CYPRUS: UNFICYP PLEASED BY LATEST LEADERS'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000916 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP PLEASED BY LATEST LEADERS' MEETINGS REF: A. NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 11/05/08 ¶B. NICOSIA 910 Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The quickening pace of leaders' meetings and some recent progress on Governance issues have heartened the UN negotiating team, according to UNFICYP Senior Adviser Wlodek Cibor. In a November 19 meeting with Embassy staff, Cibor recounted recent developments in the negotiations and reported the sides aimed to move to Property by early December. UNFICYP's twice-yearly report on peacekeeping operations and the newly-established Good Offices Mission was in New York awaiting clearance. Associated Security Council deliberations begin on December 5. END SUMMARY. -------------- Pace Quickens, Moods Brighten -------------- ¶2. (C) Three leaders meetings in seven days constituted a "miracle" and a "marathon," UNFICYP Senior Adviser Wlodek Cibor chuckled in an hour-long meeting with Emboffs November ¶19. Even better, Republic of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat had agreed to a full slate of meetings before year-end -- on November 25, December 8, December 16, December 22, and December 28. Both sides were cognizant that the earlier, slower meeting pace was not helping to convey a sense of seriousness to their electorates and the international community, hence the get-togethers during the Christmas and Bayram holidays when most of Cyprus shuts down. On November 25, the UN expected Christofias and Talat to discuss the as-yet-undiscussed issues in the Governance portfolio, with the goal to move to discussion of Property matters on December 8. Not all Governance items had fallen into the "Convergence Basket," he clarified. After nine leaders' meetings, the sides' positions were close on the makeup and functions of the federal judiciary, technical entities like the meteorological and statistics services, and the Attorney General's Office and Comptroller-equivalent. Significant problems remained on overall federal versus constituent state competencies, the structure of the federal executive, and the workings and GC/TC numerical breakdown of the federal legislature. ¶3. (C) Cibor expected that UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer, who had officiated over the recent meetings and had just departed the island, would return on/about December 11. The UN intended to propose a modalities change to coincide with the opening of Property discussions. Instead of the leaders diving into a detailed agenda and attempting to reach convergence line-by-line, Cibor previewed the UN position that they instead table their bigger-picture stances, then delegate the negotiations grunt-work to chief negotiators George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami and their respective staffs. In this way, the leaders might cover more ground and be able to present a picture of greater progress to their constituencies. Property discussions looked far more difficult than those on Governance, however, both because the sides' populations had vested interests and because the relevant working group had proven unable even to draft a joint agenda for the leaders' consideration. It was vital they agree to some form of assistance from UN-contracted experts to bridge expected gaps, Cibor thought. -------------- Report Still in Draft Mode, and Close Hold -------------- ¶4. (C) After lengthy discussions in New York, higher-ups in the Peacekeeping (DPKO) and Political Affairs (DPA) Directorates had determined not/not to return to UN practice of the Annan Plan years (2000-2004) of preparing two separate reports for the Security Council. Instead, a single report would contain both references to UNFICYP (peacekeeping) activities and developments in the Good Offices Mission (Ref A). UNFICYP chief SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun intended to present the report at a closed session of the Security Council on December 5, Cibor revealed. A draft of the report had already gone back to New York, where it would go through plenty of edits. In a break from past procedures, Zerihoun did not intend to share a pre-release report with local UK High Commissioner Peter Millett in order to aide the British Government -- traditionally the lead drafter of the accompanying UNSCR that rolled over the UNFICYP mandate. (Comment: We are not surprised with the ultra-cautious Zerihoun's decision. Cibor promised Emboffs a bootleg NICOSIA 00000916 002 OF 002 version of the UNFICYP report the week of November 24, however, and we assume he'll be passing it to our British counterparts as well.) ¶5. (C) Cibor offered little on the content of the UN draft. On one of its most controversial aspects -- how it referenced Turkish Cypriot isolation -- December's version would parrot language from June 2008's. That report infuriated the T/Cs, since prior mention of the north's "isolation" had been "downgraded" to a "sense of isolation." The UN diplomat expected blowback from Talat, but he thought it would pass quickly. "Greek Cypriots will be angry as well," he concluded, since they believed isolation to be a myth propagated by the T/Cs. ¶6. (C) At the November 17 meeting, G/C negotiator Iacovou had pushed for mention in the December report of a November 14 incident southwest of the island, in which the Turkish Navy had chased off RoC-chartered research vessels conducting seismic soundings (Ref B). Iacovou noted that The RoC UN permrep had sent a similar, formal message to UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon. UNFICYP was divided over the matter, Cibor claimed. Since the incident had occurred some distance off Cyprus, mention of it seemingly did not fall within with the peacekeeping operation's mandate. Neither Christofias nor Talat had mentioned the maritime incident at the open portion of the meeting, but Cibor ventured it had come up in their one-hour one-on-one (Note: The Ambassador discussed the incident with Talat on November 19; details to be provided Septel.) ¶7. (C) UNFICYP also was mulling mention of a recent firing range incident in Buffer Zone. A Turkish- or T/C-fired practice mortar shell had landed on a G/C house abutting the BZ, puncturing the roof but thankfully causing no injuries. That Talat so quickly took responsibility and apologized publicly seemed a positive development in UN eyes. Christofias did take a dig at Talat, accepting the apology while noting that the T/C leader "cannot control the activities of the Turkish military on Cyprus." -------------- - Confirmation the "Straw Rule" Remained in Play -------------- - ¶8. (C) The conversation next turned to the G/Cs' "Straw Rule (named after former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who, on an unofficial visit to Cyprus in 2006 during which he met the T/C leader, was snubbed by then-RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos). Cibor confirmed that Greek Cypriots continued to pressure high-level visitors to avoid formal calls on Talat. RoC Foreign Minister Kyprianou had explained that "bilateral visitors, who really had no connections to Cyprus Problem negotiations, had no need to see the T/C leader in his so-called Presidential office." In the G/Cs' estimation, that category of visitor included European Commissioners, such as Vladimir Spidla, Czech Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Spidla, who arrives in Cyprus on November 20, supposedly had wanted to see Talat, but eventually acceded to G/C pressures (Note/Comment: according to local Commission contacts, the Commissioner will cross north, but only to visit the EU's program support office, as did the visiting Australian FM in October. Such GoC influence over EU structures explains the deep-seated Turkish Cypriot rejection of the EU as a guarantor of T/C rights on the island.) Urbancic