MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI -- A VERY LONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000723 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI -- A VERY LONG TERM STRATEGY Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Abdallahi has restated his absolute rejection of negotiations with the Mauritanian military but expressed a realistic view of American capacity to bring others around to the U.S. policy approach -- a "standard" for others to compare themselves to. Abdallahi also recognizes that sanctions have limited practical effect but still sees their POLITICAL and psychological utility. Ultimately, he sees General Aziz as his own worse enemy -- bound for failure by the pattern of governance he has already established. Abdallahi and his FNDD will help push the process, but are waiting for Aziz to fail. End Summary ¶2. (C) Meeting with the President: Charge met December 9 for four hours with President Abdallahi in his home village of Lemden where he remains under house arrest. Abdallahi's Chief of Staff Mohammed Kaber Ould Hammoudi and the President's son, Mohamed, and daughter, Amal, sat in at various parts of the meeting. Security around the President's village was significantly less present than during the Charge's previous visit with no security officials registering the visit as before. (Comment: The assumption is the regime has established more discreet monitoring.) The President was fit but appeared more fatigued than before. In is starting to express a certain nostalgia about his time in office and has a habit now of speaking about himself in the third-person (i.e. "When the Head of State met with so and so....") that was not noted in previous meetings. When asked how he was doing, his daughter confirmed he was good mentally and physically but, concerning his morale, said "some days we get up full of hope, but other times it seems so depressing." From conversation, it was clear Abdallahi continues to see a steady stream of supporters but it appears there has been no effort to reach out to rivals who might have some limited shared interests like opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah and former coup leader/head of state Col. Vall. The tendency to cocoon himself from divergent Mauritanian voices was seen in Abdallahi's increasing acceptance of some of the FNDD conspiracy theories -- for instance the idea that the December 24, 2007, AQIM murder of French tourists near Aleg was orchestrated by General Aziz. ¶3. (C) A Restatement of policy: Abdallahi reviewed his meeting of December 7 with the multiagency delegation headed by the African Union's representative to the European Union. As with the previous French delegation, Abdallahi said the AU-led delegation offered no proposals but asked to hear his viewpoint. Abdallahi first approached the idea being pushed by Aziz that Abdallahi had accomplished nothing during his time in office. The President noted the significant increase in press freedoms, POLITICAL freedoms and national unity issues (slavery and return of refugees) accomplished during his time in office. On the economic front he highlighted the significant increase in fiscal transparency that had reforged relations with the World Bank and IMF. His Government's well-considered development plan had garnered strong donor support at the December 2007 donors conference. Abdallahi told the delegation, "If there were any failures, they were failures of execution. Not of ideas or good will." Abdallahi saw the coup d'etat as a terrible step backward for Mauritania with Aziz no only taking over the Presidency but manipulating all branches of government to consolidate power. The President told the Charge his bottom line position remains unchanged, " I can't imagine any participation in any negotiation with General Aziz since that only legitimizes him. The only discussion I'll have with him is about the details of his departure. Once constitutional order is re-established, with my return, I'll engage in any POLITICAL discussion needed." Abdallahi dismissed Aziz' talk of National Dialogue saying all Aziz wanted was a controlled theater that would make some "cosmetic changes" to the status quo and then arrange for Aziz to take "legitimate" power. ¶4. (C) Role of the international community: Charge reviewed with President Abdallahi the position forwarded by the AU-led delegation which, in the U.S. view, was too weak in entering with an idea of anticipated elections (suggesting Abdallahi's NOUAKCHOTT 00000723 002 OF 004 resignation has a precondition) and its apparent acceptance of Aziz' "National Dialogue" as a template for getting "the people's will." Charge told Abdallahi that the AU Chief, just as the French Ambassador previously when he represented the EU delegation, may have had a tougher organizational/national view than that presented but that they were constrained by the need to present a "common view." Abdallahi, noting that neither the UN nor EC representative spoke during the meeting, said he fully understood that some of the groups had tougher views than those presented. He noted he was satisfied with the position