SITREP 6: COUP IN MAURITANIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000421 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2018 TAGS: PREL ASEC CASC EAID MR SUBJECT: SITREP 6: COUP IN MAURITANIA Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d) -------------- Saturday Demarches on General Aziz -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador received a message from Presidential protocol the afternoon of August 9, inviting him to meet with individually with General Aziz. Once US and EU Ambassadors determined that General Aziz preferred meeting with us individually rather than to receive the joint demarche, the ambassadors agreed that each would attend the meeting, hear what the General had to say, reiterate our respective general national positions of condemnation and decline to discuss the situation more concretely until we were able to deliver our joint demarche. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Boulware was received at 5:30 pm just after the French Ambassador. President Abdallahi's protocol staff appeared intact and the Ambassador was initially received by holdover Chief of Staff of the Presidency Cheyakh Ould Ely. General Aziz received the Ambassador in President Abdallahi's ceremonial office and launched into the now well-rehearsed litany of Abdallahi's supposed incompetence, corruption, abuse of power and neglect of national security. He indicated that he had proof that President Abdallahi had personally authorized bribes to members of the national Assembly to keep them in his PNDD/ADIL party (note: previous assertions of corruption had focused on Abdallahi's family and associates). He claimed that President Abdallahi had illegally abused his authority by refusing to accept the National Assembly's petition for a special session on the grounds that it was signed by the Vice-President rather than the President of the Assembly. Conversely Aziz claimed that Abdallahi's own decree firing the military leadership was illegal in that he had not routed it through the Minister Secretary General of the Presidency, the "only legal means for issuing a decree." Not dismissing the officers in person and in the presence of the Minister of Defense also made the firings fatally flawed. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Boulware noted Secretary Rice's strong condemnation of the coup, recalled the views he expressed in his initial conversation with Aziz and observed that the same strong message had been passed along through the Mauritanian Embassy in Washington. As had been agreed with EU Ambassadors, Ambassador Boulware urged that the group be received as soon as possible to receive our collective demarche. Aziz indicated that he "understood" the position of the US and the EU. He said further that President Abdallahi was well taken care of and being seen by his personal physician and asserted that he wished no harm come to anyone. ¶4. (C) The French Ambassador confirmed that other appointments had followed the same lines and that Aziz had assured him that he agreed in principle to receive he group the following day. Although no journalists were present, Ambassadors were photographed and filmed entering the Presidency and seated with General Aziz. Firms clips were shown on Mauritanian television newscasts simply noting the meetings had taken place and captioned photos, without commentary, were published in the official press. -------------- Sunday Joint Demarche -------------- ¶5. (C) On the afternoon of August 10, Ambassador Boulware and UNDP Resident Representative Ribeiro joined with French Ambassador Vandepoorter, as leader of an EU group (including Spanish Ambassador Polanco and German Ambassador Schanz and the acting head of the EU Commission) in a joint demarche on General Aziz. Ambassador Vandepoorter noting broad international support made the agreed upon demarche. He emphasized international condemnation, the release of President Abdallahi along with access to him, the rejection of unilaterally organized presidential elections, and a return to constitutional order. He urged that the General consider the very negative impact of the coup on Mauritania's image and the potential for the country to be isolated from the international community. Ambassador Boulware underscored that the USG associated itself completely with the demarche and each of its elements, urging that the junta take quick action in the hopes that our current suspension of assistance not become definitive. ¶6. (C) General Aziz repeated yet again the now standard string of grievances that he had articulated to Ambassador Boulware during their individual meeting yesterday. He insisted that President Abdallahi had brought the coup on himself through his actions, omissions and excesses. He emphasized even more the highly irregular late-night measures undertaken by the President--at the residence, not even in the office and much less through any official chain--to fire the complete military leadership and to replace them with men who were incapable of leading their command and who very attempt to do so could have provoked "catastrophe." Aziz claimed that the junta had not sought power but that faced with emergent and very dangerous circumstances took the "decision that seemed best" for the country. He said that he understood the condemnation and that a coup was by nature condemnable, but also warned that condemnations gave aid and comfort to those who had "another agenda." The French Ambassador urged an end to extra-constitutional rule that was not good for the country and noted that Mauritania's friends were ready to help to find a way out of the current crisis. The Spanish Ambassador urged that the junta better articulate its intentions as the basis of a possible dialogue. In concluding the exchange Ambassador Vandepoorter again urged "concrete acts" upon the General recommending, in particular, freeing President Abdallahi