A DAY WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000681 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: A DAY WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 1..(C) Summary: President Abdallahi sees the United States as the strongest friend of Mauritanian democracy. He sees the current crisis in stark freedom vs. force terms and is planning for the long haul of increased international and domestic pressure on the regime rather than a negotiated settlement involving the military. Abdallahi believes there is no fundamental political crisis if the military is prevented from manipulating the political process -- he is prepared to call for early elections if he finds the political crisis is deeper than he understands it. The President fired the generals "90% sure" they would stage a coup which he saw as the best option compared to further military manipulation or a coup at the time and manner of their choosing. Abdallahi expects to have outside contact for only a limited period before Aziz shuts him off again. ¶2. (C) The Visit: Charge met for nearly four hours on November 17 with Mauritanian President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi in the President's home village of Lemden where he remains under military house arrest. Lemden is a three-hour drive from Nouakchott -- the last 20 miles over a single track dirt road. While not permitted to leave the village, Abdallahi has been receiving a steady stream of visitors as well as his family. Security is light with two uniformed policemen and approximately 18 other military from the provincial garrison who stay out of sight for most of the day. Charge was not impeded in meeting with the President. ¶3. (C) Thank You President Bush: The President told Charge he was pleased to receive him a day prior to the visit of European Ambassadors because he considered the United States Mauritania's closest friend since the coup having maintained a resolute and principled position in support of democracy. We wanted to express his personal thanks to President Bush for his continuing support and asked Charge if it would be possible to speak with the President in coming days to personally convey his gratitude. ¶4. (C) In For The Long Haul: President Abdallahi sees the current crisis in stark terms as a war between liberty and force. He gave no indication of looking for an exit strategy involving any type of negotiation with the military saying that acceptance of the High State Council's much-touted National Dialogue on Democracy leading to early elections would only legitimize the coup leading to more military meddling in the future not just in Mauritania but in the rest of the region. The President said, "I will continue to consider myself the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania until I either complete my mandate or am told by the Mauritanian people that they no longer want me." The President said General Aziz has miscalculated both international and domestic reaction to the coup and, in his view, is increasingly isolated. Abdallahi saw domestic rejection of the coup reflecting the long term evolution for Mauritanian society that was gradually undermining the ability of the so-called "notables" to control the people's votes -- leaving a democratic process that reflects far more independent choice than the past. "If the 'notables' were still firmly in control, there would have been no opposition and the military would have succeeded as they did in the past." Abdallahi saw Aziz as having gained in the short-term by the global drop in oil and food prices allowing" him to say he is "making life better for the Mauritanian people" (just as Abdallahi had struggled to deliver the benefits of democracy to the people just as global prices skyrocketed) but he did not see Aziz being able to sustain that populist position. Continued and increased international pressure coupled with sustained domestic resistance will, in the long term, force Aziz and the military out of politics. ¶5. (C) A Review of the International Position: At the President's request, Charge provided a blunt evaluation of the international position relative to the coup. The United States is somewhat isolated in stipulating that the President's return to office is needed for the return to constitutional order. The Addis Ababa Communique, while very useful in pulling together a common position between the AU, NOUAKCHOTT 00000681 002 OF 004 EU, and Arab League condemning the coup and recognizing President Abdallahi as the legitimate President of Mauritania had not called for his return to office -- only for his full participation befitting his status in the political dialogue. Charge noted that most of the international community was prepared to take a "pragmatic" approach that did not necessarily include the President's return to office. The Europeans, in particular, do not want to see "better be the enemy of good" and want to work with what they have available -- seeing the U.S. as somewhat naive or principled to the point of being counterproductive. As opposed to others, the U.S. has few practical interests in Mauritania (no business presence, few citizens, no direct impact from transnational crime) that makes it easier for us to take a principled stand -- linking Mauritania more to global priorities of democracy in the region as well as anti-extremism. Charge suggested the President's detention and inability to communicate for nearly 100 days had certainly weakened his stature internationally and, more importantly, domestically. As a result, the "NiNi" option of neither Abdallahi nor Aziz seemed the predominant theme with Mauritanians and, privately and occasionally publicly, with international partners. Charge noted that the President had the opportunity now that he can communicate with the outside world and, to an extent, with the Mauritanian people to restore his credibility and presence as President. If he fails to present a vision of the future and to make clear the differences between him and the other options, Charge offered he might not be able to transition from being President in name only to regaining the effective leadership of his country. The President asked for the Charge's reading of several countries: -- Spain: Clearly driven by practical concerns of illegal immigration and drug trafficking and willing to try to soften the international community's position particularly in the EU and NATO. Ultimately needs to follow the EU position. Abdallahi noted the involvement of some military in the drug trade made Spain's policy decision