CYPRUS: CARTER, "ELDERS" OPTIMISTIC OVER TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000816

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CARTER, "ELDERS" OPTIMISTIC OVER TALKS,
BUT WITH RESERVATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: "I'm overwhelmingly encouraged at prospects
for Cyprus's reunification," asserted U.S. President Jimmy
Carter on October 9 in Nicosia. Carter, along with fellow
"Elders" Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former Algerian Foreign
Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, had come to Cyprus "to commend the
efforts of leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat,
lend support and encouragement to the settlement
process...but not to take an active role in the
negotiations." Press coverage in the visit run-up was mostly
factual. At an Elders-Embassy meeting early October 9, the
former President and his learned colleagues praised the
political will exhibited by the sides and voiced optimism
they might reach a deal by 2009. Troubling the Elders,
however, was the UN's so-far unhurried negotiating process
and President Christofias's apparent unwillingness to put the
negotiation in high gear. Post-departure, Turkish Cypriot
media praised President Carter's repeated mention of the 2004
Annan Plan as a basis for a settlement, while Greek Cypriot
pundits criticized the octogenarian's reference to the events
of 1974 and since as a "misunderstanding." END SUMMARY.

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Who are these Guys (and Gals)?
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2. (U) According to their website and press release, The
Elders' story began when musician Peter Gabriel and
businessman Richard Branson discussed the idea of a new
gathering of world leaders -- "people of moral standing,
independent of government or financial influence" -- to guide
and support the global village. For inspiration they looked
to traditional societies where elders are often trusted by
their people to help resolve disputes and protect the
interests of the entire community. Gabriel and Branson took
their idea to Nelson Mandela, who, at his 89th birthday in
2007, announced the formation of the group. Mandela argued
that, "with their experience and energies, along with their
profound commitment to building a better world, The Elders
can become a fiercely independent and robust force for good,
tackling complex and intractable issues." Other members
include former UNSYG Kofi Annan, former Brazilian President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and former UN High Commissioner
for Refugees Mary Robinson; Burmese opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi is an honorary Elder.

3. (C) The Elders' October 8-9 trip to Cyprus was organized
by Elders' HQ in London, the Carter Center in Atlanta, and
UNFICYP officials on the island; the Embassy was asked only
to schedule a breakfast with the Ambassador and a meeting
with EU and P-5 ambassadors at the conclusion of the visit.
On October 7, The Elders released a press bulletin outlining
the purpose of and participants in their mission. Media
devoted little coverage to the coming "deployment" of two
Nobel Peace Prize winners to Cyprus; most coverage was
back-page factual, with only a couple of journalists
questioning "who are these guys, and what possibly can they
hope to accomplish?"

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Realistic Hopes, Interesting Observations
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4. (C) President Carter began the October 9 Elders-Embassy
breakfast by soliciting the Ambassador's front-lines
perspective on the current process. How was the U.S.
perceived here, and could it play an active, positive role?
Carter long had followed events on the island, and revealed
that his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, had devoted more
time to Cyprus in 1977 than to the Middle East. He had
watched in dismay as the Greek Cypriots rejected the 2004
Annan Plan that aimed to reunify Cyprus. Could they be
convinced to accept the Plan with certain changes?


5. (C) The President next turned from substance to tactics
and atmospherics. He was aware that the current Cyprus
process, begun with optimism on September 3, had hit a rough
patch, with the sides' mutual recriminations poisoning the
negotiations' climate. He would tell both Christofias and
Talat that silence was golden, and committed himself to
promoting confidence-building measures, such as the
cancellation of military exercises "Toros" and "Nikiforos,"
to clear the air further.

