CYPRUS: VISITING IO A/S HEARS BOTH SIDES OF STORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000877 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: VISITING IO A/S HEARS BOTH SIDES OF STORY Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Brian Hook visited Cyprus October 22-24 to meet Greek and Turkish Cypriot political leaders and witness firsthand peacekeeping operations of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). UNFICYP military, police, and civil affairs officials gave Hook an overview of the mission mandate and a summary of recent activity in the Buffer Zone. Similarly, representatives of the UN Good Offices mission recounted political developments since the September 3 commencement of full-fledged settlement negotiations, lamenting the slow pace and the sides' divergent positions and hinting that a more robust UN role was forthcoming. ¶2. (C) A/S Hook next engaged the political leadership of the two communities. Greek Cypriot negotiator George Iacovou insisted that RoC President Demetris Christofias possessed the requisite political will to conclude a deal, but felt frustrated by Turkish Cypriots' "extreme positions," which Ankara likely had mandated. Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou lobbied for a continued UNFICYP presence on the island, dismissing arguments that it might actually preserve the status quo; he favored a yearly (vice twice-yearly) mandate renewal, however. Continuing to talk Turkey, Kyprianou voiced concern over the GoT's recent election to a non-permanent Security Council seat. ¶3. (C) North of the Green Line, "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat presented a predictably opposite view on Cyprus Problem developments. He argued that UNFICYP was anachronistic; the operation ought be downgraded to an observer mission. As to the talks, Greek Cypriots deserved blame for the lack of progress, as they refused to negotiate using the 2004 Annan Plan -- "the culmination of 40 years of UN negotiations on Cyprus" -- as a jumping-off point. A/S Hook's visit ended with a call on hard-line T/C party leader Tahsin Ertugruloglu, who spouted typical "TRNC Forever" rhetoric. Unification of the island could only occur as the merging of two equal, sovereign states, he insisted, and Turkish guarantor/intervention rights must continue. END SUMMARY. -------------- Trip Has Two Purposes -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In his private comments and a brief statement to media after his call on Kyprianou, IO Assistant Secretary Brian Hook explained his reasons for visiting the island. First, as the State Department official ultimately responsible for U.S. participation in international peacekeeping operations, he felt it vital to obtain firsthand knowledge of their missions, challenges, and requirements. That the UNFICYP mandate renewal would occur in seven weeks' time made it more timely to see Cyprus, Hook added. Of equal importance was gauging progress in the nascent Cyprus Problem settlement negotiations. The United States valued the leaders' noteworthy efforts, Hook explained, and sought to utilize its good offices to support them. ¶5. (C) The chiefs of UNFICYP's military, civilian police, and civil affairs branches detailed the mission mandate: preventing a recurrence of hostilities on the island, and providing a constructive atmosphere for political negotiations. Chief of Staff Colonel Gerard Hughes broke down UNFICYP's 850-man force by specialty and geographic sector, and offered his estimate of Turkish troop levels (21,000),which differed greatly from Greek Cypriot assertions (40,000-plus). Dealings with oft-stubborn Turkish military leadership on Cyprus had improved of late, Hughes revealed, owing to a recent command swap-out. Civilian Police Commander Carla VanMaris explained that her forces were responsible for law and order in the 120-mile long Buffer Zone (BZ),although they depended on cooperation with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police since the UN contingent lacked arrest powers. UN CivPol also functioned as a regular liaison, since the G/C force refused direct contact with its T/C counterpart. Another element of UNFICYP's mandate lay in returning the BZ to civilian use, Civil Affairs Director Kyoko Shiotani explained, to include allowing farming and light construction. Large-scale BZ development by G/Cs was clearly provocative, however, and thus not consistent with UNFICYP's primary role of preventing renewed conflict. ¶6. (C) UNFICYP Senior Adviser Wlodek Cibor and Force Commander Mario Sanchez-Debernardi briefed A/S Hook on settlement talks developments, from Christofias's February election and the subsequent establishment of working groups NICOSIA 00000877 002 OF 003 and technical committees to the leaders' meetings this summer and the July 25 decision to commence full-fledged talks. Regrettably, discussions were not proceeding at a pace that pleased either the two sides or the UN. Both leaders could make compelling arguments why their positions were correct and the others' off-base, Cibor allowed. In general, underpinning Talat's stance was the desire for decentralization and strict bi-zonality of the unified Cyprus, while Christofias required a stronger federal entity that ensured more workable governance. In the two areas so far discussed -- competencies of the federal and component state governments, and the structure of the federal administration -- great differences in the sides' positions existed. In response to Hook's inquiry whether UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer's hands-off tactics and relative scarceness (he's officiated at only half the leaders' meetings) contributed to the slow pace, Cibor revealed that Downer likely would devote greater time to the talks after January 1 (Note: he did not/not say, however, that Downer would relocate to Cyprus in 2009, as many contacts speculate. Further, UKHC Peter Millett told the Ambassador on October 28 that Downer was loathe to abandon lucrative speaking engagements in his native Australia to work in Cyprus full-time.) As to tactics, Cibor hinted at a greater role, in stating that "we are facilitating, but not expressing our views....yet." United Nations subject-matter experts had been identified and funding allocated to pay them, should circumstances merit a more direct UN role. -------------- G/C Side: It's Turkey, Turkey, Turkey -------------- ¶7. (C) Three-time