MORE POLITICAL MOMENTUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000582 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MR SUBJECT: MORE POLITICAL MOMENTUM Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The French share Mission view that slow movement towards a political resolution is underway. General Aziz, while ever stubborn on key points, has shown most flexibility to date in meeting with the French Ambassador. The EU Article 96 process is key leverage while the Mauritania-AU dynamics may undermine Addis' effectiveness for now. Independent mediation efforts of varying credibility are multiplying with similar messages. An opportunistic Afro-Mauritanian threatens a shift to violence if the military stay in power -- demands fundamental change if Abdallahi returns. End Summary Meeting with French Ambassador ¶2. (C) Charge met October 9 with French Ambassador Vandepoorter after receiving a request from FNDD co-leader Ould Maouloud to discuss "interesting French ideas" on October 10 and to get a readout of Vandepoorter's publicized October 8 meeting with General Aziz. Vandepoorter, in his EU Presidency role, had met Aziz to lay out the seriousness of the upcoming EC Article 96 negotiations warning that this offered the final chance to avoid sanctions that would be painful and irreversible. Aziz told the Ambassador that he wanted to avoid those sanctions and confirmed he had multiple feelers our for negotiations with the FNDD. Vandepoorter emphasized that these initial contacts on the eve of Article 96 talks and the anticipated "National Dialogue" now being discussed for October 15 would not be sufficient -- there had to be something concrete. Vandepoorter emphasized the constant requirement for the return to democratic legitimacy through the return of President Abdallahi to which the general did not get the customary "absolutely not" response. The Ambassador suggested to the general that while a National Dialogue might some day have its role, now was the time for discrete talks with the opposition which will require, sooner than later, the direct participation of President Abdallahi. He allowed that President Abdallahi would likely not see the possibility to complete his mandate that would necessarily require new elections. If done via Abdallahi's resignation, Vandepoorter told Aziz that President of the Senate Ba Mamadou was, as constitutionally prescribed, is the only appropriate interim president leading to those elections -- to which Aziz responded, "Mauritania is run by Moors, a Pulaar President (Ba is an Afro-Mauritanian of the Pulaar tribe) is unacceptable even if temporarily." Vandepoorter went on to say that, from the EC perspective, the members of the HSC would have to eliminate themselves from future elections to which Aziz responded "that may not be constitutional." Vandepoorter retorted that "it may not be constitutional but it is a political reality" since any transition leading to the election of a coup maker would have no credibility. Finally, Vandepoorter floated the idea of a National Security Council that would provide the military and security services some voice in major national political issues. Aziz dismissed the idea outright saying "we are not Turkey" adding that what was needed was constitutional changes that would place more checks on presidential powers so the military would never again "need" to intercede. ¶3. (C) While Vandepoorter did not see Aziz ready to leave quite yet, he remarked that the general did not revert to his standard litany of the sins of Abdallahi and received quite a lecture without closing the conversation. The Ambassador told Charge he saw a real possibility for movement towards a resolution in which the Article 96 process would be key. While he did expected the regime to come to Brussels speaking only vaguely of political dialogue, he imagined the EU could leave the first meeting with no relaxation of condemnation but setting specific benchmarks to avoid sanctions before a later meeting. ¶4. (C) Vandepoorter lamented that the last visit of the AU's Lamamra had resulted in an impasse driven as much by personality as by substance. For EU-AU reasons, Paris wanted to see the AU in the lead but, despite Pings efforts to suggest some continued room for dialogue, he saw the EU venue the best for the moment. The ambassador believed that there was indeed a need once the two sides are really ready to talk for an internal mediator (showing no preference for any of internal initiatives that have come to the fore and unsure who might play that role from outside Mauritania). The ambassador saw the various currents heading towards discrete NOUAKCHOTT 00000582 002.2 OF 003 talks between the FNDD and the HSC with a future need to include other party leaders including Ould Daddah. Charge noted the FNDD's Ould Maouloud had suggested talks starting between General Ghazwany and National Assembly President Ould Boulkheir -- Vandepoorter thought that would be a good "representative" start. The ambassador said he saw new elections as a near given saying he found nobody, even within the FNDD, voicing interest in Abdallahi continue any longer than needed to re-establish constitutional legitimacy. He thought