DIPLOMATIC DISCORD ON NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000627 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV EU MR SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC DISCORD ON NEXT STEPS Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The first "UNDP Group" meeting following the failure of the October 20 Paris talks highlighted substantial difference between Western missions on the way forward -- centered primarily on the definition of what a "return to constitutional order" means in practical terms. European ambassadors generally find the U.S. "principled" position utopian and, in the long term, counter-productive. The U.S. (with the support of the EC rep) counter that overt efforts to compromise with the military undermine our democratic message and will ultimately lead to a long-term solution that moves Mauritania and the region backward. Everyone agrees that the lack of a unified position within the international community undermines efforts to reach an acceptable resolution to the crisis. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) The UNDP Group: Charge met October 26 with the "UNDP Group" -- the Western Group that has met regularly since the coup that includes the U.S., French, Spanish and German Missions, the European Commission and UNDP Representatives, and the IMF and World Bank representatives. This was the first meeting in over two weeks and the first in some time where all three European ambassadors were present. Meetings are held at UNDP, hence, the group's name. ¶3. (C) Paris Meeting Readout: The French Ambassador and European Commission Representative opened the meeting with a readout of the October 20 EU-Mauritanian Article 96 Consultation they had both attended in Paris. Both expressed their dismay that the regime had come to the meeting with absolutely nothing new terming the presentations made by "Prime Minister" Laghdaf and "Foreign Minister" Ould Mohamedou as "Stalinist" in their rigidity. The Mauritanians avoided all engagement on the direct questions posed: When will the President and Prime Minister be released? What will be their role in reaching a negotiated solution to the crisis? Is there a basis for a politically acceptable resolution? Does the High State Council intend to govern during a political transition? Will the military present themselves as presidential candidates? The Mauritanian response was to restate their well-rehearsed vilification of President Abdallahi and then say all other questions will be resolved in a future national political dialogue. Despite adjourning to give the Mauritanian's a chance to polish their position, the meeting closed by 2:30. The layout of the negotiating session had the French (as EU Presidency) and European Commission on one side of the table opposite Mauritania and the ACP on the other side (with the African Union and the Francophonie seated to the side as observers). The EC took significant objection to the intervention by the ACP delegation that spoke of the "special circumstances" of the coup. The EC reminded the ACP spokesman that his organization had condemned the coup. Following the collapse of the talks, "Prime Minister" Laghdaf tried to make the best of the situation lauding the meeting as a "successful beginning to dialogue" in some ways drawing upon the ACP position as evidence of "better international understanding" of Mauritania's circumstances. EC Development Commissioner Louis Michel was adamant in his retort, "There is no success and no dialogue. These talks are a failure." ¶4. (C) Next EU Steps: As the Paris meeting was closing, the Europeans had tried to open the door for next steps by suggesting a senior-level visit to meet with President Abdallahi. The Mauritanians gutted that proposal by saying it would have to be a joint EU/ACP delegations, that it would have to meet with "ex-President" Abdallahi and ALL political forces, and that Abdallahi would not be released prior to the visit. The discussion in the UNDP Group started to diverge when EC Representative Stammer spoke of the 30 days set by the EC for the Mauritanians to return to the table with something serious. Stammer stressed that the 30 days were not set as an "ultimatum" but added that if the Mauritanians came back with nothing new a move towards sanctions was inevitable. Spanish Ambassador Polanco was quick to say "not so fast" saying it would be a political decision of the member states to decide whether to invite the Mauritanians back in 30 days if nothing new seemed apparent and to decide ultimately whether sanctions were appropriate. French Ambassador Vandepoorter added that a meeting in 30 days would NOUAKCHOTT 00000627 002.3 OF 003 not likely require the prior restoration of democracy but "positive signs." He cited the release of President Abdallahi as, of course, the most important step the regime could take, but added "credible efforts" at a national dialogue as something else that could be considered. ¶5. (C) What does 'Constitutional Order" mean? The UNDP group noted the divergence in international opinion on what would be an acceptable resolution to the crisis. The Spanish Ambassador noted, "My French colleague and I differ in whether President Abdallahi's return is necessary to re-establish constitutional order. The