POLITICAL STORM SEASON IN MAURITANIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000323 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL KMCA MR SUBJECT: POLITICAL STORM SEASON IN MAURITANIA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Over the past several weeks, Mauritanian media has been rife with political intrigue. President Abdallahi is said to have had a falling out with his security head General Aziz leading to rumors of impending coups. The opposition is trying to pull together the one-third majority of the National Assembly needed to table a motion to censure the new Waghef government which, if successful, would force the collapse of that government. Members of the President's own party of the majority are pulling out. Meanwhile, the media and political observers complain that the new Waghef government has yet to deliver the promised new momentum on the political and economic agenda. Getting a clear picture of the political machinations afoot is complicated -- all contacts have a vested interest and paint the worst possible picture of the opponents, intent. In the current political maneuverings we have: ¶2. (C) The New Military Leadership: Generals Aziz and Ghazwani likely see themselves as the midwives of the current democracy -- both for their role in the coup against former President Taya and, more importantly, their role in ensuring the Transitional Authorities delivered on their promise of a post-coup democratic transition. They are extremely leery of the reappearance of Taya ministers in the newly-formed government as a step to the past. Both generals are serious in their counter-terrorism and counter-extremism concerns hence the concern of Islamist ministers in the government (even though all the ministers in question have a decent track record of past performance). If we give the Generals the benefit of the doubt, they are afraid the Abdallahi government will lose the opportunity of democratic transition by letting the wolves inside the chicken coup. If we take a darker view, they do not want President Abdallahi to get too comfortable in the idea that he drives "their" democracy. ¶3. (C) The Majority Parties: Most of the back and forth between the members of the majority party is political pork-barreling over jobs and influence with some elements not feeling they got "enough" in the most recent government reshuffle. Abdallahi,s decision to shift from the heavily technocratic but politically inexperienced Zeidane government to the more experienced (but colored by histories in past undemocratic governments) Waghef government intentionally opened the door to distribution of positions with a greater emphasis on power-block balance. While Abdallahi needed a government more able to implement policies, he did open the door to efforts by coalition partners to get just that little bit more. ¶4. (C) The Opposition: The opposition, headed by opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah, sees the chance to force a "government of national unity" by splitting off independents and dissatisfied parties from the majority. While the Mauritanian constitution has no legislative or judicial method to force new presidential elections (absent an all out impeachment trial for high treason that requires a two-thirds majority for both chambers and is tried by a special court), the bar for toppling the Prime Minister and his government is relatively low. A vote of no confidence or motion of censure passed by "one half plus one" in the National Assembly forces the President to form a new government. Two such censures within three years force new parliamentary elections which, in current circumstances, the opposition would feel well placed to dominate. Therffore, a successful censure now would force Abdala hi to either form a government with far more opoosition components or risk new parliamentary elections. ¶5. (C) The President: President Abdallah is in a difficult position of trying to move hi political agenda forward while competing interet s seem more occupied with reinforcing their relttive political weight. Abdallahi is likely asserting his legitimate right to direct political polic even over the objections of General Aziz. His ffforts to tighten his political base through a nw" majority structure (versus the loose coalitionoof backers he had coming from his election victory as an independent) is having difficulty. Meanwhie , he is spending a lot of time talking to generals and party heads (his own and the opposition) to resolve turf battles and is being pulled away from his policy objectives. Hankins