C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000659

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THE REGIME'S "FOREIGN MINISTER"

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 640

B. USUN 986

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and
d)


1. (C) Summary: Regime "Foreign Minister" Ould Mohamedou
claims the High State Council wants to find a solution that
will restore constitutionality and maintain stability. The
Regime will "put something concrete on the table" at the
November 10 African Union meeting in Addis Ababa. The regime
cannot understand how the U.S. can assume its position in
light of the serious terrorist threat facing Mauritania. The
details of what will be presented in coming weeks fall well
short of restoration of constitutional order. End Summary

The Pitch
--------------


2. (C) Something Real on the Table: Charge used a November
9 with the regime's Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Ould
Mohamedou on a consular matter to follow up on the REFTEL B
Mauritanian demarche on U.S. PermRep Ambassador Khalilzad
asking for a political dialogue with the U.S. Ould Mohamedou
said "the generals are looking for an exit that will meet
international, including American, demands for
constitutionality while preserving order." He indicated he
was actively involved in a subgroup looking at the political
situation with Ould Mohamedou pushing for a rapid transition.
The "Foreign Minister" admitted that the October 20 meeting
with the European Union was "doomed from the start because we
had not let Abdallahi free and brought nothing to the table."
He recognized that the lack of any gesture on the part of
the regime had left "our friends like Spain" with no way to
push a "cooperative agenda." Ould Mohamedou also recognized
that the second meeting with the African Union's Lamamra had
gone very poorly leading to the AU PSC's October 6 ultimatum
-- although he blamed Lamamra for going beyond his brief and
acting unprofessionally during his second visit to
Nouakchott. Having recognized the tactical mistakes of the
past, Ould Mohamedou argued that they were going into
Monday's AU meeting with something concrete that addressed
international demands. He said, "we have been working with
the AU and have gotten past our problems with Lamamra." He

also indicated that regime representatives were meeting
November 9 with Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa to
ensure that the Addis Ababa meeting was fruitful. Ould
Mohamedou said that he believed his visit to Dar-es-Salaam to
meet AU Chairman Kikwete had been useful. "To his credit,
Kikwete gave a strong democracy line, but he admitted all he
knew about Mauritania was after August 6 -- I had a chance to
explain everything that had happened before" suggesting the
condemnation seen in the Tanzanian press did not reflect the
tone of the meeting.


3. (C) The Plan: Ould Mohamedou outlined the regime's
proposal as focused primarily still on the "National
Dialogue" plan presented to the EU but with several
revisions: (a) "no taboos" allowing conversation on any and
all subjects, (b) "everyone invited" including the FNDD with
President Abdallahi being released in advance and being able
to participate, (c) a military commitment to abide by
whatever comes from the meeting. Ould Mohamedou insisted the
regime wanted the meeting to involve all political and social
forces and truly reflect Mauritanian consensus arguing, "If
Aziz wasn't interested in a real political solution he would
have just launched a classic coup." The "Foreign Minister"
suggested Aziz had rejected urging by pro-coup
parliamentarians to fundamentally revise the constitution
during the "emergency session" because he didn't want it to
look like he had "loaded the dice" for a future campaign.
While saying the final decision needed to come from National
Dialogue, his own lobbying was for a "very short" transition
to new elections. He saw two options for the transition: (a)
the High State Council stays in place in its current "policy"
role but with firm guarantees not to influence the elections,
or (b) some type of interim arrangement is created without
the military -- but this option is "more difficult" because
it could create political fissures and risk stability.
Charge noted he did not cite an Option C -- following the

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constitution that would have the President of the Senate
serve as an interim president. Ould Mohamedou said that was
"a problem of a personality" citing not the President of the
Senate's race but the fact that he had "opposed the will of
the majority of his institution."


4. (C) We Can't Understand The American Position: Ould
Mohamedou said the military leadership could not understand
why the U.S. continued to work so hard against them when the
risk of instability is so great. "We understand you have to
take some public stand against coups on principle," but
argued that the Abdallahi government was heading Mauritania
down the path to civil war, a weakened military, and
radicalization that Al Qaeda could exploit. He cited the
bloody September 15 Al Qaeda attack in Tourine as evidence
the country could easily destabilize if the regime does not
keep a strong hand in maintaining order. Ould Mohamedou
argued Mauritania's "friends" understood the risk citing
specifically the Arab League and Spain. He suggested Paris
was not entirely a failure because there was some sign of
moderation from the French adding, "There are two wings in
the French, the hard line led by Sarkozy and the
'cooperative' line of the political-military bureaucracy."
Charge noted, "Too bad for you the hard line is the elected
President of France."


