EMERGING MAURITANIAN "SOFT" COUNTERTERRORISM

UNCLAS NOUAKCHOTT 000365

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ACCRA FOR USAID/W

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID MR
SUBJECT: EMERGING MAURITANIAN "SOFT" COUNTERTERRORISM
STRATEGY

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A complementarily of Counterterrorism Strategies in
Mauritania
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1. (SBU) Both the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania (GIRM) and the U.S. have chosen similar paths to
fight the root causes of terrorism in Mauritania. In April
2008, the GIRM developed an draft Action Plan addressing
&Social and Economic Aspects of the National Strategy
Against Terror8 (Strategie Nationale de Lutte contre le
Terrorisme, or SNLT),which lays out plans for social and
economic integration of Mauritanian at-risk youth. A large
portion of the plan centers on a communications strategy
targeting that population. USAID,s Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) initiative parallels the
GIRM,s SNLT, but goes a step further.

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Mauritania,s National CT Strategy
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2. (SBU) In February 2008, following a string of alleged
terrorist attacks in the south (Aleg, December 2007),in the
north (military compound killing, December/Jan 2008) and in
the capital Nouakchott (Israeli Embassy /VIP Nightclub, March
200),the then Prime Minister Zeine Ould Zeidane requested
his cabinet to develop the SNLT to better prepare the nation
for potential future attacks.
Three inter-ministerial commissions formed to develop the
SNLT ) one focusing on prevention, one on reaction, and one
on consequences of terrorist attacks, such as psychological
impact. The outcome of their work has been a draft Action
Plan addressing the social and economic aspects of the SNLT
which was provided to the Embassy by the Ministry of Economy
and Finance that was charged with coordinating the response
of the various non-security ministries. This strategy
remains in draft. With the May change of Prime Ministers and
ensuing political tumult in June, the Government has yet to
move forward on this "soft" counterterrorism strategy or the
corresponding "hard" strategy (focused on military,
intelligence and law enforcement opertations) that has not
been shared with Embassy.


3. (SBU) The GIRM, through its SNLT Action Plan, identifies
several drivers or root causes of terrorism in Mauritania.
These are: 1) social injustice, or lack of equal opportunity
for employment, education, training, and access to credit or
other financing; 2) poverty, or lack of sufficient revenues
for subsistence needs, particularly in the face of the
current price hike for basic necessities; 3) prevalence of
precariousness among certain groups to be co-opted by
criminal groups; 4) weakness of the educational system
leading to high rates of illiteracy, and exposes the ignorant
population to deviance; 5) high rate of unemployment and a
exodus of rural populations towards the urban areas; and 6)
erroneous interpretation of religious principles.


4. (SBU) To address the growing threat of extremism, the
GIRM,s SNLT Action Plan proposes the following five
prevention strategies: 1) Develop information campaigns on
the terrorism phenomenon; 2) Reinforce GIRM,s governance
capacity, especially for that of the justice sector and
prisons; 3) Promote employment initiatives for economically
disadvantaged youth, including vocational training and income
generating activities; 4) Eliminate terrorist financing
through improved financial investigation techniques and
specialized training for financial inspectors, analysts and
others; and 5) Develop synergies within the public sector to
help identify and combat extremist behavior. Ministry of
Economy and Finance Director for Cooperation Mohedyne Sidi
Baba, who has been the Mission's primary counterpart on
USAID's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, told
EmbOffs that the deliberations within the non-security
ministries had quickly followed the same general strategies
he had seen developed in the USAID program.

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USAID TSCTP project in Mauritania
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5. (U) USAID,s TSCTP project strategy consists of:
discrediting extremist ideologies; empowering at-risk youth
both in the community and in the economy; and supporting more
accountable and effective governance in at-risk urban and
peri-urban slums. This will be done through activities
targeting: youth integration in local government and civil
society decision-making; vocational training and
micro-enterprise grants; and promotion of interfaith
dialogue, including potential traditional Islamic education,
or mahadras, sector support to strengthen moderate voices.

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2008 USAID Counterterrorism Assessment
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6. (U) The SNLT has many of the same conclusions developed
by USAID as a result of its 2005 and 2006 assessments, and
more recently, through a May 2008 re-validation assessment
conducted by USAID/AFR and a Management Sciences
International (MSI) consultant, a professor of Islamic
Studies at Colby College. This 2008 re-validation assessment
identified changes in the political context and in the
terrorism threat level. These changes will affect the core
programmatic elements of the USAID TSCTP Mauritania activity,
and may result in minor contractual changes to the project.
Suggested programmatic changes include: reinvigoration of
youth and culture centers in target areas of intervention;
cross-cutting anticorruption activities throughout the
project; broadening of media activities to include a wider
variety of voices and outlets is also a serious
consideration.

