CYPRUS: CARTER, "ELDERS" OPTIMISTIC OVER TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000816 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CARTER, "ELDERS" OPTIMISTIC OVER TALKS, BUT WITH RESERVATIONS Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: "I'm overwhelmingly encouraged at prospects for Cyprus's reunification," asserted U.S. President Jimmy Carter on October 9 in Nicosia. Carter, along with fellow "Elders" Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, had come to Cyprus "to commend the efforts of leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, lend support and encouragement to the settlement process...but not to take an active role in the negotiations." Press coverage in the visit run-up was mostly factual. At an Elders-Embassy meeting early October 9, the former President and his learned colleagues praised the political will exhibited by the sides and voiced optimism they might reach a deal by 2009. Troubling the Elders, however, was the UN's so-far unhurried negotiating process and President Christofias's apparent unwillingness to put the negotiation in high gear. Post-departure, Turkish Cypriot media praised President Carter's repeated mention of the 2004 Annan Plan as a basis for a settlement, while Greek Cypriot pundits criticized the octogenarian's reference to the events of 1974 and since as a "misunderstanding." END SUMMARY. -------------- Who are these Guys (and Gals)? -------------- ¶2. (U) According to their website and press release, The Elders' story began when musician Peter Gabriel and businessman Richard Branson discussed the idea of a new gathering of world leaders -- "people of moral standing, independent of government or financial influence" -- to guide and support the global village. For inspiration they looked to traditional societies where elders are often trusted by their people to help resolve disputes and protect the interests of the entire community. Gabriel and Branson took their idea to Nelson Mandela, who, at his 89th birthday in 2007, announced the formation of the group. Mandela argued that, "with their experience and energies, along with their profound commitment to building a better world, The Elders can become a fiercely independent and robust force for good, tackling complex and intractable issues." Other members include former UNSYG Kofi Annan, former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mary Robinson; Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi is an honorary Elder. ¶3. (C) The Elders' October 8-9 trip to Cyprus was organized by Elders' HQ in London, the Carter Center in Atlanta, and UNFICYP officials on the island; the Embassy was asked only to schedule a breakfast with the Ambassador and a meeting with EU and P-5 ambassadors at the conclusion of the visit. On October 7, The Elders released a press bulletin outlining the purpose of and participants in their mission. Media devoted little coverage to the coming "deployment" of two Nobel Peace Prize winners to Cyprus; most coverage was back-page factual, with only a couple of journalists questioning "who are these guys, and what possibly can they hope to accomplish?" -------------- Realistic Hopes, Interesting Observations -------------- ¶4. (C) President Carter began the October 9 Elders-Embassy breakfast by soliciting the Ambassador's front-lines perspective on the current process. How was the U.S. perceived here, and could it play an active, positive role? Carter long had followed events on the island, and revealed that his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, had devoted more time to Cyprus in 1977 than to the Middle East. He had watched in dismay as the Greek Cypriots rejected the 2004 Annan Plan that aimed to reunify Cyprus. Could they be convinced to accept the Plan with certain changes? ¶5. (C) The President next turned from substance to tactics and atmospherics. He was aware that the current Cyprus process, begun with optimism on September 3, had hit a rough patch, with the sides' mutual recriminations poisoning the negotiations' climate. He would tell both Christofias and Talat that silence was golden, and committed himself to promoting confidence-building measures, such as the cancellation of military exercises "Toros" and "Nikiforos," to clear the air further. ¶6. (C) Day l's meetings with youth groups and NGO leaders had proven fruitful, Carter assessed, and the peoples' will to solve their problems seemed strong. The only negatives The Elders had felt had come from UNFICYP and the negotiating process itself. Archbishop Tutu criticized Downer, the former Australian FM, for his limited appearances at the negotiating table. Note: Downer's employment approximates that of U.S. "When Actually Employed -- WAE" staff, and he is contracted to devote only 400 hours per year, travel time included, to the settlement effort. End Note.) "Even if he's not doing anything, his presence on the island would have great effect" Tutu thought. ¶7. (C) Nor had the UN diplomat won over Carter. No settlement effort could succeed with three-week breaks between meetings, he reasoned. The former President intended to push both leaders and the UN to meet more often. -------------- To the Diplomats, the Elders Expound -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Elders revisited these themes and raised others at their concluding event, and Embassy-hosted briefing for P-5 and European Union resident ambassadors. They began optimistically: never since the Cyprus Problem's appearance had relatively youthful, pro-solution leaders reigned in both communities, boding well for a settlement. The Elders had come not to prescribe solutions, Tutu clarified, but to cheerlead. "Now go score the touchdown," he charged. Carter offered his positive impressions of Cypriot youth, who had voiced their desires for greater bi-communal contacts. Brahimi, at 74 the "baby" of the bunch, noted that an "imperfect peace, but definitely peace," was well within the leaders' grasp. The Elders demurred when questioned over specific follow-up actions, but insisted that their visit was more than high-profile tourism. "We cannot provide panaceas," Tutu concluded, "but we can raise worldwide interest in Cyprus." ¶9. (SBU) Downer, seated to President Carter's right, fielded a question and offered his own observations of the current negotiations. There existed the makings of a solution, he insisted, to include the leaders' wills and their domestic political incentives to ink a deal. Further, the international community was acting in concert and not offering competing plans to distract the dispute parties. Carter asked Downer point-blank why, in the Australian's opinion, the Annan Plan had failed, and how the UN might learn from it. "Two main reasons," Downer replied. "It was too long, at 9000 pages, and peoples' hard-wired instinct is to reject things they cannot understand. And two, it was perceived not to be a Cypriot settlement, but a UN settlement." Simplicity and greater buy-in from the sides were imperative, he argued. -------------- Press Play Either Good or Bad -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Post-visit media coverage predictably differed in the two Cypriot communities. North of the Green Line, journalists focused on President Carter's repeated mention of the Annan Plan and its possible use as a basis for a future settlement. One prominent columnist took unfair potshots at Carter for his oversized security detail, in comparison to the other Elders', and others criticized Tutu for visiting a Turkish- (vice T/C-owned) shop in northern Nicosia. In the Greek Cypriot community, media pounced on Carter for stating that the leaders, via the current settlement effort, were trying to settle a misunderstanding that had existed for 35 years. "So a bloody invasion and occupation has been reduced to a 'misunderstanding?'" they bitterly quipped. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) To many Greek Cypriots, Jimmy Carter was a disappointment, a candidate who had espoused the strongest-possible positions against Ankara's 1974 intervention only to fail as President to eject the Turks from the island. It therefore came as no surprise that the G/Cs did not exactly roll out the red carpet for him and his colleagues -- chief negotiator George Iacovou had displayed clear discomfort with The Elders' visit in an earlier pull-aside with the Ambassador, and Elders' staff voiced dismay over the hurdles the GoC was erecting, to include insisting that Tutu acquire a Cypriot visa. Should the negotiations gain real traction, however, the Greek Cypriots might have Carter to thank in part. As the EU/P-5 briefing broke, the President pulled Downer aside and seemingly delivered a stern message on how third-parties facilitated effective negotiations via continuity of effort and regular attendance at gatherings. A day later, Christofias and Talat met for 3 1/2 hours, and announced a follow-on meeting only three days later. Urbancic