KOSOVO: CYPRIOTS AGREE ON ESDP CONOPS, NOT YET

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000080 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/SCE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KO SE CY SUBJECT: KOSOVO: CYPRIOTS AGREE ON ESDP CONOPS, NOT YET THERE ON DEPLOYMENT REF: A. "USEU TODAY 1/30/08" ¶B. 07 NICOSIA 979 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Cypriot Political Director Euripides Evriaviades claimed victory in seeing the Kosovo ESDP Concept of Operations document stripped of text "dangerous" to the Republic of Cyprus, leaving instead acceptable, "status-neutral" language. Cyprus has not yet agreed to support the deployment of the EU force, however, citing legal deficiencies in UNSCR 1244. Bringing the RoC to "yes" on the ESDP mission looks difficult but not impossible (as convincing them to recognize Kosovo would be). As to tactics, we recommend putting our own, more flexible interpretation of 1244 front-and-center. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Evriviades summoned the Ambassador January 30 to demarche on unrelated subjects, but the conversation turned quickly to Kosovo, since the MFA official only hours before had returned from the GAERC in Brussels where Balkans matters figured high. "On the ESDP Concept of Operations, we're there," he noted. The original ConOps draft had troubled Cyprus greatly, being full of references that essentially demanded member-states recogize Kosovo. After hours of hard give-and-take, the status-neutral text that emerged was acceptable to Nicosia, Evriviades clarified. ¶3. (C) Not all of Cyprus's concerns had been met, however; it remained worried over the legal basis for the ESDP deployment in Kosovo (a day earlier, Foreign Minister Erato Marcoullis had announced that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 was insufficient to allow the EU to undertake a rule of law mission in Kosovo). Evriviades complained that his EU counterparts were attempting to "cherry-pick" the UNSCR in drafting the Kosovo Joint Action document; like Marcoullis earlier, he warned that a partial introduction of 1244 could set negative precedent for the Cyprus issue. Cypriot legal sensibilities also were stoked by Ban Ki Moon's attempts to make international law via personal pronouncement, Evriviades argued, pointing to the UNSYG having "taken note" of the December GAERC's findings on Kosovo. Only the UN Security Council held such powers, Cyprus believed. ¶4. (C) Evriviades had worked the phones in recent hours, calling fellow PolDirs from a handful of EU countries in an attempt to explain Cyprus's ESDP position and win converts to its arguments. Kosovo was a matter of principle and precedent for the RoC, he explained; it was willing to fight hard for both. And regardless of countless declarations from all sides claiming Kosovo was sui generis, Cyprus continued to fear that Turkey would attempt to capitalize on the situation to build support for an upgraded "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." ¶5. (C) Cyprus would "never" recognize Kosovo, Evriviades stated firmly. Yet the Kosovars' "Managed Declaration of Independence" -- the international community's latest term d'art, he chuckled -- would soon arrive, and he was certain that many capitals would recognize Europe's newest "state." He understood the Secretary did not want to delay the MDI until March, as Spain and other EU member-states wished. Putting the declaration off a month would result in more countries backing it, he wagered. But not the entire EU -- Brussels was far from adopting a consensus position. On the Balkans the Europeans were divided, he asserted, highlighting their recent failure to secure an SAA for Serbia at the January GAERC. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: On Kosovo recognition, the Greek Cypriots would willingly tolerate 26-1 isolation in Brussels over fear of creating negative precedent. This fear, always present, is especially vivid now, with the prospect of Turkey taking a seat on the Security Council, and with some Turkish Cypriots talking about the need to abolish UNSCR 186, a cornerstone of international recognition of Nicosia as the legitimate government of the entire island. As to deploying the ESDP rule-of-law mission in Kosovo, however, we believe they want to get to "yes." The best approach to erase the RoC's legalistic red lines would entail emphasizing our own, broader interpretation of UNSCR 1244, with the demarche delivered in coordination with our European allies. SCHLICHER