CYPRUS: T/C NEGOTIATOR URGES GREATER U.S. ROLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000836 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: T/C NEGOTIATOR URGES GREATER U.S. ROLE Classified By: By Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4 (d) 1.(C) Summary: Repeating a common Turkish Cypriot (T/C) view on internationalizing the quest for a CYPROB solution, T/C negotiator Ozdil Nami urged the USG to play a more activist role in the effort. In an October 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Nami said his October 16 meeting with G/C negotiator George Iacovou was inconclusive and charged that a Greek Cypriot proposal for weighted voting was "a direct attack on political equality." The T/C negotiator said that the talks were disorganized and aimless due to Christofias, refusal to use the Annan Plan as the main frame of reference for the talks. Regarding the opening of the Limnitis-Yesilirmak crossing, he said the "ball was in the G/C court" and reiterated the T/C proposal to ship non-lethal supplies to T/C troops in the Kokkina enclave, presumably under UN-escort, in return for the opening. He refused to engage on reaching out to pro-solution forces in the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, arguing that Talat and his administration were already working to improve conditions for Orthodox worshipers in the north. The Church, he said flatly, should use established channels (the UN or G/C negotiator Iacovou). He rejected a May 2008 proposal by the RoC Minister of Education to craft a mechanism to accredit universities in the north, arguing that education*even under the 1960 constitution*was a communal, not federal, matter. He also complained that the G/Cs were using the "Straw Rule" to limit foreign meetings with Talat, most recently with the Australian FM. Overall, Nami had a much darker view of things, even since our last meeting with him on October 14. His boss continues to engage with the G/Cs, however, and appears willing to work directly with Christofias within the UN-framework. End Summary -------------- "US not showing a lot of Interest" -------------- ¶2. (C) Responding to the Ambassador,s question about a press statement by Talat, Nami said that the T/C leader was correct in that the "US was not showing a lot of interest" in the process. He charged international recognition as President of the RoC gave Christofias unwarranted "credit" without affording Talat the ability to counter with a reality check. Consequently, things were moving far too slowly, and Christofias, views more and more appeared to be merely a more "diplomatic version" of former hard-line RoC President Papadopoulos. He urged the US to level the international playing field afforded Christofias by giving Talat equal access and consideration(without going into detail as to modalities). The Ambassador said he would report Nami,s comments but reminded him that the Embassy and the USG as a whole were seriously engaged, not just watching. For the moment, however, the two leaders had taken the direct responsibility on themselves to produce results. -------------- "G/Cs want to reinvent the wheel" -------------- ¶3. (C) Nami complained that Christofias was trying to "reinvent the wheel" with his total rejection of the Annan Plan, even as a point of reference. AKEL agreed with nearly eighty percent of its content, but &Christofias is pretending it does not even exist,8 he griped. This lack of structure in the talks was causing serious delay and even, he claimed, violating the UNSG,s call to use the entire UN Body of Work, which clearly included the Annan Plan. Nami said the T/Cs were willing to address G/C concerns regarding Annan Plan shortcomings, for example the need to strengthen the executive or improve the property regime. They would even respect domestic G/C sensitivities. They were not ready, however, to "start from scratch," as this would drag out the process and imperil the &ruling8 CTP,s election chances (Note: "Parliamentary" elections are scheduled for February 2010 but may be called sooner. End Note). -------------- "Direct Attack on Political Equality" -------------- ¶4. (C) Nami said that there was no "movement" in his October 16 meeting with Iacovou. Moreover, Nami characterized Iacovou,s presentation of "weighted voting," part of a G/C-proposed presidential system, as a &direct attack on political equality." Under the G/C plan, a Greek Cypriot presidential candidate would be paired with a Turkish Cypriot vice-presidential candidate on a single ticket, with the two swapping positions at some point. This, with weighted voting, might result either in a G/C presidential candidate coming to power without majority Turkish Cypriot support, or lead to exclusion of nationalist, right-wing forces on both sides, as they would be less inclined to pair with former enemies. In response to the Ambassador,s question, Nami said that the G/Cs understood these concerns, but were unclear as to whether they could effectively address them. Nami complained that the G/Cs were fixated on the 80/20 population split, rather than on the need to give the Turkish Cypriots an effective voice. While he