former Foreign Minister and current G/C negotiator George Iacovou had first crack at A/S Hook. Iacovou explained how President Christofias had pinned his campaign on a promise to immediately engage the T/C side on Cyprus substance. Christofias had delivered, with Iacovou pointing to the opening of the Ledra Street BZ crossing as proof. Further progress was being blocked, however, by Ankara's hard lines. "Even on Phase II of Ledra, which involves shoring up decrepit buildings and beautifying the passage, I feel the breath of the Turkish Army," he decried. Iacovou repeated an oft-heard complaint that Talat could make promises to Christofias in the negotiating rooms, but real decision-making authority remained in Turkish hands; for example, despite the T/C leader's commitment to open another crossing at Limnitis, he had failed to obtain TGS buy-in and the project had stalled. "I got my fingers burned badly on Limnitis," Iacovou exclaimed. ¶8. (C) Turning next to the core talks, the G/C negotiator voiced similar sorrow that governance matters, thought to be low-hanging fruit, had proven problematic. "I figured we could finish competencies in an hour, since there had been so much convergence in the working groups," he explained. Talat, however, had chosen to start from scratch and was deliberating nearly every point, seeking maximum responsibilities for the constituent states. Similar divergence of positions lay in the structure of the federal government; the T/C demand for a presidential council practically guaranteed unworkability, Iacovou declared. At the heart of the issue was Talat's conviction that Cyprus's federal government was a Greek Cypriot enemy, its powers to be reduced at all costs. "But it's actually a shared structure that should build trust and bring the communities together," he reasoned. ¶9. (C) Assistant Secretary Hook commenced his call on Foreign Minister Kyprianou by noting the UN had passed over 125 resolutions on Cyprus. At present, there was significant interest in New York and Washington in the current settlement process, and great desire to lend a hand in a mutually-agreed (by the sides) fashion. Kyprianou raised the continuing necessity of UNFICYP, claiming it provided not only security to Greek Cypriots but also a useful conduit to Turkish Cypriots and ultimately Turkey. UNFICYP's mandate should be left as-is, the FM contended, with the only change being yearly rollovers vice twice-yearly. ¶10. (C) Kyprianou showed that daylight existed between his personal CyProb stance and Christofias's, observing that the preparatory negotiations phase "was not significantly mature" to mandate transition to full-fledged talks. As such, the sides were not really negotiating currently, but rather expressing opening positions. Echoing Iacovou, the FM attributed the slow pace of talks to Turkish "intransigence" and questioned whether the sides would conclude negotiations on governance before Christmas. He doubted Ankara would become more flexible, especially after its election to the UN NICOSIA 00000877 003 OF 003 Security Council, "a development that concerns us greatly." Turkey, Kyprianou claimed, was acting schizophrenically, voicing support for the process and its goal of a bizonal, bicommunal Cyprus while also proclaiming the existence of two peoples and two states on the island. A direct Nicosia-Ankara communications channel might help, Kyprianou conclude. Cyprus had tried numerous times to establish it, lately through France, only to receive a Turkish rebuff, however. -------------- -------------- Northerners Cite G/C Nationalism, Desires to Dominate -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) A/S Hook next called on Talat and chief T/C negotiator Ozdil Nami. Without prompting, Talat opened with criticism of the Orthodox Church's influence on G/C society, claiming there was no counterpart Islamic role in the Turkish Cypriot community. Changing subjects, the A/S described his interest in seeing UNFICYP operations up close and personal, which drew an immediate reaction from his host. "UNFICYP should become an observer mission staffed by police, not a military peacekeeping mission," he charged. There was little sense in UNFICYP escorting weekly humanitarian convoys to enclaved Greek Cypriots in the north, for example, since the goods transported -- which fueled a thriving black market in the Karpass -- were widely available from T/C vendors. ¶12. (C) Talat shared UNFICYP and G/C dissatisfaction with the pace of settlement talks but differed over root causes. Greek Cypriots' refusal to utilize as a starting point the 2004 Annan Plan, which represented the culmination of 40-plus years of UN effort, had resulted in a chaotic process in which both sides were tabling extreme, opening positions instead of starting with Annan and negotiating its fine-tuning. Talat continued to see personal goodwill and a desire to deal with counterpart Christofias, but worried the RoC president lacked the spine to withstand expected pressures from nationalist G/Cs. ¶13. (C) Hook's trip concluded with a visit to hard-line Turkish Cypriot party UBP headquarters and its leader, Tahsin Ertugruloglu. Ertugruloglu, who had just passed south for the first time in 30-plus years to meet a G/C opposition party, set the tone for the meeting when he opined there was "nothing spectacular" about the government-controlled areas. "Sure, it's more developed," he continued, "but what we've accomplished under international isolation is far more impressive." Turkish Cypriots took their "state" seriously, Ertugruloglu asserted, any reunification must be a marriage of equals, not absorption of T/Cs by the larger Greek Cypriot community. His UBP now owned 40-45 percent of the Turkish Cypriot vote, proof that attitudes had changed greatly since the Annan Plan days, when his nationalistic party's fortunes were on the decline. ¶14. (C) Ertugruloglu offered no surprises in describing his preferred end-state. The new Cyprus must be a partnership of two sovereign states, provide continued guarantor/intervention rights for Turkey, and stipulate global property exchange and/or compensation instead of restitution and the subsequent dilution of bizonality as Greek Cypriots moved back to their homes in the north. Only this type of arrangement would prevent G/Cs from attempting to subjugate T/Cs as they had done prior to 1974. ¶15. (U) A/S Hook has cleared this message. Urbancic