FOLLOW-UP MEDIA REVIEW: 3 MONTHS POST-COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000624 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL MR SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP MEDIA REVIEW: 3 MONTHS POST-COUP Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Three months into what initially appeared a quickly consummated coup, Mauritanian media leaders see the country either no closer to finding a solution to the August 6th coup d'etat or on the brink of another one, depending upon who you talk to. The PAO sat down with media who in the initial wake of the coup had been ardent supporters of what they termed a necessary "rectification" to discuss their views of the future -- i.e this report reflects views of initial coup supporters. Mission wanted to come back to these sources to see whether there had been a change in the political dynamic away from the military. Common themes included their lack of fear of sanctions and resentment of the US position as well as wholehearted belief in economic support from friendly nations Iran, Venezuela and China; the fear that Mauritania would become another Western Sahara, Abdallahi's fatally splintered FNDD party and an inability to return to pre-coup days and finally the relative prosperity that &main street8 Mauritanians feel since Aziz' takeover. END SUMMARY Iran will help us ¶2. (C) On October 19th PAO met with Mohamed Hussein, young, fiercely intelligent, and openly aligned with Ould Daddah (the candidate who ran against President Abdallahi in the March 2007 elections),Hussein and his Arabic daily Emil El Jedid, have been consistently opposed to Abdallahi and supportive of the coup. Three months later, they are equally confident that the current status quo could remain this way for years to come, even joking that Aziz might be in power for twenty years or longer. As proof, he noted that the junta was able to withstand the 40% subsidies required to lower prices for the month of Ramadan, costing 200,000 ) 300,000 UM. More realistically, he feels that Mauritania could survive five to ten years even with international aid suspended by counting on the financial support of friendly nations like Libya, Iran, Venezuela and China. ¶3. (C) In an October 22nd meeting La Press editor Mohammed Khayer mentioned having met with the junta-appointed Minister of Economy who boasted that Mauritania could survive with international embargoes for anywhere from 6 months to 2 years and that their friends China, Iran and Venezuela would come to their rescue. He conceded that already before the coup, �A;in early August 2008, Mauritania was experiencing an economic crisis that has only been exacerbated by international market tumult and the coup. No-Man's Land ¶4. (C) In a meeting with CRED president (the only fully functional Association of Mauritanian journalists) and editor-in-chief of the daily Assahifa, on October 20th, Dr. Abderrahamane Ould Horma Babana expressed his dissatisfaction with the US and international community at large following the August 6th coup. He feels that they have underestimated the strategic importance and danger a failed state of Mauritania could pose for the region and world. He fears a "no mans land" could make Mauritania ripe for exploitation not only by terrorists like AQIM, but also by traffickers of arms, drugs and humans, who see opportunity in a territory that is lawless, borders fluid and with access to the Atlantic Ocean. As a zone between the Arabic and African worlds with access to both and porous land and sea borders it is an ideal zone for trafficking. ¶5. (C) Unfortunately, he sees international/EU interest in Mauritania centering only on three main things: 1) immigration, 2) fish industry and 3) terrorism, none of which, he remarks, are democracy. He posited three possible future scenarios, of which the most probable, in his opinion, are the first two, and least likely the latter. First, he sees another soldier (not affiliated with Generals Aziz, Ghazwani) coming to the fore and starting from zero with a "real" or "classic" coup d'etat, one that dispenses with the constitution and all other democratic institutions. This coup would have to be carried out by Mauritanians but supported by international parties with an interest in seeing a regime change. The second scenario is one in which General Aziz remains and attempts to convert those in opposition and NOUAKCHOTT 00000624 002 OF 004 those who he is unable to convert he either throws out or begins a campaign of disappearances like those seen following the 10 July 1979 coup. (Comment: During this coup, a silent chapter of Mauritania,s history, over 160 people "disappeared". A power struggle between regimes close to Morocco (Buseif) and Algeria (Haiddalah) stirred animosity. An airplane crash killed Col. Lulli along with thirty others while the Prime Minister Buseif was killed in a car accident on the road to