of the AU's Lamamra. He had found strong support from the Secretary General of the Francophonie Abdou Diouf who had called from Cairo -- saying he had just complained to the Arab League's Amr Mussa for allowing Aziz to be invited to a Arab economic meeting in Kuwait in February (a meeting Mussa said was strictly a Kuwaiti affair). Abdallahi said he had also been called by OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu with a strong message of support. Abdallahi saw the international community weakening somewhat on the details but still strong in condemnation of the coup. He told Charge he did not see a role for the international community to serve as a mediator to find a solution to the crisis but to look at their rules to determine whether the coup required censorship or not -- through sanctions, expulsion or other tools available. He thought that even European countries that were backpedaling could not get past the fact that the coup is unacceptable under their own guidelines. ¶5. (C) The U.S. Position: Abdallahi started his meeting with Charge saying, "What is truly amazing is the change of Mauritanian attitudes (suggesting of his own as well) concerning the United States. Prior to the coup we saw the U.S. as a super power mainly interested in its own narrow needs and not necessarily as a defender of democracy." Abdallahi acknowledged that the U.S. influence over the various organizations looking at Mauritania or over bilateral partners like France and Spain was, while important, still limited. That said, he praised the U.S. for maintaining "the most clear, consistent and principled" position through the coup. Even if the U.S. could not bring others to the same policy stand, Abdallahi said the U.S. "sets the standard against which the others will compare themselves" suggesting that in that comparison, the rest of the international community will find itself lacking. ¶6. (C) The French: Abdallahi told Charge he was most concerned about the staying power of the French. He appreciated the personal interest of President Sarkozy and marveled that the French leader still seemed to reserve some attention for Mauritania despite his many national and EU-Presidency commitments. He said, though, he found the late November presentation by French envoy Romain Serman as disingenuous. He noted he could not get a straight answer on whether the French supported his return or not and, if not, what their current policy was. He noted the French Ambassador, in meetings with FNDD leaders, would often stray far from the Elysee position only to then say, "Of course, this is only my personal position." Abdallahi noted a recent interview with Foreign Minister Kouchner where, despite three very direct questions, he danced away from answering whether, for the French, "return to constitutional order" included the return of the President. Abdallahi pressed the Charge on why the Europeans had "so quickly abandoned their principles." Charge noted that some, like the Spanish, are straightforward in highlighting their perception that the military, despite the lamentable coup, offer the best assurance of stability and control of drugs, boat people and terrorism. Charge noted some had also picked up on a theme sadly heard too often among Mauritanians themselves that the country was perhaps too immature to be ready for democracy. Finally, Charge noted that Mauritania remains a second-level issue in Africa compared to Darfur, Zimbabwe, and Congo. Abdallahi completed the analysis that on the global stage, then, Mauritania was an issue of only the third or fourth order. ¶7. (C) The African Union: Despite the relatively weak presentation by the AU-led delegation, Abdallahi said he still had confidence the African Union was prepared to take NOUAKCHOTT 00000723 003 OF 004 serious steps. He was also aware Algeria will have the rotating presidency of the AU's PSC in January which will enhance the chance of strong measures which he understood to be exclusion of Mauritania from all AU meetings and diplomatic isolation. He wants to see the Africans recommend United Nations Security Council Chapter 7 sanctions. ¶8. (C) The Power of Sanctions: The President told Charge he was aware the effective impact of sanctions would be limited on the Generals who generally don't travel much, have limited assets outside of Mauritania, and are in it more for real power than the trappings of power. He saw European sanctions as having the most direct effect but accepted the Charge's point that, once announced, the regime could probably figure out how to get around financial sanctions -- they will, however, miss their trips to Paris and the Canary Islands. Abdallahi also recognized that the idea of Chapter 7 Security Council sanctions was a long shot and, at best, a process needing at least a year of UNSC deliberations. That said, the President highlighted the usefulness of sanctions for their POLITICAL and psychological effectiveness saying, "No head-of-state wants to be excluded, and the idea of sanctions keeps them nervous." In sum, Abdallahi did not see sanctions as the means to topple the regime but a steady form of pressure and