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Evolution of the Political Context
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7. (SBU) This assessment found that since 2006, many factors
have contributed to the new political environment. Most
signigicant was the arrival of Mauritania's first
democratically-elected government through 2006 legislative
and 2007 presidential elections. While challenged by
economic and political constraints, the new democratic
movement has allowed for unprecedented open debate on
previously taboo social and political issues -- including
open debate on internal extremism. Meanwhile, the 2008 USAID
assessment found that religiosity has visibly and steadily
increased in Mauritania, as evidenced by a range of
behavioral changes, such as an increase in bearded men,
veiled women and mosques, and greater societal pressure to
prevent practices that are seen as &un-Islamic.8 While
Islam has always played a central role in the lives of
Mauritanians, the country,s tradition of tolerant,
pluralistic Maliki and Sufi-inspired Islam appears to be
evolving due to infiltration of strict Salafist or Wahhabi
ideas. One of the most significant changes noted by the
assessment is the greater readiness by the government to
recognize that Mauritania,s violent extremist problem is not
merely &imported8 ) from training camps in northern Mali
or Algeria ) but homegrown as well. The traditional
Mauritanian propensity to dismiss the threat of internal
violence or radicalization is beginning to dissolve in light
of the recent alleged terrorist tasks mentioned above. That
said, &imported extremism8 is still present and must not be
neglected. &Exported extremism8 also appears to be on the
rise. The January 23, 2008 AQIM attack on Italian tourists
in Mali was carried out by a group that included six
Algerians and eight Mauritanians.


8. (SBU) In parallel to this grassroots religious
phenomenon, President Abdallahi, has also endeavored to
project a greater image of religiosity. This has been
demonstrated from his highly publicized post-election prayer
to building a mosque inside the Presidential Palace and
allowing Prime Minister Waghef to appoint Islamist ministers
in his first new government (a Salafist imam to the Ministry
of Islamic Affairs, and two other well-known Islamists to the
two key ministries of Higher Education and Employment,
Vocational Training and Insertion). The presence of these
three Islamists proved a lightening-rod that, in part, forced
the collapse of the first Waghef government. The political
unrest over the issue highlights the debate on how best to

deal with those Salafists who are prepared to work within the
political system -- with President Abdallahi generally
interested in providing fundementalists a political platform
to peacefully express their views while others fear Salafists
will necessarily bring down Mauritania's democracy if allowed
inside the tent. President Abdellahi,s strategy is not
without risks. Encouraging broader integration of hardline
Islamist thought could create greater freedoms for Islamists
to compete in the political process and play by the rules of
the game, and such, weakening any threat they may pose. At
the same time, it could also help to drive a wedge between
traditional religious versus modern religious tendencies,
and/or contribution to a steady radicalization of society.
This risk may be hedged in a variety of ways. The assessment
found that perhaps the best way may be if the modern,
extremist Islam spokespeople speak out against violence,
given their increased visibility within society, and the
penetration of Salafi-Wahhabi ideas into the Islamic
mainstream. This would likely be most effective if dynamic
Salafist youth leaders made these anti-violence
proclamations.

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USAID,s TSCTP project target ) at-risk youth
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9. (SBU) The USAID assessment found no surprises in the
profile of the most vulnerable population, as identified
through a variety of interviews, included the following
characteristics: male urban youth 15 ) 25 years of age;
second- or first-generation urban dwellers living in poor
neighborhoods, but not necessarily the neighborhood,s
poorest resident; most were born in and live in peri-urban
areas in and around Nouakchott; socially isolated, lacking
structure, direction, social support networks and sources of
positive encouragement; and attainment of a modest
educational level, most having completed primary school; most
have attended mahadra (religious school) education system;
perception of pervasive injustice and psychological
transposition of jihadist ideology on local conflicts or
disputes; approximately two thirds are unemployed; the
majority have been accused of illegal acts ranging from
illegal drug peddling, to car theft, to basic petty criminal
activity; most use a strict interpretation of Islam as a
conduit for redemption and spiritual salvation; and finally,
although the vast majority are men, the role of women as
communicators and mobilizers should not be discounted. The
USAID 2008 assessment found that the factors that push
vulnerable individuals towards a path of violence are, as the
SNLT identified: high levels of social fragmentation and
societal decay evidenced by one of the highest divorce rates
on the continent; widespread resentment at the perceived
dysfunction of the GIRM; and the economic failure of the
Mauritanian economy to provide jobs and other opportunities
for vulnerable, alienated youth all provide a fertile
environment for radical extremist and terrorist ideas to
flourish. Additionally, the two factors that attract at-risk
individuals appear to be: the pervasiveness and appeal of
criminal networks and activities; and the existence of
&violence entrepreneurs8 and &violent voices8 (radical
Salafi preachers) who prey on youth.