Boutelimit.) ¶6. (C) He posited what he sees as an equally fearful situation, where Abdallahi transfers his support base abroad and he retains a government in exile only to return later to take over power- -- he mentioned what occurred in 2003 with Hanana as an example. Finally, the last scenario, which Babana believes is the least likely, is a win-win situation for everyone involved. For him, this would be when the international community understands Mauritania's interests and puts equal pressure on all domestic parties to find a solution. He seemed very preoccupied by what he sees as the first time since pre-independence, when part of Mauritanian society wanted to remain under French rule and the rest sought independence, that Mauritanian is as fractured into two parts as it is today. These parts are irreconcilable and permeate all levels of society, such as Parliament, senate and government bodies. ¶7. (C) In an October 21st meeting with the Arabic daily El Bedil,s editor Mafoud Jalani, he expressed that his biggest fear is for Mauritania to replace Western Sahara as the battleground for a war between Algeria and Morocco. He feels the US has underestimated the dire consequences for the subregion of a destabilized regime in Mauritania and Western Sahara. The Algeria axis is supported by Nigeria and South Africa, all giving harsh condemnation for the coup while Morocco, Aziz,s tribal home and the nationality of his wife, has increased contact with the junta, going to far as to see the Prime Minister Laghdaf on his return from the failed AU/EU Paris talks of October 20th. Many point to the oil between northern Mauritania and Algeria as a key piece of the puzzle. In a meeting on October 22nd with Mohamed Khayer, editor of La Presse, he pointed out that currently 40% of the French oil company Total's stake in Mauritania oil is controlled by Algeria --- through the name Qatar Oil, and 60% is French, while none is Moroccan owned. This has further fueled tension between the two rival nations. This also explains Algeria's fierce condemnation of the coup, as they need a stable regime in Mauritania order to extract oil and profit from their stakes. Mauritanian proverb: "When flour spills it can never be fully recovered" ¶8. (C) In a meeting with Nouakchott Info/Akhbar Nouakchott's editor Abou Maali on October 21st, he seemed to have soured since our initial meeting in August when he spoke at length about potential solutions to the crisis. This time he heavily criticized what he termed the "international dimension" which was a clear attack on US policy. Again, like Assahifa's Babana, he seemed especially perturbed by the US announcement of sanctions prior to the October 20th EU/AU Paris Consultations. He also mentioned the chasm in Mauritanian society between two sides who refuse to negotiate, divisions which he believes are being exploited by the international community. "When flour spills it can never be fully recovered" refers to the fact that we can never return to August 5th 2008 and the US/International community should let go of their demands for the return of Abdallahi. He called President Sidi Abdallahi "democratically imposed"; it took a democratic coup d,etat to get him elected and it took a military coup d,etat to get him removed. He repeated his disapproval of sanctions which he feels only punish the people and never reach the intended individuals, like Aziz. ¶9. (C) For him, the only solution is to find a candidate with no military or international influence, that is, a truly independent candidate. When asked if that would be possible, in this clan/ethnic/tribal driven society, to find someone without some kind of affiliation, he retorted that if these were the conditions put in place many candidates would appear and they would be judged finally on their merit and political experience. His best case scenarios involved the shortest NOUAKCHOTT 00000624 003 OF 004 delay for new elections, without military candidates either presenting themselves or supporting any candidate, and jokingly said Abdallahi should be allowed to present himself without military support so that the international community could see his true support base, which would be nil. He went on to say, why stop there, we should put together a slate of candidates including Haidallah, Taya, Hanana. According to Maali the sad reality though was that he is sure Taya would win if there were elections tomorrow. He concluded by stating that Mauritania never had a chance at truly free and fair elections and that what they were living before, with Abdallahi, was a situation that didn't fully fulfill the requirements of either an oligarchy or a democracy. ¶10. (C) In the October 20th meeting with Banana he opined that the role of the US was not as a participant, as they have been getting too involved in Mauritania's internal affairs, the most recent example being the announcement of sanctions on October 17th, just before the