immediately. Aziz promised to continue to keep the door open for dialogue. ¶7. (C) Comment: Aziz was clearly less at ease and more defensive in the group setting. International pressure is clearly having some impact on him and his description of the coup as a course that "seemed best" at the time might indicate some tentative second thoughts. The articulation of a strong common position is a very positive development but we continue to believe that international pressure would work best if complemented by the engagement of a well placed, friendly interlocutor who might actively help the Generals think out an exit strategy. At present, it is clear that they have little at all in the way of a strategy and are continuing to improvise. -------------- The Envoys -------------- ¶8. (c) Representatives of the Maghreb Arab Union, the Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations have all visited Mauritania in he past few days. While the African Union and UN have taken a hard line relative to the coup, the Arab organizations have left the country with public remarks stating they were reassured after meeting with General Aziz that Mauritania remains on the path of stability and democracy. Aziz met Saturday morning with Arab League Deputy Secretary General Ahmed Ben Hilli who, like Secretary General of Maghreb Arab Union Lehbib Ben Yahya on Thursday, made tepid statements highlighting the assurances General Aziz had provided for an early return to democracy. Statements by UN Special Representative for West Africa Said Djinnit took a tougher line in public comments raising the international community's rejection of the coup while offering good offices to re-establish democratic government. Ambassador met evening of August 9 with Djinnit after his meeting with Aziz. Djinnit noted the strong reaction of the international community but noted the U.N. works more slowly than the AU which had quickly taken firm action to what Djinnit termed "the continuation of the same (2005) coup." Djinnit indicated he was working closely with the AU and, responding to the weaker positions taken by the Arab League, said his experience with the Arab League when the AU suspended Commoros was that the Arab League will follow the AU lead if somewhat reluctantly. -------------- The Case of Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba -------------- ¶9. (C) DCM met August 9 with Mohedyn Ould Sidi Baba, son of detained President of the three-week old Economic and Social Council Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba. The younger Sidi Baba, who has been perhaps the Mission's most important working-level contact as Director for Cooperation in the Ministry of Finance and Economy, sought Embassy assistance in obtaining information concerning his father. ¶10. (C) The Father: Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba is a long-term behind the scenes politician for decades. He has been a friend of President Abdallahi since the 1950's and, according to his son, is one of Adballahi's few friends who can say "you are an idiot" to his face. According to the son, there is no logical political reason for his father to be arrested since the father held no position of authority or influence -- rather, the arrest was a punishment for political opposition to Aziz. Reportedly, the elder Sidi Baba stood at a large political confab early in the political crisis leading to the collapse of the first Waghef government to say, "This is bull, we all know the crisis is all because of the generals. It is time for the President to start acting like one and stand up to them." The message was reportedly passed to Sidi Baba the same night that Aziz saw this as a "declaration of war" to which Sidi Baba said essentially "bring it on." President Abdallahi's decision to name Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba to the Economic and Social Council on July 23 was seen by Aziz as a direct affront according to the son. Talking to his father between President Abadallah's announcement sacking the generals and his own arrest, Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba said, "Abdallahi is an idiot. He knows nothing about the security forces and has no idea how they will react." Since his arrest, Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba has had no verbal contact with his family although messages have been transmitted asking for clothes, medicine and reading material. 68-year-old Sidi Baba is said to be in good health needing only eye drops on a regular basis. He reportedly cut his hand prior to being arrested for which the family sent anti-tetanus medication. ¶11. (C) The Son: Mohedyn Ould Sidi Baba has been a vital player in building Mauritania's relations with the IMF, World Bank and donors. His tireless work was instrumental to Mauritania's consideration for the MCC and re-establishing confidence with the IMF. The appointment of new Economy and Finance Minister Sidi Ould Tah, who Sidi Baba termed "one of the generals' ministers," was already indicating his exit as the Minister had termed him "a liability." Sidi Baba was already being by bypassed and expected to be fired. He noted that former Minister Vezzaz, "was scared -- he tried playing both sides and failed." Sidi Baba noted that his father's political position always drew attention to him and that the Deputy Secretary General (General Ghazwani's first cousin) constantly scrutinized his work to find something to catch him on. Sidi Baba predicted he would be arrested soon for tying to pursue his father's case. Indeed, a room-mate from his hometown showed up at the cafe where DCM and Sidi Baba were meeting 5 minutes after the meeting started and immediately assumed a "minder" position nearby. Sidi Baba said it was no coincidence. ¶12. (C) The Political Situation: Sidi Baba did not see the coup as a surprise saying the generals had been planning something for months. He noted, however, that Abdallahi's