AZIZ LETS NGO CONTACT GROUP MEETS WITH PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000603 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: AZIZ LETS NGO CONTACT GROUP MEETS WITH PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI ON EVE OF EU TALKS REF: NOUAKCHOTT 601 Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The NGO "Contact Group" met with General Aziz on October 19 and received permission to meet with President Abdallahi that same evening. The Contact Group, seeking to facilitate a political resolution to the crisis, saw Aziz as anxious to find an exit. They found President Abdallahi in good spirits and anxious to defend himself against accusations made against him while open to a political solution. Abdallahi was reluctant to take a position on future scenarios without being able to freely speak with his supporters. The Contact Group was aware their meeting with Aziz and Abdallahi was being used by the regime for propaganda on the eve of the October 20 Paris talks with the EU. End Summary ¶2. (C) Contact Group meeting: Contact Group members Ely Ould Allaf, Mohamed Said Ould Hemody, and Sid'Ahmed Ould Habott met at Charge's request on October 20 to provide a readout of their October 19 meetings with General Aziz and President Abdallahi (see REFTEL for background on the Contact Group). The group noted their meetings had followed the initial work they had done in talking to all the significant players for and against the coup except for the two principals. They were aware that General Aziz had likely put off his meeting with the group until the 19th so he could use it as evidence of openness to dialogue in October 20 talks with the EU. The Contact Group was pleased to hear that the EU talks had come to a swift and difficult close. Although they thought their meetings had been useful, they didn't want them manipulated by Aziz to avoid action. The Charge asked whether they saw much difference between the direction in which they were heading and the plan put forward by President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. They saw a great deal of commonality and generally thought Ould Boulkheir had touched on all the key elements of an eventual resolution but thought that Ould Boulkheir would have a harder time winning consensus than they because he is seen as seeking position as much as any of the other political protagonists. The Contact Group sees the one-month deadline for action they understand to have been imposed by the EU as an opportunity to forge a political solution. ¶3. (C) Meeting with General Aziz: After several days' delay, the Contact Group met with General Aziz the afternoon of October 19. Few of the Contact Group had any previous experience with Aziz. Ould Hemody said he entered the meeting with the mind-set that, "The military are like scorpions -- if they are afraid, they will strike." They told Charge that after an initial bit of posturing and "frank discussion," Aziz seemed to relax and speak a bit more freely. They told Aziz that, as human rights advocates, they had to raise President Abdallahi's freedom as their first concern and pushed for access -- to which they were surprised to get Aziz' immediate okay. While Aziz avoided commitment on timing or the return of President Abdallahi to office, he did tell them that, "If it is in the national interests, Abdallahi will of course be set free and be allowed to participate in meetings with his supporters. He can even run again for president." Aziz told him he wanted a real political dialogue for an exit and, for that reason, had postponed the promised National Dialogue until at least November -- he said he did not want to have a dialogue all the other political movements would boycott. ¶4. (C) Again stressing their lack of personal familiarity with Aziz, the Contact Group representatives said their impression was that he is looking for an escape strategy but not yet ready to give up his preferred option -- the continued presence of the High State Council through a transition leading to new elections. The members stated that was the only option they could not see as being viable in re-establishing democratic legitimacy. ¶5. (C) Meeting with President Abdallahi: A delegation from the Contact Group met with President Abdallahi the evening of the 19th. The Contact Group sent only members who had a previous relationship with the President -- people he used the close "tu" form with. Abdallahi was in good HEALTH and NOUAKCHOTT 00000603 002 OF 002 spirits making small jokes throughout the 90 minute meeting. Unlike meetings with diplomats, there was no minder in the meeting although the Contact Group representatives assumed they were being monitored electronically. Abdallahi welcomed them as the first Mauritanian's he had seen since Prime Minister Waghef was released some two months ago. He said he had questioned whether the meeting was a junta publicity stunt on the eve of the Paris meeting but said he had seen the Group's intentions as sincere once he saw who was included. Ould Allaf, for instance, is a friend from high school and university. ¶6. (C) The Contact Group ran through with the President what they saw as common themes in their contacts with various political leaders: (a) growing, almost universal, rejection of the coup, (b) a desire to find a negotiated exit to the crisis, (c) a consensus that legitimacy could only be re-established through President Abdallahi's return but an equal consensus that Abdallahi could no longer complete his mandate, (d) a recognition that some type of transitions arrangement (whether under Abdallahi, the President of the Senate, or some ad hoc structure) was needed leading to new elections -- certainly presidential and probably legislative as well. (e) agreement that the military coup leaders needed some guarantees of non-retaliation. The President said he had two concerns: a personal desire to be able to defend himself against the many accusations levied against him and an institutional desire to find a resolution. He said he could not commit to a particular strategy because "I'm only ONE person" and that he needed to talk to those who had rallied to the cause of democracy and had suffered from tear gas and intimidation. He did note that this was the first he had heard of discussion about new legislative elections as well as presidential -- the Contact Group saw him pleased by the prospect since it would entail both a new president and discredited parliamentarians having to win a new mandate. They sensed Abdallahi was prepared to negotiate, but agreed that it was unreasonable for him to make any commitments until liberated and permitted to talk to his base. Ould Hemody (with the other two nodding) questioned whether Abdallahi would want to run again if offered the chance -- saying he appeared extremely disillusioned with politics. ¶7. (C) The Contact Group representatives noted they were surprised that Abdallahi did not discuss his wife and children. There was some discussion among themselves whether they should press Aziz to let Abdallahi's family visit him as a next sign of openness. Charge said their objective had to be Abdallahi's liberation and that a family visit would gain the junta good press but do nothing to advance the political process. Charge added that if the Contact Group thought only an interim step short of liberation was possible, that had to be a visit between the President and his closest political advisors. HANKINS