6. (C) Day l's meetings with youth groups and NGO leaders had
proven fruitful, Carter assessed, and the peoples' will to
solve their problems seemed strong. The only negatives The
Elders had felt had come from UNFICYP and the negotiating
process itself. Archbishop Tutu criticized Downer, the

former Australian FM, for his limited appearances at the
negotiating table. Note: Downer's employment approximates
that of U.S. "When Actually Employed -- WAE" staff, and he is
contracted to devote only 400 hours per year, travel time
included, to the settlement effort. End Note.) "Even if he's
not doing anything, his presence on the island would have
great effect" Tutu thought.

7. (C) Nor had the UN diplomat won over Carter. No
settlement effort could succeed with three-week breaks
between meetings, he reasoned. The former President intended
to push both leaders and the UN to meet more often.
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To the Diplomats, the Elders Expound
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8. (SBU) The Elders revisited these themes and raised others
at their concluding event, and Embassy-hosted briefing for
P-5 and European Union resident ambassadors. They began
optimistically: never since the Cyprus Problem's appearance
had relatively youthful, pro-solution leaders reigned in both
communities, boding well for a settlement. The Elders had
come not to prescribe solutions, Tutu clarified, but to
cheerlead. "Now go score the touchdown," he charged. Carter
offered his positive impressions of Cypriot youth, who had
voiced their desires for greater bi-communal contacts.
Brahimi, at 74 the "baby" of the bunch, noted that an
"imperfect peace, but definitely peace," was well within the
leaders' grasp. The Elders demurred when questioned over
specific follow-up actions, but insisted that their visit was
more than high-profile tourism. "We cannot provide
panaceas," Tutu concluded, "but we can raise worldwide
interest in Cyprus."

9. (SBU) Downer, seated to President Carter's right, fielded
a question and offered his own observations of the current
negotiations. There existed the makings of a solution, he
insisted, to include the leaders' wills and their domestic
political incentives to ink a deal. Further, the
international community was acting in concert and not
offering competing plans to distract the dispute parties.
Carter asked Downer point-blank why, in the Australian's
opinion, the Annan Plan had failed, and how the UN might
learn from it. "Two main reasons," Downer replied. "It was
too long, at 9000 pages, and peoples' hard-wired instinct is
to reject things they cannot understand. And two, it was
perceived not to be a Cypriot settlement, but a UN
settlement." Simplicity and greater buy-in from the sides
were imperative, he argued.
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Press Play Either Good or Bad
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10. (SBU) Post-visit media coverage predictably differed in
the two Cypriot communities. North of the Green Line,
journalists focused on President Carter's repeated mention of
the Annan Plan and its possible use as a basis for a future
settlement. One prominent columnist took unfair potshots at
Carter for his oversized security detail, in comparison to
the other Elders', and others criticized Tutu for visiting a
Turkish- (vice T/C-owned) shop in northern Nicosia. In the
Greek Cypriot community, media pounced on Carter for stating
that the leaders, via the current settlement effort, were
trying to settle a misunderstanding that had existed for 35
years. "So a bloody invasion and occupation has been reduced
to a 'misunderstanding?'" they bitterly quipped.

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Comment
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10. (C) To many Greek Cypriots, Jimmy Carter was a
disappointment, a candidate who had espoused the
strongest-possible positions against Ankara's 1974
intervention only to fail as President to eject the Turks
from the island. It therefore came as no surprise that the
G/Cs did not exactly roll out the red carpet for him and his
colleagues -- chief negotiator George Iacovou had displayed
clear discomfort with The Elders' visit in an earlier
pull-aside with the Ambassador, and Elders' staff voiced
dismay over the hurdles the GoC was erecting, to include
insisting that Tutu acquire a Cypriot visa. Should the
negotiations gain real traction, however, the Greek Cypriots
might have Carter to thank in part. As the EU/P-5 briefing
broke, the President pulled Downer aside and seemingly
delivered a stern message on how third-parties facilitated
effective negotiations via continuity of effort and regular
attendance at gatherings. A day later, Christofias and Talat
met for 3 1/2 hours, and announced a follow-on meeting only
three days later.

Urbancic