ultimately self-defeating. -- France: Strong U.S. - French coordination on Mauritania with President Sarkozy personally leading a principled stance despite numerous "pragmatic" strains throughout the French bureaucracy. Abdallahi raised concerns about the French Ambassador being interested in "cutting a deal" to get past the impasse. -- Germany: Charge noted that while Germany had no close attachment to Mauritania, they would be representing the EU for the Czech Presidency after January 1. Charge suggested Abdallahi renew his contacts with the German President who had previously visited Mauritania when the President was in office. -- Libya: Charge noted the regime had already sent two delegations to Tripoli to win Libyan backing (even though they had criticized Abdallahi with us for having paid too many visits to Libya). Difficult to read Libyan intent but widely understood they were tying recognition of the regime to ending Mauritania's ties to Israel. Abdallahi said that regardless of what Qadaffi might do privately, he did not see the Libyans publicly recognizing the regime since that would complicate Libya's broader objective of leadership within the African Union. -- Gulf States: Abdallahi noted his personal friendship with the Emirs of Kuwait and Qatar but did not see them being truly committed to supporting democracy if it meant isolating an Arab state. ¶6. (C) Short Time Out: The President told Charge he expected he would only have a short period of relatively free communication. The High State Council's Secretary General had already warned the FNDD leadership that General Aziz was upset about President Abdallahi's public statements and that, if he did not shut up, he would be moved again to some very isolated internal location where he would be unable to communicate. The President thought Aziz would likely move him again after the African Union's November 21 meeting unless the EU and AU took his transfer as a sign of "progress." He said he was prepared to again be placed incommunicado but would take the limited time available to shore up contacts with international partners, set out his positions to the public and media, and try to get some long-term administrative systems in place. On the final NOUAKCHOTT 00000681 003 OF 004 point, he wanted to reiterate that we still sees his Ambassador in Washington (Ambassador Dia) as his representative (Charge assured him the U.S. still considers him as such). The President then asked that any Mauritanian Government accounts in the U.S. be frozen and, if possible, that Ambassador Dia be able to access those accounts to support his government's international activities. Charge confirmed our understanding that there was an account with several million dollars in the U.S. federal reserve system that could be blocked but said he was unsure whether arrangements could be made to make them available to his designee. ¶7. (C) Provoking the Coup: The President reviewed some of the events leading up to the coup saying that when he fired the Generals the night of August 5 he was "90% sure they would launch a coup." Abdallahi said he had misread Aziz before and after the coup thinking he would be able to reach an accommodation with him whereby Aziz would have free rein on security matters while Abdallahi took the lead in the political realm. Despite constant warnings from his advisors, he said it was only in April that he fully understood the degree to which Aziz was manipulating the political system to create instability with the intent of forcing early elections in which Aziz would be able to take over. By August, he had reached the end of all possible appeasement with the military and saw them planning a coup (constitutional or otherwise) is the very near future. Abdallahi fired the generals saying "if they were no longer generals for even 24 hours the rest of the military would have forgotten them" but recognizing the likelier result was a coup -- but not one of the time and manner of their choosing. ¶8. (C) No Political Crisis: The President saw the High State Council's call for a National Dialogue on Democracy as a charade to again allow them to manipulate the political process. He said, "I am convinced that if the military was no longer manipulating things behind the scenes there would no longer be a 'political crisis' in Mauritania." He said his own experience when he had worked directly with parliamentary rivals was that he could find common ground -- although he often found the military undermining his efforts afterward. In a review of the political events prior to the coup, Abdallahi said he had resisted the second censure motion because he saw it not as a censure motion against Prime Minister Waghef (who was still putting together is government) but against the President. He had been prepared to dissolve parliament under those circumstances to force new elections saying, "if I had one a majority the problem would have been resolved but, if the voters came back with a majority against me, I probably would have resigned rather than try to deal with a cohabitation arrangement." Abdallahi said "IF I ever return to office with the military no longer engaged in politics, I don't believe there will be the political strife of the past. If I misread the problem, I would then most likely call for early elections." ¶9. (C) The Military: The President asked for the Charge's evaluation of the military. Charge noted there were some signs of discontent within the High State Council but nobody seemed prepared yet to confront Aziz directly. Charge added there had been reports of significant discontent in the rand and file following the Tourine attack as soldiers has seen their compatriots killed through a combination of poor equipment, training, and guidance from the highest military levels. Abdallahi asked specifically about Ghazwany noting that before the coup he had found him the smarter and more capable of the two generals and confiding that Ghazwany had apologized for Aziz's excesses prior to the coup. Charge noted that Ghazwany could be key in rallying support away from Aziz but that he still seemed to attached to the senior General -- even though Ghazwany seems to have lost some access and influence in resent months. Charge did note the need to support the military in their proper role and suggested Abdallahi address the military directly to morn their losses in Tourine and assure them he would see to it that they are trained and equipped for their legitimate missions if they respect the democratic role of a modern military. NOUAKCHOTT 00000681 004 OF 004 HANKINS