CYPRIOT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000070

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT, EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: ASEC ECON PTER PREL PGOV ETTC EAID EFIN CY
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES

REF: SECSTATE 6461

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) This telegram contains Embassy Nicosia's assessment
of critical infrastructure and key resources on Cyprus which,
if destroyed, disrupted, or exploited, might have an
immediate and deleterious effect on the United States.
Embassy responses are keyed in Reftel order.


2. (SBU) Reftel Paragraphs 7, 8: The Embassy does not
believe that the loss of Cyprus-owned physical
infrastructure, nor the interruption of key resource exports
from the island, would immediately affect the security,
national economic security, and/or public health or safety of
the United States. A Connecticut-sized Mediterranean island
some 5000 miles from the East Coast of the United States,
Cyprus simply is too small, too distant, and too lacking in
natural resources to affect U.S. interests in that fashion.
We are unaware of any direct physical linkages, such as
pipelines or undersea telephone cables, between Cyprus and
the United States, for example. Similarly, there are no sole
or predominantly Cyprus-sourced minerals or chemicals on
which U.S. industry is dependent.


3. (C) Reftel Para 10: Under the terms of the 1960
independence treaties, Great Britain was allowed to retain
two "Sovereign Base Areas" (SBAs) and several isolated sites
scattered throughout Cyprus, such as the RAF radar dome on
Mt. Olympus, the island's highest point, and various antenna
arrays in Ayios Nikolaos, near Famagusta. Via varied formal
agreements and informal arrangements, the United States
enjoys some access to and benefits from these UK facilities.
Unlike the Cyprus-owned infrastructure noted above, the
damage or complete loss of SBA-housed facilities would pose a
threat to our national security interests in the eastern
Mediterranean.


4. (C) Reftel Paras 11, 12: Cyprus has engaged in limited
study of threats to its own critical infrastructure/key
resources. For example, after the July/August 2006
evacuation from Lebanon of over 80,000 foreign nationals
through Cyprus, GoC officials established a working group to
deal with crisis operations, and the Greek Cypriot National
Guard soon will conduct a related crisis simulation. In
general, however, most Cypriot decision-makers do not
consider the island's infrastructure and resources to be
threatened and have placed little emphasis on protecting
them. For example, although the island depends heavily on
financial services and banking, contacts reveal a
near-absence of state-of-the-art data protection facilities
and procedures. Similarly, Cyprus's waterworks, especially
its desalinization plants, are nearly unguarded and therefore
susceptible to sabotage.


5. (SBU) Embassy staff regularly raise these concerns with
Cypriot interlocutors and have offered ideas, funding, and
training to meet them. Meriting special mention is the
Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program,
responsible for providing, inter alia, radiation monitors and
underwater surveillance cameras to Cypriot Ports and Customs
officials. Other Mission elements have engaged Cypriot
counterparts in hopes of improving their humanitarian relief
and crisis response operations.
SCHLICHER