MEETING WITH THE REGIME'S "FOREIGN MINISTER"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000659 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THE REGIME'S "FOREIGN MINISTER" REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 640 ¶B. USUN 986 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Regime "Foreign Minister" Ould Mohamedou claims the High State Council wants to find a solution that will restore constitutionality and maintain stability. The Regime will "put something concrete on the table" at the November 10 African Union meeting in Addis Ababa. The regime cannot understand how the U.S. can assume its position in light of the serious terrorist threat facing Mauritania. The details of what will be presented in coming weeks fall well short of restoration of constitutional order. End Summary The Pitch -------------- ¶2. (C) Something Real on the Table: Charge used a November 9 with the regime's Foreign Minister Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou on a consular matter to follow up on the REFTEL B Mauritanian demarche on U.S. PermRep Ambassador Khalilzad asking for a political dialogue with the U.S. Ould Mohamedou said "the generals are looking for an exit that will meet international, including American, demands for constitutionality while preserving order." He indicated he was actively involved in a subgroup looking at the political situation with Ould Mohamedou pushing for a rapid transition. The "Foreign Minister" admitted that the October 20 meeting with the European Union was "doomed from the start because we had not let Abdallahi free and brought nothing to the table." He recognized that the lack of any gesture on the part of the regime had left "our friends like Spain" with no way to push a "cooperative agenda." Ould Mohamedou also recognized that the second meeting with the African Union's Lamamra had gone very poorly leading to the AU PSC's October 6 ultimatum -- although he blamed Lamamra for going beyond his brief and acting unprofessionally during his second visit to Nouakchott. Having recognized the tactical mistakes of the past, Ould Mohamedou argued that they were going into Monday's AU meeting with something concrete that addressed international demands. He said, "we have been working with the AU and have gotten past our problems with Lamamra." He also indicated that regime representatives were meeting November 9 with Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa to ensure that the Addis Ababa meeting was fruitful. Ould Mohamedou said that he believed his visit to Dar-es-Salaam to meet AU Chairman Kikwete had been useful. "To his credit, Kikwete gave a strong democracy line, but he admitted all he knew about Mauritania was after August 6 -- I had a chance to explain everything that had happened before" suggesting the condemnation seen in the Tanzanian press did not reflect the tone of the meeting. ¶3. (C) The Plan: Ould Mohamedou outlined the regime's proposal as focused primarily still on the "National Dialogue" plan presented to the EU but with several revisions: (a) "no taboos" allowing conversation on any and all subjects, (b) "everyone invited" including the FNDD with President Abdallahi being released in advance and being able to participate, (c) a military commitment to abide by whatever comes from the meeting. Ould Mohamedou insisted the regime wanted the meeting to involve all political and social forces and truly reflect Mauritanian consensus arguing, "If Aziz wasn't interested in a real political solution he would have just launched a classic coup." The "Foreign Minister" suggested Aziz had rejected urging by pro-coup parliamentarians to fundamentally revise the constitution during the "emergency session" because he didn't want it to look like he had "loaded the dice" for a future campaign. While saying the final decision needed to come from National Dialogue, his own lobbying was for a "very short" transition to new elections. He saw two options for the transition: (a) the High State Council stays in place in its current "policy" role but with firm guarantees not to influence the elections, or (b) some type of interim arrangement is created without the military -- but this option is "more difficult" because it could create political fissures and risk stability. Charge noted he did not cite an Option C -- following the NOUAKCHOTT 00000659 002 OF 003 constitution that would have the President of the Senate serve as an interim president. Ould Mohamedou said that was "a problem of a personality" citing not the President of the Senate's race but the fact that he had "opposed the will of the majority of his institution." ¶4. (C) We Can't Understand The American Position: Ould Mohamedou said the military leadership could not understand why the U.S. continued to work so hard against them when the risk of instability is so great. "We understand you have to take some public stand against coups on principle," but argued that the Abdallahi government was heading Mauritania down the path to civil war, a weakened military, and radicalization that Al Qaeda could exploit. He cited the bloody September 15 Al Qaeda attack in Tourine as evidence the country could easily destabilize if the regime does not keep a strong hand in maintaining order. Ould Mohamedou argued Mauritania's "friends" understood the risk citing specifically the Arab League and Spain. He suggested Paris was not entirely a failure because there was some sign of moderation from the French adding, "There are two wings in the French, the hard line led by Sarkozy and the 'cooperative' line of the political-military bureaucracy." Charge noted, "Too bad for you the hard line is the elected President of France." The Response -------------- ¶5. (C) You Picked the Wrong Side: Charge told Ould Mohamedou we had enjoyed working with him when he arrived during the summer as the director of the MFA International Organizations Directorate -- he is smart and compelling but, in this case, he had picked the wrong team. Charge noted the lack of any serious effort on the part of the regime to address the fundamental democratic problems