Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NOUAKCHOTT633
2008-10-30 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:
MAURITANIAN - ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP SAFE -- FOR NOW
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHNK #0633 3041220 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 301220Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7777 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0266 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0595 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0273 RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000633
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN - ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP SAFE -- FOR NOW
Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000633
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN - ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP SAFE -- FOR NOW
Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (SBU) Articles in the Mauritanian Arab press on October
28 suggested that General Aziz was on the verge of severing
relations with Israel in response to "the will of the
people." Rumors within the diplomatic community suggested
that the Israeli Ambassador had been convoked by Aziz to get
the bad news.
2. (C) Charge met October 30 with Israeli Ambassador Arbel
who said the reports were wrong. He had met October 29 with
junta "Foreign Minister" Ould Mohamedou who had lobbied the
Israeli's to see that the regime "is your best option" in
terms of the long-term Mauritanian-Israeli relationship.
Ould Mahamedou told Arbel that while there was pressure being
placed on the regime to cut ties with Israel, "the General
and I like you" and the junta had no intention of cutting
ties. The "Foreign Minister" ran through the security
concerns that played in Israel's interests -- a more serious
approach to the AQIM threat from abroad and the end of
Abdallahi's appeasement strategy with radical Islamists.
Ould Mohamedou insisted that the political situation will
resolve itself soon -- "we will have a true national dialogue
and release Abdallahi sooner than you think." Arbel found
the "Foreign Minister" engaging and impressive although he
noted with concern that in his two meetings with Ould
Mohamedou there has been no note taker -- raising concern
that their conversations may not be reported through channels
or reflect an "official" position (he also noted Ould
Mohamedou did not remember important parts of their first
meeting suggesting, at minimum, a bad management style).
3. (C) Ambassador Arbel told Charge he remains under
guidance from Tel Aviv that he can only present his
credentials to President Abdallahi despite pressure from the
regime to present credentials to Aziz. Arbel arrived very
soon after the coup. He met initially with Foreign Minister
Ben Hmeida who, luckily for diplomatic purposes, stayed on
with the regime immediately following the coup and therefore
could be met as "President Abdallahi's" Foreign Minister.
Ben Hmeida had objected that Arbel's official documentation
was addressed to President Abdallahi but relented when Arbel
said that was all he was going to get. Arbel told the
Mauritanians he would be happy to meet with General Aziz but
that he would not present his credentials to him nor
acknowledge him as head of state. Arbel was not convoked by
Aziz as rumored. He indicated he did not believe the Israeli
Government would change its position -- sticking instead to
the international line.
4. (C) Charge told Arbel the U.S. saw no credibility in the
game plan being suggested by the regime. A "National
Dialogue" organized under the thumb of the High State Council
and the Laghdaf "government" could not be credible -- even
less so if President Abdallahi and his supporters were not a
full and willing partner. Charge also noted the strong U.S.
conviction that the return to constitutional order
necessarily required the return to office of President
Abdallahi and the departure of the military from any
political role -- political decisions after those conditions
are wide open, but that constitutional point of departure
must be established first. Arbel said he was aware that the
regime would be willing to use the relationship as a
bargaining chip to gain popular support or get international
funding (citing specifically Libya) or to try to get Israel
to try to pressure the U.S. to be more accommodating. He
noted, however, that the only real Israeli interest in the
Mauritanian relationship is the public value of the
relationship itself. There is no over-riding strategic value
to the relationship that Tel Aviv could not walk away from.
5. (C) Arbel noted Tel Aviv's primary focus in Mauritania is
not so much the political situation but Mission security --
with decisions on who could stay at post and who had to leave
changing week-to-week. Arbel had been pulled out for several
weeks because of security threats to be allowed back about 10
days ago. Spouses were being kept out but returned to post a
few days ago. The Israeli's are actively looking for a
better location for their chancery and residence -- one
possible chancery location is across the street from our own
location.
HANKINS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN - ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP SAFE -- FOR NOW
Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (SBU) Articles in the Mauritanian Arab press on October
28 suggested that General Aziz was on the verge of severing
relations with Israel in response to "the will of the
people." Rumors within the diplomatic community suggested
that the Israeli Ambassador had been convoked by Aziz to get
the bad news.
2. (C) Charge met October 30 with Israeli Ambassador Arbel
who said the reports were wrong. He had met October 29 with
junta "Foreign Minister" Ould Mohamedou who had lobbied the
Israeli's to see that the regime "is your best option" in
terms of the long-term Mauritanian-Israeli relationship.
Ould Mahamedou told Arbel that while there was pressure being
placed on the regime to cut ties with Israel, "the General
and I like you" and the junta had no intention of cutting
ties. The "Foreign Minister" ran through the security
concerns that played in Israel's interests -- a more serious
approach to the AQIM threat from abroad and the end of
Abdallahi's appeasement strategy with radical Islamists.
Ould Mohamedou insisted that the political situation will
resolve itself soon -- "we will have a true national dialogue
and release Abdallahi sooner than you think." Arbel found
the "Foreign Minister" engaging and impressive although he
noted with concern that in his two meetings with Ould
Mohamedou there has been no note taker -- raising concern
that their conversations may not be reported through channels
or reflect an "official" position (he also noted Ould
Mohamedou did not remember important parts of their first
meeting suggesting, at minimum, a bad management style).
3. (C) Ambassador Arbel told Charge he remains under
guidance from Tel Aviv that he can only present his
credentials to President Abdallahi despite pressure from the
regime to present credentials to Aziz. Arbel arrived very
soon after the coup. He met initially with Foreign Minister
Ben Hmeida who, luckily for diplomatic purposes, stayed on
with the regime immediately following the coup and therefore
could be met as "President Abdallahi's" Foreign Minister.
Ben Hmeida had objected that Arbel's official documentation
was addressed to President Abdallahi but relented when Arbel
said that was all he was going to get. Arbel told the
Mauritanians he would be happy to meet with General Aziz but
that he would not present his credentials to him nor
acknowledge him as head of state. Arbel was not convoked by
Aziz as rumored. He indicated he did not believe the Israeli
Government would change its position -- sticking instead to
the international line.
4. (C) Charge told Arbel the U.S. saw no credibility in the
game plan being suggested by the regime. A "National
Dialogue" organized under the thumb of the High State Council
and the Laghdaf "government" could not be credible -- even
less so if President Abdallahi and his supporters were not a
full and willing partner. Charge also noted the strong U.S.
conviction that the return to constitutional order
necessarily required the return to office of President
Abdallahi and the departure of the military from any
political role -- political decisions after those conditions
are wide open, but that constitutional point of departure
must be established first. Arbel said he was aware that the
regime would be willing to use the relationship as a
bargaining chip to gain popular support or get international
funding (citing specifically Libya) or to try to get Israel
to try to pressure the U.S. to be more accommodating. He
noted, however, that the only real Israeli interest in the
Mauritanian relationship is the public value of the
relationship itself. There is no over-riding strategic value
to the relationship that Tel Aviv could not walk away from.
5. (C) Arbel noted Tel Aviv's primary focus in Mauritania is
not so much the political situation but Mission security --
with decisions on who could stay at post and who had to leave
changing week-to-week. Arbel had been pulled out for several
weeks because of security threats to be allowed back about 10
days ago. Spouses were being kept out but returned to post a
few days ago. The Israeli's are actively looking for a
better location for their chancery and residence -- one
possible chancery location is across the street from our own
location.
HANKINS