MAURITANIAN COUP: IFI'S FIRM, SPANISH IFFY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000515 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL MR SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN COUP: IFI'S FIRM, SPANISH IFFY REF: NOUAKCHOTT 505 Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (b and d) ¶1. (C) During a regular meeting on September 16 of the ad hoc local coordinating group composed of representatives of the EU, UN, US, World Bank and IMF, attendees had a readout on the just concluded visit of AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra (Ref). UN Resident Coordinator Maria Ribeiro reported that no meaningful progress had been made toward getting cooperation from General Aziz for a return to constitutionality in Mauritania. Given that assessment, she noted that UN Special Representative Said Djinnit would not be coming to Nouakchott in the next few days to follow up on Lamamra's visit as he had originally planned to do. ¶2. (C) IMF Resident Representative Marc Carre (strictly protect) reported that he had received policy guidance from the IMF regarding its posture in Mauritania following a formal request from the Central Bank. He said that all IMF missions would be suspended as would all current technical assistance to include offshore training. He indicated that the technical assistance contractor currently on his staff would be assigned other duties for the time being. He said that the IMF would review the situation when it determined that the junta was "recognized" by a majority of IMF member states. In addition to recognition, he said that the junta's economic situation would need to normalize with the articulation of clear government policies, budgets and operating procedures. In the meantime, the IMF mission here would limit contact with the junta's ministers and the Governor of the Central Bank but would continue limited technical contact. No decision had been made about Mauritanian attendance at the annual meetings in Washington. World Bank Resident Representative Francois Rantrua confirmed that his institution remained in "suspended disbursement" status although he hoped that local staff could return next work to work on "internal" matters. Spanish Ambassador Polanco scoffed at the idea that IMF member states did not recognize Mauritania arguing that we all continued to work with the government "at one level or another." ¶3. (C) Carre opined that the junta could soon find itself in difficult economic straits although he simply did not have enough solid information to make projections about when problems such as a balance of payments crisis might occur. He said that the foreign currency reserve target for the year had been USD 330 million but that anticipated foreign exchange earnings of at least USD 200 million, including payment from the EU for fishing rights and anticipated earning from the sale of fish to Japanese buyers, among potentially other transactions, were at serious risk. He noted that on the other hand, the parastatal mining company SNIM had significant capital reserves for infrastructure projects that could possibly be tapped. French Ambassador Vandepoorter noted that this would be disastrous for SNIM in view of an EU agreement that limited government influence over its operations. ¶4. (C) Asked about the USG's position on personal sanctions, Ambassador Boulware indicated that we were still moving in that direction, particularly for travel sanctions, and that the question was being closely reviewed in Washington. When asked in turn about potential unilateral French sanctions, Ambassador Vandepoorter said the current emphasis was on the EU sanctions process. Ambassador Polanco said that it would be hard to imagine unilateral travel sanctions for a Schengen government. EU Commission Charge Geza Strammer said that the EU letter inviting Mauritania to participate in Article 96 consultations should go out just about any day. Ambassador Vandepoorter underscored that if Mauritania came to such a consultative meeting to present a road map along the lines of that recently endorsed by the National Assembly and while President Abdallahi was still detained, the meeting risked being a very short one and sanctions would likely follow. ¶5. (C) Comment: Ironically, along with the US and France, the World Bank and the IMF have the firmest actions in opposition to the coup. The comments by the Spanish Ambassador about recognition and the difficulty of imposing NOUAKCHOTT 00000515 002 OF 002 travel sanctions reflect the difficult task that country faces in reconciling its multiple bilateral interests in what is effectively a neighboring country with the principled position of the EU. Boulware