FRENCH AND ALGERIAN TAKES ON AU COMMISSIONER

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000514

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AND ALGERIAN TAKES ON AU COMMISSIONER
LAMAMRA'S VISIT

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 505

B. NOUAKCHOTT 508

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (b and d)


1. (C) The African Union's Peace and Security Commissioner
Ramtane Lamamra made his third visit to Nouakchott September
14 and 15. Following his meeting with representatives of the
international community (Ref A),Lamamra met with General
Aziz. Ambassador met on September 16 with French Ambassador
Michel Vandepoorter and Algerian Ambassador Rachid Chakib
Kaid, both of whom had seen Lamamra after his meeting with
Aziz.


2. (C) According to both Ambassadors, Lamamra not only felt
that he had been unable to make progress with Aziz but even
that the latter had "taken a step back" in that he was
evasive about earlier assurances given to the AU that
Abdallahi would be released "soon." In fact, and although he
asked, Lamamra did not even have the opportunity to visit
Abdallahi in detention. Both Ambassadors agreed that the
timing of Lamamra's visit was complicated by the simultaneous
Ghazwani visit to Paris. The Algerian ambassador said that
Lamamra told him that Aziz seemed to think the discussions
there would be more fruitful. Lamamra reportedly told Aziz
not to expect Ghazwani to come back with a different message.
The French Ambassador said that he had not yet gotten a
readout on the Ghazwani meeting but confirmed that he
expected the same message to be conveyed in Paris.


3. (C) Ambassador Vandepoorter said that the visit was even
further complicated by the reported terrorist attack on
Mauritanian soldiers in the north (Ref B). He characterized
it as a serious attack and said that Lamamra found him to be
distracted by that threat and in a &military mode.8 The
Ambassador speculated that SNIM might have been the intended
target. For his part, the Algerian Ambassador found the
attack suspicious, noting that apparently no bodies had yet
been found.


4. (C) The French Ambassador also discussed his own visit
to General Aziz, on instructions, on September 12 to make
sure that Aziz understood that the French government,s call
for Abdallahi,s return was not a call for a &definitive8
return that would preclude further developments. Ambassador
Vandepoorter said that he saw no sign that General Aziz
intended to deviate from his current path.


5. (C) Comment: Ambassador will attempt to get a readout on
the Ghazwani visit either locally or during consultations in
Paris on September 19. He will also try to get a sense
whether Vandepoorter's demarche of General Aziz represents a
softening of the French position or merely encouragement to
seize the opportunities for progress that would be open once
Abdallhai was restored. If there is no progress in the days
immediately following General Ghazwani,s return to
Nouakchott, there is likely to be no movement until the junta
feels the bite of sanctions, or of a faltering economy or
both.


Boulware