Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08NOUAKCHOTT256 | 2008-05-29 13:01:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Nouakchott |
R 291301Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7287 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS CIA WASHDC SECDEF WASHDC JOINT STAFF WASHDC CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE |
S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000256 |
1. (C) Summary: The visit of Personal Military Chief of Staff to the Presidency General Mohamed Abdel Aziz provides the opportunity for Washington policymakers key to sustaining Mauritania's democratic transition and helping face the challenge of terrorism. 2. (S - N/F) The Trip: GRPO will be bringing General Aziz to Washington during the first week of June for meetings at GRPO headquarters and at the Pentagon. With administrative control over all elite Mauritanian military forces and intelligence services, General Aziz is interested in discussing the current state and future of our counter-terrorism security relationship with Mauritania. 3. (C) Who is General Aziz?: General Mohamed Abdel Aziz is the most important security figure in Mauritania. As has traditionally been the case in Mauritanian governments, as Personal Military Chief of Staff to the Presidency, Aziz has effective control over the most important tools of the military, security and intelligence services. Some detractors of the Abdallahi Government will say that Aziz is the real leader of the country because of his security role. When pushed, they will concede that there is an effective division of power between the President (who has full reign over political, social and economic policy) and Aziz (who has policy control over security issues). When pushed still further, detractors will agree that President Abdallahi and new Prime Minister Waghef are exerting stronger policy control over security matters following the emergence of a publically-recognized terrorist threat. The terrorist attacks of December and February showed for those that did not already know it that "the king has no clothes" and that decades of military rule had somehow left a poorly trained military. The on-going development by the Prime Minister's Office of a National Counter-terrorism Strategy is asserting necessary civilian leadership over security issues. While Aziz remains "the man" on military and intelligence issues, we would term his role as "Security Czar" -- a term that reflects a high degree of policy autonomy and delegation of authority from the President but retains the underlying chain-of-command to the President. 4. (C) Bio: Mohamed Abdel Aziz was born in 1956 in Akjoujt -- capital of the Inchiri region. He is a White Moor member of the Oulad Bouaba warrior tribe that has been the source of many Mauritanian military leaders including Transitional Authorities leader Col. Vall. Aziz was a key member of the military coup against Taya and served as Commander of the Presidential Battalion during the transition. He is credited for getting military support behind Abdallahi's candidacy and was awarded the most important security role for his trouble. Aziz has been unpopular with many of the older senior colonels in the military for being too "political" but he has effectively pushed out all the old guard during the past year replacing them with leaders he trusts. If the point was still lost on the rest of the military, President Abdallahi broke a long-held tradition of an Army without Generals, to name Aziz as the first Mauritanian general. Aziz is a frequent Mission contact who takes the terrorist threat very seriously. On the military side, he has been bucking the tide by advocating a substantially smaller (around 9000) but far better trained and equipped military than the past. -------------------------- THEMES TO RAISE WITH AZIZ -------------------------- 5. (C) Democracy Is Our Interest: We have heard some Mauritanians tied to Col. Vall try to use the terrorist threat much like the Soviet threat used to be played in the past -- suggesting that the risk was to great to leave in the hand of an inexperienced democratic government and that men with a firm hand might have to step in even at the cost of democracy. We continue to stress that our counter-terrorism support cannot and will not be at the cost of our support for democracy. We warn that any deviation from Mauritania's promising democratic process will see U.S. support quickly dry up -- no building of Mauritanian forces, no ACOTA, no Millennium Challenge Account. Nothing but the humanitarian assistance and intelligence liaison of the past. We do not see Aziz as one trying to derail democracy (although he holds the keys to every unit that could make that happen) but he needs to report back to military colleagues in Mauritania that U.S. support is absolutely contingent on democracy. 6. (C) Rule of law essential in counter-terrorism: Aziz holds the police in low regard with some reason -- they are poorly trained and motivated. The recent escape and re-arrest of one of the terrorists involved in the December 24 attack on French tourists simply reconfirmed Aziz's low assessment of the police. Indeed, it was only the intervention of military leaders that put an effective man-hunt in place and allowed the Mauritanians to roll up a substantial number of AQIM operatives in April. That said, the Mauritanian courts are playing their appropriate role in ensuring that suspected terrorists are arrested, interrogated and detained according to legal and human rights standards. That means that the police and judiciary need to be reinforced at the same time as the military and intelligence and that their primacy for police powers be respected. 7. (C) Integrated Strategy: The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy is already being drafted; however, we have yet to see a well integrated approach that draws all the police, military and intelligence tools together under effective civilian leadership. The strategy will not work if it gives into institutional rivalries of stove-piped lines of communication, redundant capabilities, and poor information sharing. As Mauritania's leading security partner, we are already well along the way towards providing Mauritania with the military and intelligence tools it needs to combat terrorism. Over the coming year, we will supplement those efforts to build better judicial law enforcement capabilities as well. As Mauritania gets the tools it needs, it needs to figure out how to use them effectively in combination. Boulware |