CYPRIOTS SUPPORT DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000938

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE CY RU
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS SUPPORT DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN SECURITY
PROPOSAL, UNAWARE OF CONTENT

REF: A. COHEN-FITZPATRICK EMAIL OF 11/25/2008

B. MOSCOW 3437

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The head of RoC President Demetris
Christofias's diplomatic office, Leonidas Pantelides, met the
DCM on November 25 to brief on Christofias's November 19-20
trip to Moscow. Pantelides had accompanied Christofias and
was privy to discussions on Russia's European security
proposal. The Russians had welcomed Cyprus's support, he
said, but considered Nicosia an inappropriate interlocutor on
the details of this initiative, and provided no specifics on
its content or on plans for moving it forward. Pantelides
ventured that Medvedev would seek a broad trans-Atlantic
audience to deliberate his plan, and thus use the OSCE as a
venue for formal discussion. Turning to Russia's relations
with the West in general, Pantelides, a former RoC ambassador
in Moscow, suggested the new Obama administration take a page
from French President Sarkozy's book and engage Russia. "The
Russians are big and clumsy but not ambitious or aggressive
-- you can talk to them." Pantelides himsefEzQFQo~Q``ever, about Christofias's anti-NATO statements made
during the trip. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Rolling Back the Years?
--------------


2. (SBU) Christofias's trip to Moscow (Ref B) dominated
Greek Cypriot media in late November. Most coverage tilted
positively, focusing on a half-dozen technical MOUs the
countries signed and on the Joint Political Declaration, in
which Russia accepted as its own nearly every Greek Cypriot
position on the Cyprus Problem. Pundits raised eyebrows and
critics croaked, however, over the Cypriot president's
November 19 comments welcoming Russia's initiative to update
the international security architecture in Europe. "I am
confident that European partners will in the long run share
the opinion of Cyprus," Christofias later declared. Upon
receiving an honorary doctorate from a Moscow university the
following day, the RoC leader turned his sights on NATO,
voicing pride that Cyprus was one of a handful of EU member
states not party to the Alliance, with Cypriot headlines
reading "No Links to NATO While I'm Around." Government
Spokesman Stephanos Stephanou on November 24 questioned why
NATO remained in existence, after the Warsaw Pact's
dissolution, and suggesting that NATO had taken on
unpalatable roles since. "Should I remind you of Yugoslavia,
Iraq, or Afghanistan?" Stephanou asked.


3. (C) Post since has engaged numerous interlocutors to
determine whether Christofias and Stephanou's anti-West
diatribes were fleeting products of being swept up by the
moment in Moscow, vestiges of their Communist Party roots, or
deliberate and indicative of an "eastward" policy shift.
Their commentary followed a string of unhelpful Cypriot
foreign policy moves, from green-lighting a Cypriot embassy
in Havana and a Venezuelan mission in Nicosia to strongly
criticizing the alleged U.S. raid in eastern Syria in
October.

--------------
They Love Us Because We're Small
--------------


4. (C) A well-respected Cypriot diplomat reasonably friendly
to the Embassy, Leonidas Pantelides enjoys a reputation of
defending wholeheartedly the actions of the countries where
he has served. In his November 25 meeting with the DCM, he
empathized throughout with Russia's specialness, paranoia,
and need to be understood. Prompted by the DCM, he expounded
on Christofias's Moscow visit, "On the new security
architecture, we welcomed the idea and asked for the
discussion," he began. But Medvedev did not offer
Christofias any details on the plan. "We're not a threat to
them, so they're candid with us. But Russia doesn't consider
Cyprus a serious interlocutor on political-military themes,"
he explained, and so had shared no detail, nor had the
Cypriots requested any before publicly voicing their support.


5. (C) While President Christofias had publicly endorsed
the architecture proposal and called on other EU countries to
do the same, Cyprus had not committed to promote it in
specific fora. Pantelides thought Medvedev would aim for a
broad audience. "The circle of interlocutors must be
Euro-Atlantic," he ventured. Nicolas Sarkozy had called for
deliberations at the OSCE when Medvedev first floated the

NICOSIA 00000938 002 OF 002


proposal, and the Russian president likely would cite French
support in seeking a hearing there.

--------------
More a Teddy than an Angry Bear
--------------


6. (C) The new U.S. administration would be well served by
emulating Sarkozy in his dealings with Russia, Pantelides
thought. "He doesn't try to isolate them. He engaged them
and won their trust." In so doing, the French president
might have prevented the Russians and/or their Ossetian
proxies from taking Tbilisi, Pantelides continued, ensuring
that last August's conflict did not spread further. His four
years in Moscow had shown him the Russians don't want to be
feared, but respected. Now, however, they once again felt
surrounded and under attack, if not physically then
ideologically. "But they do listen," he assured.


7. (C) In seeking this new security architecture, Moscow
hoped to restore the balance of power that existed before the
1990s, Pantelides said. There were plenty of reasons for the
U.S. and NATO to seek a cooperative arrangement with
Medvedev, he argued, from countering arms proliferation to
winning the fight in Afghanistan. Moscow had welcomed news
of President-elect Barack Obama's victory in November, and
was optimistic that U.S.-Russia relations could be put on a
better course.

--------------
Saw No Evil, Heard No Evil
--------------


8. (C) Why, then, had Christofias bashed NATO from Moscow,
with his spokesman echoing the inflammatory points at home?
the DCM questioned. Their remarks dismissed not only NATO's
relevance as a force for peace and security, countering 21st
century threats, and helping to build security in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans, but also ignored existing
cooperative efforts with Moscow such as the NATO-Russia
Council. Not even Medvedev and Putin were taking as strong a
line against the Alliance, he added. Pantelides refused to
engage. "I'm afraid I cannot comment on this, as I was out
of the country and didn't hear those comments," he
unconvincingly replied.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Christofias had two primary objectives for his visit
to Moscow. One was economic: to win Cyprus's removal from
Russia's "black list" of countries not fully cooperating with
GoR tax officials. The other was to ensure Russia would
continue to watch the RoC's back regarding Cyprus Problem
developments, especially in the Security Council where Turkey
will sit as a non-permanent member beginning in January.
Once Christofias had secured Medvedev's signature on the
Joint Political Declaration, he'd likely have agreed to
renaming Nicosia "St. Petersburg" -- or perhaps "Leningrad,"
given his political beliefs. All Embassy contacts canvassed
have agreed there is little substance (and even less
understanding) behind Cyprus's support of the Medvedev
European security plan. Further, Cyprus's use as a Russian
Trojan Horse in organizations like the European Union lies
mainly in its ability to block consensus, not to promote
initiatives like this one. While Cyprus conceivably could
prevent adoption of an EU common position regarding the new
security architecture, local EU member-state representatives
claim it won't have to -- member states already are deeply
divided.
Urbancic