decision to fire the generals (something his father said should have and could have been done during Abdallahi's early honeymoon period) had caught them off guard and had forced an immediate coup by force versus the longer-term "constitutional coup" they had been trying to put together where, after some show investigations for corruption, would have led to impeachment. Sidi Baba noted that while Abdallahi may have underestimated Aziz's reaction, the coup was not going well for Aziz. He cautioned the U.S. not to see the lack of mass protests as a sign of public indifference noting that, unlike past coups, there were - in fact - some counter demonstrations and, more importantly, significant public opposition by key political leaders, civil society and elites. He noted that several minister had said they would resign and that a number of governors and regional military commanders had refused to recognize Aziz's authority. Sidi Baba also said Aziz had misjudged his international support saying Aziz had told the military hierarchy recently that "France and the U.S. support me" pointing to an extended trip he made to France and the then-pending visit of a number of U.S. generals under NDU's Capstone program. The strong negative French and U.S. reaction, then, was a surprise. Sidi Baba noted that French President Sarkozy's reference to holding the coup leaders "personally responsible" could be very effective since both Aziz and Ghazwany have a significant personal assets -- he indicated both had profited handsomely in the sale of a cellular phone license to Sudan's SUDATEL that resulted in the Chinguetel cellular phone network. (Comment -- In a subsequent call, Sidi Baba noted his deputy Secretary General (Ghazwany's cousin) had called asking what the French might be talking about with "personal responsibility." Sidi Baba outlined the types of travel bans and asset seizures that had been used in other situations and told DCM the possibility of personal sanctions had caused significant concern among the coup leadership. End comment.) Sidi Baba noted that while western and AU response to the coup has been strong, the Arab response is weak. Morocco is seen by Sidi Baba as, at least, complicit in the coup. Sidi Baba sees Col. Vall as "the man behind the generals" suggesting Aziz and Ghazwany may still be getting their orders from him. Sidi Baba indicated Vall has reportedly ended his intensive English course in Ireland and is now consulting with the Moroccans. Sidi Baba is not overly optimistic of a political turn-around, but stressed that Aziz has not pulled off an easy success. Continued strong criticism from abroad with internal passive resistance may, in his view, force Aziz to look for an out. Exile in Morocco could be an option but is not viable unless and until Aziz (and perhaps the Moroccans) see the coup as a failure. -------------- Other Reactions -------------- ¶13. (SBU) President of National Assembly denounces coup: In an August 10 press conference, President of the National Assembly Messoud Ould Boulkheir refused to recognize the new High State Council saying it was widely condemned and anti-constitutional. He rejected any effort to amend the constitution to legitimize a relationship between the National Assembly and the High State Council and declared that President Abdallahi was the only legitimate president and that there could be no solution to the crisis without freeing him. Boulkheir rejected any new presidential elections as illegal and a clear breach of constitution. (Comment: Boulkheir's statement poses perhaps the most difficult challenge to Aziz who is desperately seeking a way to establish a veneer of legitimacy for the coup. Having pledged not to interfere with the parliament -- he now faces a substantial roadblock. End comment.) ¶14. (C) Provincial Reactions: A quick roundup of political leaders outside of Nouakchott highlights deep-set, albeit non-vocal, opposition to the coup. Pro-coup rallies have been reported throughout the country with little to no overt opposition outside of Nouakchott. Comments by prominent provincial leaders include: Mayor of Boghe: Ba Adama Moussa (Pular). The coup of August 6 is unacceptable, because "it will open doors to countless other military coups." Mokhtar Thiout (Wolof leader),President of development association in Trarza. General Aziz is "the best student of Taya." "All the progress made on slavery and on the solution of the Afro Mauritanian issues, will be blocked." Idoumou Ould Kharchi (White Moor),a businessman in Aioun. Investors will leave Mauritania, at least during the transition period, "and that we don,t know how long that transition will be." Sid,Ahmed Ould H,Meymed (White Moor),Mayor of Atar. The country is in trouble. Knowing Aziz very well and his capabilities, "He can,t do any positive things for Mauritania." Mohamed O. Allali (White Moor),Mayor of Oualata. What happened on August 6 will show to Mauritanians that all the seeming progress seen after the coup of August 2005 was an illusion. "The military will never leave power." Moham Vall Ould Youssouf (Black Moor leader),Deputy Director of SOCOGIM (state house building company based in Nouakchott): "No matter who is elected as President in coming elections, if elections will be organized, no-one, inside or outside the country, will believe that the winner is the real president." -------------- EAC -------------- ¶15. (C) The EAC met morning of August 10 to review the security situation which remains peaceful. The EAC noted the French had issues a consular warning urging French citizens to defer travel to Mauritania; however, absent any incidents of violence ) particularly violence directed against foreigners ) the EAC saw the French guidance as driven by policy considerations rather than a worsening security situation. The EAC saw no need for any change to Mission's current security posture or guidance to American citizens. Boulware