AZIZ LETS NGO CONTACT GROUP MEETS WITH PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000603

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: AZIZ LETS NGO CONTACT GROUP MEETS WITH PRESIDENT
ABDALLAHI ON EVE OF EU TALKS

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 601

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: The NGO "Contact Group" met with General
Aziz on October 19 and received permission to meet with
President Abdallahi that same evening. The Contact Group,
seeking to facilitate a political resolution to the crisis,
saw Aziz as anxious to find an exit. They found President
Abdallahi in good spirits and anxious to defend himself
against accusations made against him while open to a
political solution. Abdallahi was reluctant to take a
position on future scenarios without being able to freely
speak with his supporters. The Contact Group was aware their
meeting with Aziz and Abdallahi was being used by the regime
for propaganda on the eve of the October 20 Paris talks with
the EU. End Summary


2. (C) Contact Group meeting: Contact Group members Ely
Ould Allaf, Mohamed Said Ould Hemody, and Sid'Ahmed Ould
Habott met at Charge's request on October 20 to provide a
readout of their October 19 meetings with General Aziz and
President Abdallahi (see REFTEL for background on the Contact
Group). The group noted their meetings had followed the
initial work they had done in talking to all the significant
players for and against the coup except for the two
principals. They were aware that General Aziz had likely put
off his meeting with the group until the 19th so he could use
it as evidence of openness to dialogue in October 20 talks
with the EU. The Contact Group was pleased to hear that the
EU talks had come to a swift and difficult close. Although
they thought their meetings had been useful, they didn't want
them manipulated by Aziz to avoid action. The Charge asked
whether they saw much difference between the direction in
which they were heading and the plan put forward by President
of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. They saw a
great deal of commonality and generally thought Ould
Boulkheir had touched on all the key elements of an eventual
resolution but thought that Ould Boulkheir would have a
harder time winning consensus than they because he is seen as
seeking position as much as any of the other political
protagonists. The Contact Group sees the one-month deadline
for action they understand to have been imposed by the EU as
an opportunity to forge a political solution.


3. (C) Meeting with General Aziz: After several days'
delay, the Contact Group met with General Aziz the afternoon
of October 19. Few of the Contact Group had any previous
experience with Aziz. Ould Hemody said he entered the
meeting with the mind-set that, "The military are like
scorpions -- if they are afraid, they will strike." They
told Charge that after an initial bit of posturing and "frank
discussion," Aziz seemed to relax and speak a bit more
freely. They told Aziz that, as human rights advocates, they
had to raise President Abdallahi's freedom as their first
concern and pushed for access -- to which they were surprised
to get Aziz' immediate okay. While Aziz avoided commitment
on timing or the return of President Abdallahi to office, he
did tell them that, "If it is in the national interests,
Abdallahi will of course be set free and be allowed to
participate in meetings with his supporters. He can even run
again for president." Aziz told him he wanted a real
political dialogue for an exit and, for that reason, had
postponed the promised National Dialogue until at least
November -- he said he did not want to have a dialogue all
the other political movements would boycott.


4. (C) Again stressing their lack of personal familiarity
with Aziz, the Contact Group representatives said their
impression was that he is looking for an escape strategy but
not yet ready to give up his preferred option -- the
continued presence of the High State Council through a
transition leading to new elections. The members stated that
was the only option they could not see as being viable in
re-establishing democratic legitimacy.


5. (C) Meeting with President Abdallahi: A delegation from
the Contact Group met with President Abdallahi the evening of
the 19th. The Contact Group sent only members who had a
previous relationship with the President -- people he used
the close "tu" form with. Abdallahi was in good health and

NOUAKCHOTT 00000603 002 OF 002


spirits making small jokes throughout the 90 minute meeting.
Unlike meetings with diplomats, there was no minder in the
meeting although the Contact Group representatives assumed
they were being monitored electronically. Abdallahi welcomed
them as the first Mauritanian's he had seen since Prime
Minister Waghef was released some two months ago. He said he
had questioned whether the meeting was a junta publicity
stunt on the eve of the Paris meeting but said he had seen
the Group's intentions as sincere once he saw who was
included. Ould Allaf, for instance, is a friend from high
school and university.


6. (C) The Contact Group ran through with the President what
they saw as common themes in their contacts with various
political leaders:

(a) growing, almost universal, rejection of the coup,
(b) a desire to find a negotiated exit to the crisis,
(c) a consensus that legitimacy could only be re-established
through President Abdallahi's return but an equal consensus
that Abdallahi could no longer complete his mandate,
(d) a recognition that some type of transitions arrangement
(whether under Abdallahi, the President of the Senate, or
some ad hoc structure) was needed leading to new elections --
certainly presidential and probably legislative as well.
(e) agreement that the military coup leaders needed some
guarantees of non-retaliation.

The President said he had two concerns: a personal desire to
be able to defend himself against the many accusations levied
against him and an institutional desire to find a resolution.
He said he could not commit to a particular strategy because
"I'm only one person" and that he needed to talk to those who
had rallied to the cause of democracy and had suffered from
tear gas and intimidation. He did note that this was the
first he had heard of discussion about new legislative
elections as well as presidential -- the Contact Group saw
him pleased by the prospect since it would entail both a new
president and discredited parliamentarians having to win a
new mandate. They sensed Abdallahi was prepared to
negotiate, but agreed that it was unreasonable for him to
make any commitments until liberated and permitted to talk to
his base. Ould Hemody (with the other two nodding)
questioned whether Abdallahi would want to run again if
offered the chance -- saying he appeared extremely
disillusioned with politics.


7. (C) The Contact Group representatives noted they were
surprised that Abdallahi did not discuss his wife and
children. There was some discussion among themselves whether
they should press Aziz to let Abdallahi's family visit him as
a next sign of openness. Charge said their objective had to
be Abdallahi's liberation and that a family visit would gain
the junta good press but do nothing to advance the political
process. Charge added that if the Contact Group thought only
an interim step short of liberation was possible, that had to
be a visit between the President and his closest political
advisors.
HANKINS