The Response
--------------


5. (C) You Picked the Wrong Side: Charge told Ould
Mohamedou we had enjoyed working with him when he arrived
during the summer as the director of the MFA International
Organizations Directorate -- he is smart and compelling but,
in this case, he had picked the wrong team. Charge noted the
lack of any serious effort on the part of the regime to
address the fundamental democratic problems posed by the
coup. Just prior to the October 20 meeting in Paris, we had
sent a message that had gone through Ould Mohamedou that
allowing the FNDD leadership to meet with President Abdallahi
would have been some sign of seriousness behind the pre-Paris
flurry of "outreach" to the FNDD. That message had been
ignored although Ould Mohamedou added "we did let him meet
civil society." Charge told Ould Mohamedou, "we think you
are losing" noting that their diplomatic outreach seemed only
to harden the international position against them, that the
"80 percent of the Mauritanian people" the junta claims
support them are rapidly shifting away from the regime (with
the expectation the Senate will reconvene with an anti-coup
majority coalition), and that the state coffers the regime
has been able to divert to support the coup ares both running
out and in the process undermining international investor
confidence. Charge noted last week's appointment of General
Aziz' cousin as head of the Central Bank as a clear
indication that the internal financial controls developed
over the years are going to be ignored and that Aziz' pledge
to stamp out clientelism was a bunch of hooey. Charge noted
we recognized there were some talented and, we believed,
committed members of the Laghdaf "government" but we simply
could not understand how modern, western-oriented
professionals like Ould Mohamedou could defend a military
regime with a straight face. Charge stressed that one of the
reasons the U.S. is responding so strongly against the coup
is that, unlike the situation in 2005, Mauritania has taken
on an importance greater than itself -- Mauritania was
heralded as a test case for democracy in Africa and Arab
world so a military putsch becomes a challenge not only to
our bilateral policy but to larger regional interests.


6. (C) Nothing New There: Charge told Ould Mohamedou there
didn't seem anything new in what he was describing as the new
and improved proposal for Addis Ababa. Any "National
Dialogue" held under the auspices and control of a military
junta and its appointed "government" can have no credibility.
Discussion of solemn pledges of non-interference by the
military during a political transition can't be believed --
"You tried that in 2005 and maybe we fell for it, but you
can't play that movie again." Charge noted that in his
30-minute discourse on the "government's" position, Ould
Mohamedou had not once mentioned "Prime Minister" Laghdaf.

NOUAKCHOTT 00000659 003 OF 003


Instead, Ould Mohamedou had made clear that "President" Aziz
was calling the shots on all things political and diplomatic.
The military argument we have heard that "we put Abdallahi
in office so we can take him out" is the height of cynicism
and certainly not the basis to believe the military will
REALLY be democratic the second time around. Charge
suggested that failure to answer the basic questions posed by
the international community (the same ones they heard in
Paris) will only make the situation worse for them in Addis
Ababa and inexorably take them closer and closer to the
Security Council. Charge recommended Ould Mohamedou look at
the fate of countries the Security Council becomes "seized
of" -- whether over months or years, countries that defy the
Security Council inevitably face sanctions.


7. (C) Democracy is our Counterterrorism Strategy: Charge
told Ould Mohamedou the U.S. saw no disconnect between our
insistence on the return to democracy and the terrorist
threat. He noted that we had been working with the
Mauritanian military before the coup on "hard"
counterterrorism and had been impressed by Aziz and others as
military and security chiefs. That said, Aziz had emphasized
and Abdallahi confirmed that "everything security goes
through Aziz" so any success or failure in that realm falls
on Aziz -- Abdallahi is not responsible for Tourine, that
falls (if on anyone) on Aziz. Post coup we continue to
cooperate with the military and security services against
credible and actionable threat information. Charge stressed
that "hard" counterterrorism against Al Qaeda forces was only
one of our terrorism concerns -- internal radicalization of
Mauritanian society was our greater long-term concern.
Charge noted that studies we had done with the Mauritanians
themselves highlighted that Mauritanians with an ideological
attraction to Al Qaeda often have great disillusionment with
their government's corruption and clanism. The Mauritanians
seen killing the French in Aleg were not suddenly radicalized
by Abdallahi but turned away from their society over years if
not decades -- a period when the military called the shots in
Mauritania. The Abdallahi democracy, while imperfect, was
the first step in reversing the people's disillusionment with
their government. We see no way that a military regime can
reverse radicalization; therefore, our security interests are
best served by democracy.


8. (C) Comment: Ould Mohamedou is related to General Aziz
but insists he got his position on merit. There are not many
former Mauritanian Harvard lecturers around, so he may be
right. His implicit criticism of the way the regime went
into Paris and negatively personalized the relationship with
Lamamra suggests he is now trying to get a better handle on
the regime's diplomatic messaging and, by implication,
previously had to follow what Aziz said. For all the tough
messages he received, the comment that democracy supports
counterterrorism drew his greatest attention with him saying
he had not heard that analysis before. He also conceded that
"nomadic politics" means that the regime no longer has the
vast majority of support it trumpeted in the past. Ould
Mohamedou can be a good diplomat and he didn't get off his
talking points (he noted he had cleared the meeting and his
approach with Aziz in advance) but he doesn't seem entirely
committed to what he says. He is embedding himself into
potential transitions scenarios going beyond his foreign
affairs portfolio. As a long term academic, he seems to be
relishing his time in the limelight as an operator and would
likely want to be seen as someone who can deliver a deal.
HANKINS