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What,s Next?
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10. (SBU) Although only in its initial stages of
administrative set-up, the USAID TSCTP project in Mauritania
aims to address the root social and economic causes of
terrorism and extremism in Mauritania as identified by the
GIRM and the USG. The convergence of the GIRM National
Counterterrorism Strategy and the USAID TSCTP strategy mark
the start of what will be a cooperative team effort on the
civilian side of the equation. The USAID program will begin
only in three geographic areas (Nouakchott, Zouerate, and
Nema) and will never reach the size to address all the
infrastructure issues that would be included in the GIRM
strategy. Three growing needs which are only summarily
addressed in the USAID project are: infrastructure, material
resources and anti-corruption programming.

o First, a top priority for additional support should be
youth center infrastructure and resource needs. Youth and
cultural centers, once vibrant platforms for positive social
and cultural communication and distraction through sports,
music and theater, have fallen into significant disrepair
across the country. The Mayor of Nouakchott raised this as
the single most imprtant factor he saw in leading to youth
extremism. The youth center in F,Derick was literally taken
over by goats and a thick layer of sand. The youth center in
Nema has a roof that is falling in, and a sports field so
rugged and dangerous, that a least one youth has died there.
In addition to sports fields and center re-building, all
could use more resources, including books, audio-visuals and
professional support and events programming. The story is
repeated in all major towns.

o Second, traditional koranic schools, mahadras, are in
desperate need of infrastructure support. Under the Ministry
of Islamic Affairs, they are run largely from fees collected
from parents. In Zouerate, nearly 80% of the youth attend a
mahdras either full-time or concomitantly with regular
state-run school, for example attending mahadras as a
before-school and after school activity. The vast majority
of mahdras do not have running water or electricity. Most
are so poor that they are obliged to combine boys and girls
in an effort to share and conserve modest resources ) from
books to toilets.

o Third, water is a prevalent need, and devastating to youth
and communities alike. The water table in the F,Derick area
is more than 25 meters, and what water there is, is salty.
Bir Moghrein, north-west of F,Derick, has collaborated with
the government to acquire a water filtration system, however
there is no electricity in Bir Morgrein and the system will
be run using a diesel electrical generator. Needless to say
there are no gas stations in Bir Moghrein and the budget for
transporting diesel is slim. In Nema, the water situation is
also serious. Belgian and Saudi-financed water projects
exist around the outskirts of the town, water resources
in-town are precarious at best. There is no water much more
frequently than not.

o A fourth, yet non-infrastructure need, is anti-corruption
activities. As more donor and private sector funds come into
the country, more needs to be done to combat a rapidly rising
World Bank-assessed level of corruption. USAID programming
will only scratch the surface of what is becoming a more and
more deeply rooted problem among youth and the nation as a
whole.

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Other Donors throw their hat in the ring
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11. (SBU) Since the first TSCTP assessment in 2005, other
donors have recognized the need for social and economic
programming to address the root causes of terrorism in
Mauritania, however few as explicitly as USAID. UNDP is
increasingly concerned with anti-extremism programming --
always couched under the "Good Governance" rubrik. The
European Union recently sent a counterterrorism programming
assessment team to Mauritania. Any resulting programming,
however, could take over a year to initiate. The French are
involved along the perimeter of at-risk youth and community
development. The French Cooperation has developed a
community action planning and development program that is
expected to launch in Nouakchott in October 2008. The Agence
Francaise de Developpement (French Development Agency) is
involved with vocational technical training of youth in
Zouerate. Likewise, the Qatari Cooperation (Etablissement
Qataro-Mauritanien pour le Developpement Social) is not only
involved in vocational training in Nema, but is also
curiously implementing an entire infrastructural re-vamping
of Boutelimit town, a town which is widely believed to harbor
extremist thought leaders. Neither the French nor the
Qataris publicly declare their activities to be
counter-terrorist or )extremist in nature.

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Reality check
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12. (SB) The situation in Mauritania is evolving, both
politically and economically. The US can only do so much.
What was once a sleepy town, back as recently as 2005 when
the initial TSCTP assessments were conducted, Nouakchott is
now becoming a bustling center where &terrorism8 is a
common word. Unlike many countries in the region, the
Mauritanians are prepared to speak frankly of the terrorist
threat -- both internal and external -- however, the root
causes of external extremism are in many ways the greatest
economic and social challenges facing Mauritania.

Boulware