Abdallahi would himself agree to this one he had contact with his advisors. As for who might succeed Abdallahi, he saw that as a "problem for later on" but offered that "Vall will lose to just about anyone" having been a bit too transparent in his posturing. ¶5. (C) Vandepoorter suggested some lingering problems with Spain noting "as soon as we denied a visa to a pro-coup parliamentarian, they ran over to the Spaniards to get a Schengen visa." Noting that, like France, Spain has significant commercial, migration and drug concerns in Mauritania Vandepoorter said, "if we go forward on Article 96 every embassy will be required to deny visas." The "NiNi" initiatives -------------- ¶6. (C) At least two more internal negotiation initiatives in addition to that of former foreign minister Ould Benhmeida have surfaced in the past week. At an October 7 event at the Qatari vocational training center, Charge was introduced to NGO leader Sid'Ahmed Ould Habot who, with three other civil society leaders involved in good governance, had already met with the FNDD, "Prime Minister" Laghdaf and Ould Daddah and were to meet October 8 with Aziz to put together a dialogue (Comment: it was not clear to Charge if this was a chance meeting or whether it reflected a subtle Qatari initiative). On October 9, Charge met with three members of the newly announced "National Salvation Front" who presented themselves as a "third option" movement who has also met with both sides aiming to create a national dialogue. Both initiatives shared several policy stands: the need for a temporary return of Abdallahi leading to new elections (with Ould Habot highlighting what he termed an ADIL proposal for a national referendum "Do you wish President Abdallahi to complete his electoral mandate?" to determine whether to hold elections; the dismantling of the HSC; some type of interim government based either on Senate President Ba or some type of national coalition. Both fell under the "NiNi" heading being cited increasingly by Mauritanians -- "Ni (neither) Abdallahi, ni Aziz." With both groups, Charge indicated that the U.S. and international role of forcing the regime towards dialogue seemed to be showing initial effects that was leading to these initiatives. The U.S. firmly believed any solution needed to have the re-establishment of constitutional legitimacy through the return of President Abdallahi as a point of departure but that it was up to Mauritanians to find their own democratic path from that point. Charge demurred from endorsing any of the initiatives and cautioned that they not let mediator proliferation be used to undermine common objectives. And Something Disturbing -------------- ¶7. (C) Charge met October 9 with anti-coup Senator Youssouf Tijani Sylla -- senator of Mbout in Gorgol Province. Sylla has an Afro-Mauritania Solinke father and a White Moor mother but presents himself as a leader of both Afro Mauritanians and Black Moor "Haratines." Sylla had been clubbed by the police during the October 5 anti-coup protest. He said he was beginning a round of diplomatic contacts to say Mauritanian blacks were firmly behind President Abdallahi and were ready to move from peaceful to armed resistance to the military. Sylla viewed the coup in racial terms as a White Moor response to Abdallahi's outreach to Afro-Mauritanians and Black Moors. He denounced the concentration of all power and wealth in the White Moor community which, because of his mixed blood, he said he understood well. Sylla claimed to be in contact with the hard-line Afro-Mauritanian FLAM movement in Senegal to prepare to shift to violence against the coup. Charge stated unequivocally that the U.S. does not advocate violent opposition to the coup. The isolation of the coup by the international community was starting to bear fruit and violence now would be counter-productive. Charge emphasized NOUAKCHOTT 00000582 003 OF 003 the obvious -- that the military has most of the weapons -- but also cautioned racially-based violence could only spell disaster. Sylla said, "we will use sticks and machetes if we have to," but then pulled back on the immediacy of any transfer to violence. He also added that, even if the military steps down and democracy is restored, "we will no longer accept the one Pulaar one Wolof, one Solinke and one Haratine" tokenism of past governments and demand full integration reflective of White Moors' minority status. ¶8. (C) Comment: An Afro-Mauritanian local Mission employee from Sylla's constituency told Charge Sylla is not seen by Afro-Mauritanians as a significant leader both because his mixed blood and because of multiple opportunistic loyalty changes in the past. Sylla had worked with Taya, then became a Sidi Baba supporter, then jumped in with Ould Daddah. He was elected to the Senate as an independent (our LES says because the military had been to overt in supporting his opponent in an 80% black district) and first allied himself with Ould Maouloud and, just recently, became an Ould Boulkheir supporter. Sylla is not a contender but his statements underline the risk that continued political impasse can bring out negative elements -- new "counter coups" or the emergence of race-baiting opportunists. HANKINS