CYPRUS: DENKTASH SCION NOT HOPEFUL ON PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000782

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: DENKTASH SCION NOT HOPEFUL ON PROSPECTS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: By Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1
.4(d)

1.(C) Summary: "Turkey is ready to get rid of the Cyprus
Problem in exchange for EU membership", Denktash family scion
and leader of the center-right Democrat Party (DP)Serdar
Denktash told the Ambassador during a September 25 courtesy
call. He said that AKP was "very sincere" in its
pro-solution stance and support of Talat. Eventual Turkish
EU accession, which he himself deemed highly unlikely,would
also obviate the necessity for Turkish guarantees in Cyprus
and Acquis derogations on freedom of movement. Even the
Turkish military was on board, but wanted the continuation of
Turkish guarantees to protect Turkey,s southern flank.
Denktash claimed he supported a solution, but was "not
hopeful," given what he termed the "Hellenistic bent" of the
Greek Cypriots. If the G/Cs could only accept the duality of
sovereignty (i.e., that it emanates equally from both the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot peoples),then other thorny
issues like property and territory, could be solved. He also
made a plea for equal treatment in international for and
international mediafor T/C leader Talat, and warned that the
Turkish Cypriots were simply not ready for EU accession. The
Ambassador pledged support for the on-going UN-brokered
process and urged Denktash, both on the island and in Turkey,
to press T/C and Turkish leaders to make public statements of
support and flexibility. End Summary.

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"Turkey wants to get rid of the Cyprus Problem"
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2. (C) Denktash told the Ambassador that Turkey (the AKP
government and PM Erdogan) desired to "get rid of the Cyprus
problem" to open the door to EU entry. While he noted, in
response to the Ambassador,s query, that Ankara rejected
linkage of the two issues, the road to Brussels for Erdogan
clearly passed first through Cyprus. To that end, the
Turkish government was supporting Talat and was, as far as
Denktash could perceive, "sincere" in its efforts. He agreed
with the Ambassador,s comment that, despite widespread G/C
thinking to the contrary, it was unlikely that the carrot of
EU membership could be wielded as a stick against Ankara to
wring concessions on fundamental principles.


3. (C) From his own T/C perspective, Denktash saw a
positive linkage between a CYPROB solution and Turkey,s
entry into the EU. For example, Acquis derogations on freedom
of movement for G/Cs in a future Turkish Cypriot constituent
state could be dropped once Turkey got into the EU. Denktash
joked that at that time, the Greek Cypriots themselves will
demand derogations against Turkey (regarding immigration of
its nationals to Cyprus). He also
said that Turkish guarantees might be lifted after Ankara,s
EU accession provided, of course, that Greece, Turkey, and
the UK agreed. Ultimately, however, he weakened his own
points by scoffing that Turkey would never accede. "Too many
problems", he quipped.

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TGS balances solution and strategic concerns
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4. (C) Denktash, whose father Rauf by all accounts here is
revered by the Turkish military and has excellent access to
its leadership, said that even the TGS wanted the Cyprus
problem to be solved, though it was less keen than AKP and
leaning more towards the the U.S. than the EU. In response
to the Ambassador,s query regarding a justification for a
continued Turkish troop presence on Cyprus, Denktash said
Turkey wanted a continuation of guarantees both to protect
the T/C community on the island and to guard the mainland,s
southern flank from attack. Limiting the area under Turkish
guarantee just to ensure establishment of the future Turkish
Cypriot constituent state, according to Denktash, would be
insufficient for those in Turkey who saw Cyprus as a buffer.
(Note: Some of Talat,s advisers have told us that, as a last
ditch effort to save the solution process, they could accept
a limitation of Turkish guarantees to the T/C constituent
state, and hinted that Ankara would not oppose. End Note).
Barring a solution, however, Denktash said he would oppose
even the withdrawal of one hundred troops. He argued that
the stability afforded by Turkish troops had contributed
greatly to G/C economic growth by
eliminating the risk of inter-communal conflict.

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NICOSIA 00000782 002 OF 002


"We Need a New Federal State"
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5. (C) Denktash said that he supported a solution as long as
it resulted in a "new federal state", not a mere "patch" of
the "TRNC" on the existing Republic of Cyprus (RoC).
Otherwise, he argued, the rights of Turkish Cypriots would be
forfeited, either politically or economically. The best way
to secure "forever" the future of Turkish Cypriots on the
island was through Greek Cypriot acceptance of the dual
origin of sovereignty, i.e., that sovereignty emanates from
both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot peoples. If that
were conceded, Denktash said that his party was willing to
renounce unilateral secession. Unfortunately, he said that
the G/C position on sovereignty "was far beneath" his
expectations, and there was "no common ground." (Note: The
G/Cs presently claim that sovereignty is single and
indivisible and emanates from the "people of Cyprus." T/Cs
fear such a formulation over time will lead to their
absorption in the larger Greek Cypriot society. End Note).
Denktash complained that Greek Cypriots view Cyprus as a
purely "Hellenic" island where the Turkish Cypriots, simply
put, have no place.


6. (C) Should the G/Cs compromise on sovereignty, other
seemingly tough issues, such as property and territory, could
be solved, he said. Denktash pointed out that his party did
not reject the right of return for G/C displaced (a core
Greek Cypriot demand) as long as it was balanced with the
other "humanitarian issues", i.e. with the fate of Turkish
Cypriots and others who have, in the interim, settled on
Greek Cypriot-titled property. He said that he did not seek
an "ethnically pure state" as some Greek Cypriots claimed.
At the same time, however, he told the
Ambassador that the "vast majority" of the population in the
north would always have to be Turkish Cypriot.

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T/Cs Not Ready for the EU
--------------


7. (C) Denktash was brutally honest over the lack of T/C
economic competitiveness in comparison to Greek Cypriots or
the rest of the EU: "near zero." Consequently, he said that
T/Cs needed time to prepare for EU accession, and regretted
that the preparation process had not commenced sooner,
ideally after the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004. When
the Ambassador pointed out that permanent Acquis derogations
were neither probable nor helpful in the long-term, Denktash
agreed, noting that the only area where he sought such
derogations was over land sales to foreigners, for which
there were precedents elsewhere, without clarifying further.

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We want equal treatment
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8. (C) Denktash complained that the Turkish Cypriots are
forced to "tell our story" through Turkey because of their
lack of international recognition or access to mainstream
international media. Without prejudice to the status of the
"TRNC", Denktash called on the USG and the EU to afford
Talat, in his capacity as Turkish Cypriot leader, equal
access to government officials during the negotiation
process. He complained that Christofias traveled the world
as RoC President, "telling his story", while Talat was shut
out.


9. (C) For his part, the Ambassador underscored USG support
for both the present UN-brokered process and for Talat and
Christofias. He said that the Embassy would listen carefully
and report fairly, and sought ways, without interfering, of
improving the atmosphere around the talks. To that end, he
urged Denktash in his encounters on and off the island to
call on policy makers to make symbolic, though unqualified,
gestures of support and flexibility.


10. (C) Comment: Despite charges, at times deserved, of
rarely straying from the ideological shadow of his "Deep
State" father, Serdar Denktash this time toed a largely
moderate line. Many of the issues he raised, such as the
dual origin of sovereignty, the need for Turkish guarantees,
and deep-seated fears of Greek Cypriot/ Hellenistic
domination, are shared by the majority of mainstream Turkish
Cypriot parties. End Comment.
Urbancic