agreed, in line with UN resolutions, that political equality did not mean numerical equality, ratios, he argued, would have to differ depending on the institution if the T/C equities were to be protected in the long term. ¶5. (C) For his part, Nami said he preferred the Presidential Council of the Annan Plan, which would be elected by an equal number of senators from both communities, ensuring from the onset that it would enjoy a bicommunal majority. Nami said that he hoped Christofias would not insist on the idea of a "weighted vote" as it fundamentally undermined political equality, and could not be accepted by the T/Cs. -------------- -------------- "Ball in G/C court on Limnitis-Yesilirmak Opening" -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Nami said that the "ball was in the G/C court" regarding the opening of Limnitis-Yesilirmak crossing, which both leaders have committed to open. He said, however, that it was "unthinkable" to spend the 6-7 million Euros needed to upgrade the road on the T/C side and then deny the T/Cs the right to resupply their forces in the Kokkina pocket with non-lethal civilian goods. Nami claimed that UNFICYP Chief Zerihoun said the UN "would find a way", if both sides agreed, to facilitate a resupply deal, which, according to Nami, would include UNFICYP escort of T/C resupply vehicles. Nami said that his G/C counterpart said such a deal "would be difficult" and did not necessarily agree with the approach. UNFICYP COS Hughes told us separately it would be impossible for the UN to escort a military resupply mission, even if it only involved non-lethal goods. ¶7. (C) Taking another tack, the Ambassador tried to ask for Nami's view on the failed, September ad hoc opening for Greek Cypriot worshipers of the Limnitis-Yesilirmak crossing point as a CBM. The T/C refusal weakened pro-solution forces in the Greek Orthodox Church. Nami said it had been a "last minute request," which the T/Cs, despite their best intentions, could not implement. Emphasizing what Talat had told the Ambassador previously, Nami was adamant that the T/Cs never made any promises. When the Ambassador tried to raise with Nami allegations of harassment of pro-solution Greek Cypriot clergy and worshipers in the north, Nami said that those involved should address their concerns to UNFICYP or to the Greek Cypriot authorities and refused to accept a document regarding these allegations that a G/C bishop had asked the Ambassador to pass on. Nami said that Talat had a "good record" on dealing with the Church. -------------- "Education is a Communal matter, period" -------------- ¶8. (C) Nami rejected out of hand a G/C proposal to craft a bicommunal mechanism to accredit T/C universities that the RoC Minister of Education had asked the Ambassador to forward (the proposal had apparently been made to the Turks in May 2008). Nami said that education was a "communal matter" and, consequently, the G/C approach was "totally unhelpful." If the Greek Cypriots really wanted to show goodwill, Nami said he would support a proposal to create a bicommunal committee to accredit all universities on the island, not just Turkish Cypriot institutions. He also said that the Greek Cypriots should find a mechanism under which Turkish Cypriot universities could participate in the Bologna process*"not a legal impossibility", he argued. -------------- "Straw Rule Back" -------------- ¶9. (C) Nami claimed that the "Straw Rule," a holdover Papadopoulos-era G/C practice that forbid high-level foreign guests (senior ministers) from meeting with senior RoC leaders should they also call on Talat at his "Presidential Palace," was back in force. He alleged that the Australian FM was being threatened with no high-level G/C meetings should he see Talat. Consequently, instead of the T/C leader, the Australians had invited Nami to a dinner with their visiting minister. Nami was affronted by such behavior and would discuss his participation with Talat. (Note: The Straw Rule, as applied under Papadopoulos, prevented foreign visitors from meeting the RoC president only, not other cabinet-level officials. If what Nami said was true, the rule not only has re-appeared, but may be more restrictive.) ¶10. (C) Comment: Nami,s tenacious insistence on political equality underscores a sine qua non for T/C participation in the entire process. The T/Cs use the term political equality as shorthand for confirmation of their right to a continued long-term presence on the island as a distinct community with its own viable constituent state. They cling to the hope that the G/Cs will be willing to enshrine such a distinction into a final agreement, but Nami indicated the T/Cs are now worried that the G/Cs may have reneged on this fundamental principle. Meanwhile, talks resumed October 22 in a still-hopeful atmosphere, with Special Adviser Alexander Downer having left this round to be chaired by Special Representative Taye-Brook Zerihoun. On October 21, Christofias rebuffed calls from his own hard-liners to pull out of the talks, insisting he would not bow to such pressure. Hours after the October 22 meeting, Christofias flew to China for a multilateral meeting. End comment Urbancic