posed by the coup. Just prior to the October 20 meeting in Paris, we had sent a message that had gone through Ould Mohamedou that allowing the FNDD leadership to meet with President Abdallahi would have been some sign of seriousness behind the pre-Paris flurry of "outreach" to the FNDD. That message had been ignored although Ould Mohamedou added "we did let him meet civil society." Charge told Ould Mohamedou, "we think you are losing" noting that their diplomatic outreach seemed only to harden the international position against them, that the "80 percent of the Mauritanian people" the junta claims support them are rapidly shifting away from the regime (with the expectation the Senate will reconvene with an anti-coup majority coalition),and that the state coffers the regime has been able to divert to support the coup ares both running out and in the process undermining international investor confidence. Charge noted last week's appointment of General Aziz' cousin as head of the Central Bank as a clear indication that the internal financial controls developed over the years are going to be ignored and that Aziz' pledge to stamp out clientelism was a bunch of hooey. Charge noted we recognized there were some talented and, we believed, committed members of the Laghdaf "government" but we simply could not understand how modern, western-oriented professionals like Ould Mohamedou could defend a military regime with a straight face. Charge stressed that one of the reasons the U.S. is responding so strongly against the coup is that, unlike the situation in 2005, Mauritania has taken on an importance greater than itself -- Mauritania was heralded as a test case for democracy in Africa and Arab world so a military putsch becomes a challenge not only to our bilateral policy but to larger regional interests. ¶6. (C) Nothing New There: Charge told Ould Mohamedou there didn't seem anything new in what he was describing as the new and improved proposal for Addis Ababa. Any "National Dialogue" held under the auspices and control of a military junta and its appointed "government" can have no credibility. Discussion of solemn pledges of non-interference by the military during a political transition can't be believed -- "You tried that in 2005 and maybe we fell for it, but you can't play that movie again." Charge noted that in his 30-minute discourse on the "government's" position, Ould Mohamedou had not once mentioned "Prime Minister" Laghdaf. NOUAKCHOTT 00000659 003 OF 003 Instead, Ould Mohamedou had made clear that "President" Aziz was calling the shots on all things political and diplomatic. The military argument we have heard that "we put Abdallahi in office so we can take him out" is the height of cynicism and certainly not the basis to believe the military will REALLY be democratic the second time around. Charge suggested that failure to answer the basic questions posed by the international community (the same ones they heard in Paris) will only make the situation worse for them in Addis Ababa and inexorably take them closer and closer to the Security Council. Charge recommended Ould Mohamedou look at the fate of countries the Security Council becomes "seized of" -- whether over months or years, countries that defy the Security Council inevitably face sanctions. ¶7. (C) Democracy is our Counterterrorism Strategy: Charge told Ould Mohamedou the U.S. saw no disconnect between our insistence on the return to democracy and the terrorist threat. He noted that we had been working with the Mauritanian military before the coup on "hard" counterterrorism and had been impressed by Aziz and others as military and security chiefs. That said, Aziz had emphasized and Abdallahi confirmed that "everything security goes through Aziz" so any success or failure in that realm falls on Aziz -- Abdallahi is not responsible for Tourine, that falls (if on anyone) on Aziz. Post coup we continue to cooperate with the military and security services against credible and actionable threat information. Charge stressed that "hard" counterterrorism against Al Qaeda forces was only one of our terrorism concerns -- internal radicalization of Mauritanian society was our greater long-term concern. Charge noted that studies we had done with the Mauritanians themselves highlighted that Mauritanians with an ideological attraction to Al Qaeda often have great disillusionment with their government's corruption and clanism. The Mauritanians seen killing the French in Aleg were not suddenly radicalized by Abdallahi but turned away from their society over years if not decades -- a period when the military called the shots in Mauritania. The Abdallahi democracy, while imperfect, was the first step in reversing the people's disillusionment with their government. We see no way that a military regime can reverse radicalization; therefore, our security interests are best served by democracy. ¶8. (C) Comment: Ould Mohamedou is related to General Aziz but insists he got his position on merit. There are not many former Mauritanian Harvard lecturers around, so he may be right. His implicit criticism of the way the regime went into Paris and negatively personalized the relationship with Lamamra suggests he is now trying to get a better handle on the regime's diplomatic messaging and, by implication, previously had to follow what Aziz said. For all the tough messages he received, the comment that democracy supports counterterrorism drew his greatest attention with him saying he had not heard that analysis before. He also conceded that "nomadic politics" means that the regime no longer has the vast majority of support it trumpeted in the past. Ould Mohamedou can be a good diplomat and he didn't get off his talking points (he noted he had cleared the meeting and his approach with Aziz in advance) but he doesn't seem entirely committed to what he says. He is embedding himself into potential transitions scenarios going beyond his foreign affairs portfolio. As a long term academic, he seems to be relishing his time in the limelight as an operator and would likely want to be seen as someone who can deliver a deal. HANKINS