condemnation. ¶9. (C) Africa's Aung San Suu Kyi? Abdallahi said the AU-led delegation had ended their meeting with two observations from their meeting: (a) That the positions between the two sides (Abdallahi and Aziz) are very far apart and frozen leaving no room for negotiations between the two. and (b) that Abdallahi supports targeted sanctions but recognizes their limited utility. Abdallahi said he agreed with both points. Charge asked whether he was prepared to be an African equivalent of Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi who had been under house arrest for some 19 years -- resting in opposition to a coup that had always and consistently been condemned by the international community all the while rejecting many "deals" that had been offered. Abdallahi said he didn't know all the details of Burmese politics but, in principle, "yes" he was prepared to play that role -- not for himself, but for Mauritanian democracy. That said, he didn't believe he had to wait that long. ¶10. (C) Aziz is Aziz' Own Worst Enemy: Abdallahi told Charge he did not believe it would be either international sanctions or the internal resistance of the FNDD that will ultimately dislodge Aziz -- his fall will be of his own making. Abdallahi saw the seeds of Aziz failure already. He knew the coup was driven primarily by Aziz himself with "most of the twelve members of the High State Council only hearing about the idea after they had already been named." Despite Aziz' efforts to implicate everyone else in supporting the coup, Abdallahi still believes most of the military leadership does not support him. Of those close to Aziz, Abdallahi had different views. He noted Ghazwany was "well educated and sophisticated" compared to Aziz and had, prior to the coup, apologized to Abdallahi for Aziz' actions. He noted , "Some believe he is well intentioned and believes he can moderate Aziz by sticking close -- others think he is weak and afraid. I would like to think the former but probably it's the latter." As for Hady, Abdallahi said, "he is someone who will kill for power." Abdallahi saw that Aziz will become more and more radical and isolated as he tries to hang on, eventually inviting someone to push him out. He saw Aziz as openly bolstering his small Ould Bousba tribe over others and in open warfare with significant tribes such as the Smassid that will engender the resistance of those not tied to his tribe. He also saw that Aziz would block previous progress on slavery issues and the return of refugees generating enmity of Afro-Mauritanians and Black Moors. He did not believe Aziz has the charisma or vision to garner public support once the money runs out -- which will be soon. Abdallahi recognizes it is hard to guess how the end will come -- whether those around Aziz will force him out or whether there will be a coup. His hope is that those who are disaffected will gradually rally back to the FNDD as the path that gets Mauritania back on the track to legitimacy. Abdallahi conceded the Charge's point that it could also lead NOUAKCHOTT 00000723 004 OF 004 to another bloodier coup or in Aziz dropping all pretext and ruling as a tyrant. ¶11. (C) Torture: Abdallahi raised the recent Amnesty International report on torture in Mauritania. He said that soon after coming to office he had ordered that torture not be used in interrogation. Ghazwany told him, "I will not hide the fact that torture was used in the past but we will respect your wishes." Abdallahi believed they were true to their word particularly after the debacle of the high court decision to release suspected terrorists in June 2007. Abdallahi said, "the military knows I was very unhappy with that decision but the only option we had was to appeal. At that point I found repeated military resistance to cooperate with the Justice Ministry" and found they could not mount an effective appeal. Abdallahi thought Hady was capable of ordering torture despite his orders. ¶12. (C) Comment: Charge's concern coming into the meeting was that those close to Abdallahi were placing too much emphasis on the U.S. position as the vehicle to bring President Abdallahi back to power -- perhaps serving as a disservice in closing off the possibility of dialogue. The meeting demonstrated that Abdallahi has a clear appreciation of just how much the U.S. position can deliver and is making a calculated strategy option for the long haul. His position will not allow for mediation and suggests an extended crisis (as opposed to what Abdallahi would see as some type of "Band-Aid" solution that would just doom Mauritania to a continued cycle of coups). In waiting for Aziz' house of cards to collapse there are obvious risks -- the risk that Aziz will still manage to consolidate power and, perhaps the more dangerous option, that the collapse will be sudden and go in an unexpected and bloody direction. Abdallahi, for one, thinks a steady hand of pressure internal and external and Aziz' own weaknesses will bring Mauritania back to democracy. If Aziz were to depart, one senses Abdallahi would not particularly care whether he or someone else resumes democratic leadership. End Comment. HANKINS