DISY CHIEF STILL UNCONVINCED ITS CANDIDATE WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000091 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: DISY CHIEF STILL UNCONVINCED ITS CANDIDATE WILL ADVANCE REF: 07 NICOSIA 869 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Nikos Anastassiades claimed that candidate Ioannis Kasoulides's presidential prospects were improving, but continued to worry he might not advance to the second round. Harming Kasoulides were DISY's inability to maintain discipline amongst members in Nicosia and Limassol, its weakness (and incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos's strength) with civil servants, and the Cypriot electorate's general aversion to change. Anastassiades next turned to campaign finance, lamenting the ever-growing cost of ferrying overseas Cypriots home to vote; such fees were more easily borne by the wealthier Papadopoulos and Dimitris Christofias (AKEL) campaign teams. Should his candidate fail to advance to Round 2, the DISY chieftain was contemplating assembling the party politburo to conduct a "way forward" secret ballot to choose between Papadopoulos and Christofias SIPDIS in the run-off round. As is customary in his meetings with the Embassy, Anastassiades held court on the Cyprus problem, fretting that solving it looking increasingly difficult. And a Papadopoulos re-election would make matters worse. END SUMMARY. -------------- - Kasoulides's Chances? Improving, But Not Great -------------- - ¶2. (C) The always expansive Anastassiades welcomed the Ambassador February 6 for a presidential campaign / CyProb tour d'horizon. While still not thrilled with Ioannis Kasoulides's chances, he admitted the candidate's recent upswing in polling had buoyed party morale somewhat. DISY cohesion remained suspect, however, especially in Nicosia and Limassol, where the President was succeeding in co-opting traditional DISY voters of the commercial elite. Winning back these deserters was key to ensuring Kasoulides's advance and Papadopoulos's ouster, Anastassiades asserted. DISY internal polling showed Kasoulides currently trailing Papadopoulos, but running neck-and-neck with Christofias. Potentially halting the party's upward swing were its weakness among civil servants -- always susceptible to pressures or inducements from the governing party, especially this one -- and Cypriot voters' general aversion to abandoning the status quo. ¶3. (C) DISY was losing the campaign finance battle as well, Anastassiades fretted. It would cost the party some two million euros to fly home over 5,000 overseas voters from the UK, Athens, and points further, just for the first round. At least another million would be required for a similar Round 2 operations. While Papadopoulos was independently wealthy and the Christofias campaign could count on AKEL-owned businesses' earnings to cover these costs, DISY was nearly tapped out. The cash crunch limited the campaign team's ability to secure increasingly more-costly media access, he explained. ¶4. (C) In case of a Kasoulides first-round defeat, DISY would summon its political bureau to determine next steps, Anastassiades revealed. He saw three possible outcomes emerging from the resulting secret ballot: 1) a recommendation to endorse either Papadopoulos or Christofias and call for the rank-and-file to support him; 2) a call for a special DISY congress where party members could debate endorsement; and/or 3) instructions to the membership "to vote according to their conscience." Anastassiades welcomed an informal tie-up between ideologically-dissimilar DISY and AKEL since, in his opinion, such an arrangement would ensure that any CyProb solution that Greek Cypriot negotiators secured would enjoy broad-based political support in Parliament. "AKEL probably doesn't have the courage to dance, however," he charged. Further, he predicated that many Kasoulides voters might prefer Papadopoulos over Christofias because of "AKEL's attitude" (i.e., its historical animosity toward the right-wing party) and Christofias's demonization of DISY. -------------- It's All About The Cyprus Problem -------------- ¶5. (C) Echoing points the Ambassador often makes publicly, Anastassiades lamented that time to reunite the island under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal arrangement was running out. "And Cyprus has lost multiple opportunities to better the NICOSIA 00000091 002 OF 002 climate for negotiations," he added. Recent polls showed that 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots wanted a separate state, Anastassiades continued, and T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat's positions had hardened recently. Attitudes within the G/C community were tilting towards partition as well. Such a scenario represented the worst-possible outcome, Anastassiades moaned, with the Turks "enjoying a partnership with the south and absolute control of the north." ¶6. (C) In regards to Papadopoulos's expected (February 8) announcement of a new Cyprus initiative, Anastassiades doubted the measures would convince voters that he was the leader to reunify the island. "If Papadopoulos were the one, then what has he been doing the last five years?" he quipped. And why didn't his campaign ads focus on the future, instead of his "heroic" acts of saving Cyprus from the "internationally-imposed" 2004 Annan Plan? -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶7. (C) Anastassiades never has given Ioannis Kasoulides much chance of winning the presidential race. Even with Kasoulides's steady rise the past four weeks, the DISY leader's support for him still seems lukewarm. Why? Certain Embassy contacts speculate that Anastassiades might prefer a Christofias win for personal reasons: Kasoulides's defeat would make him damaged goods within the party and unable to mount a serious challenge for the DISY presidency, the theory asserts, and rumors have circulated that Christofias might "bequeath" his House Speaker position to Anastassiades in exchange for DISY leadership's support in the runoff. While we agree that Kasoulides as president would cause Anastassiades some discomfort, we're skeptical over claims he would sabotage the campaign over personal ambition, since a first-round loss could harm DISY -- and his own future -- long-term. Advance deliberation over the party's moves should it fail to advance seems prudent, however, and we agree with Anastassiades that some semblance of political cooperation between AKEL and DISY raises hopes that G/C negotiators could work a deal more flexibly, free of fear that the opposition would rubbish their efforts. SCHLICHER