a strongly pro-Arab identify from the "Arab / African Crossroads" image advocated by Abdallahi. Reporting in other channels has suggested the delivery of at least one shipment of small arms to FNDD militants. While potentially significant, we have too few data points at present to judge this a serious short-term risk. End Comment. HANKINS