European Union certainly has never stipulated that. The U.S. has set that condition as have elements in the African Union." The French Ambassador chimed in saying France had never stipulated "in writing" that Abdallahi had to return. UNDP ResRep Ribeiro stressed that "only" the AU's Ping had called for Abdallahi to return. She also responded negatively when the Charge suggested that the Security Council (through its PRST) had given the lead to the AU -- saying that the Secretary General of course preferred to support regional solutions to regional problems but had not firmly committed the AU to that track. Charge made clear that the U.S. position that the return to constitutional order means the re-establishment of constitutional institutions which, by definition, includes restitution of the legitimate presidency. Charge noted that the differences in nuance had existed since the beginning of the crisis with the U.S. always stipulating the return of the President as a requirement and the Europeans and others leaving that question open. The fact that the issue increasingly needs to be defined reflects some progress. At the beginning nobody felt it necessary to clarify the positions because the odds of a reversal were seen as slim so the differences were largely theoretical -- the current debate reflects the recognition of a greater chance of successfully reversing the coup. German Ambassador Schanze, the most pessimistic in the group, pushed back saying the return of Abdallahi "even for one minute" is the one and only thing that General Aziz could not accept. Insistence on that point, which he added "nobody wants," only closed off the opportunity for real dialogue and risked pushing the regime to an ever more extreme position. The Spanish Ambassador added that international rigidity was useful for General Aziz since it allows him to play the sovereignty card -- playing the masses by shifting responsibility for everything that may go wrong in the future from himself to the interfering international community. We run the risk of helping Aziz become a new Taya -- staying on for the next 20 years, according to the Spaniard. ¶6. (C) Blaming the Victim: The Europeans, led by the Spanish, laid into the FNDD leadership -- most particularly Mohamed Ould Maouloud. "He says "no" to the regime, he says "no" to civil society, and he says "no" even to his own ally Messaoud Ould Boulkheir" suggesting that there is an effective "Aziz - Maouloud" alliance where both benefit form gridlock. The Spaniard dismissed Ould Maouloud as an "insignificant intellectual who could only poll 3% in the presidential elections (it was 4%)" who is benefiting from Abdallahi's detention to make himself more significant than he merited. Charge was quick to point out that Maouloud had always taken the position that he could not say "yes" to anything until the President was free and that even Ould Boulkheir had conditioned his exit strategy on first having the chance to get Abdallahi's blessing. Charge cautioned that we could not force a solution on the FNDD (even though we knew many of the elements of a political deal being discussed had a certain resonance within the FNDD) until they had a chance to meet with Abdallahi. ¶7. (C) Comment: This discussion, as well as discussions at a UNDP Group dinner Charge hosted October 24, reflects the wide convergence of views held by locally assigned diplomats. The German was quick to say he had the liberty to speak freely since Berlin was not seized of the problem whereas he saw his French colleague required to toe the line set by their capitals. The Europeans are all smart, seasoned diplomats who tend to discount the quality of democracy prior to the coup and look more to security than progress towards a better democracy as the main priority. They see the principled U.S. position as naive and one that makes better NOUAKCHOTT 00000627 003.14 OF 003 the enemy of good. The UNDP representative is primarily concerned with programming, not politics, and likes to play the "good cop" role with Aziz saying "as someone who wants to help your people, I have to say you have to do something to get out of this mess." The French Ambassador tends to side with his European brethren that "we won't get anything from Aziz unless he gets something on his most important issue," but adds that his President's views are clear and that is the line he needs to follow. He said his personal view is that the international position needs to be in agreement on the following: (a) President Abdallahi and Prime Minister Waghef need to be released, (b) they need to be given the real opportunity to be fully engaged in the political debate for a resolution to the crisis, (c) the military must withdraw from politics, and (d) new elections need to be credible. The European Commission Representative is perhaps the hardest against the coup saying "I don't believe a word the military says." For him, as with Charge, the international community needs a strong and consistent position that offers the military no chance to legitimize their coup. The UNDP Group agreed that public expressions of disagreements within the international community concerning the need for President Abdallahi to return tends to embolden Aziz to think his "wait 'em out" strategy will work. HANKINS