October 20th Paris/EU/AU talks. He believes that continued pressure will only lead to another coup. ¶11. (C) Comment: The anger towards US sanctions and their futility was a sentiment echoed by many, but a minority view, voiced by La Presse's Khayer, noted that the sanctions have had a real psychological, if not immediate, impact on the population. While the actual consequences of the travel ban do not seriously adversely hurt infrequent travelers to the US, some see it as a scarlet letter, in that they are taken for terrorists when forced to admit they are refused US visas and banned from the country. In addition, the fact that Mauritania is sanctioned by the US, recalls to the mind of Mauritanians Iraq and Afghanistan, and makes many fear their country could suffer a similar fate. He also reinforced that only sixty one deputies are actively in support of the coup. Asssahifa's Babana is an older well-respected member of the community with a long standing relationship of candor with the US. During the October 20th meeting he highlighted that while he is usually only critical of US policy in the Middle East and Israel, not Mauritania, the current policy towards Mauritania is vague and inconsistent. When pressed to detail US policy inconsistency in Mauritania following the coup he referred to 2005 and the changing position of the US Embassy in the wake of the coup. While the US had initially been firm they then softened and supported the military-led transition and military-led candidacy of Abdallahi. All of this was said with warmth and a smile and a hope for continued dialogue. Babana encourages dialogue and refused personally to take sides or posit who might be an eventual candidate. It was clear he disapproved the principle of the coup and supports democracy and the "ideas upon which the American nation was formed". Better off today ¶12. (C) On October 21st PAO met with Mafoud Jalani, editor of El Bedil, the newspaper that President Abdallahi's wife issued a complaint against in April 2008 effectively paralyzing their publication. For them, the coup was a solution to their crisis, as it allowed them to recommence publication. They note that for the population, the past three months of Aziz has been better than one and half years of Abdallahi. Improvements for the people on "main street" can be seen in their every day life, oil and food prices are down, land distribution has been promised and people feel there is a semblance of justice and legality. They feel, for the first time, that they are being taken care of. Again, Jalani noted the fracture in the FNDD party that was mentioned by many editors. The various splinters include FLAM, the Haratines, Salafist extremists/Tawassoul/Islamists and the Communists/UFP Party /Khadajin. The only thing that unites this heterogeneous group is their over 40 year history of running the country, money, international support and the fact that they belong to the FNDD. While satisfied with having Abdallahi out of power, El Emel El Jedid editor Hussein waxed concerned about the future of Abdallahi's FNDD party with a real fracturing having taken place following his ousting. He fears there is a lack of true independents, as all Mauritanians are colored by party, race or tribal affiliations. According to Hussein, even Abdallhi's FNDD party really does not want his return, evidence being that the Islamist/Tawassoul splinter will certainly accept a NOUAKCHOTT 00000624 004 OF 004 solution that does not include the return of Abdallahi if in the end there is a place for them. ¶13. (C) Comment: The Mission has maintained a no-contact policy with political officials of the junta since the coup which can easily result in skewed perceptions. Increasingly we hear Mauritanians speak of an "after the coup" Mauritania as if the relatively short-term departure of the military is a given. This report and others to follow is meant to present the views of those who soon after the coup were firm supporters of the military and their "rectification" of what they saw as a malfunctioning executive. Their attitudes are changing. Previously pro-coup editors on the whole seem less patient with the international community and more ready to see change now. They are generally now in the "Ni-Ni" mode, that is, wishing to see neither Abdallahi nor Aziz in power, and it is clear that many are increasingly fearful of Aziz's tenure. Some feel the longer he stays, the more entrenched he becomes and the more popular support he garners, thus making his removal more difficult. While others believe that the longer he stays the more likely someone close to him will stage another coup d'etat. On the whole, it is apparent that their attitude to the US has changed, many openly interrogating as to the purpose of the US hard-line and disbelieving principle driven policy -- in some case perhaps blaming us for making things complicated by not simply letting the coup succeed. HANKINS