CYPRIOTS TORN BETWEEN SUPPORTING RUSSIA, GEORGIA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000660

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY RU GG
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS TORN BETWEEN SUPPORTING RUSSIA, GEORGIA'S
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

REF: A. SECSTATE 86108

B. USNATO 281

Classified By: Political Chief Gregory Macris, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) In response to Ref A, PolChief on August 12 demarched
Cyprus MFA Russia Desk Officer Alkys Ieromonachou and
Ministerial Counselor Charis Christodoulidou, emphasizing
that the Euro-Atlantic community must act in concert to
condemn Russian aggression in Georgia, demand an immediate
cease-fire, and insist that Moscow withdraw its military
forces from the entirety of Georgian territory. Ieromonachou
was scrambling to prepare briefing materials for Foreign
Minister Markos Kyprianou, who was cutting short his holidays
to attend the August 13 GAERC. He was focusing his drafting
on a "who did what, when" timeline in response to the
Minister's request, and lamented that authoritative
information was difficult to obtain. Both the Georgian and
Russian heads of mission had called on him that morning, and
predictably offered accounts that differed 180 degrees.
Ieromonachou accepted our points and promised to incorporate
them into his briefer for Kyprianou. Evaluating our
proposals for the GAERC statement, he ventured that Cyprus
would back a strong expression of support for Georgian
territorial integrity and sovereignty, an immediate demand
for a cease-fire, commencement of negotiations that aimed for
a lasting political settlement, and efforts to prevent a
humanitarian disaster on the ground. Ieromonachou demurred
when pressed whether Cyprus would publicly demand full
Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia and/or urge that
Brussels send Russia the message that its aggression in the
Caucusus could damage long-term relations with the West. On
the statement negotiation process, he doubted Cyprus would
take a leadership role or risk isolation, thinking instead it
would opt to follow consensus.


2. (C) Christodoulidou, of late the Cypriot MFA's chief
staffer at the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC),
noted that no draft GAERC conclusions had yet been
circulated. In formulating its position on the Georgia
crisis, Minister Kyprianou would need to weigh Cyprus's
historically close ties to Russia against its general support
for sovereign nations' territorial integrity. Hinting at the
direction Kyprianou might turn, Christodolidou, while
accepting that Russia's response to Georgian military
operations in South Ossetia was not commensurate with its
(Moscow's) stated objectives, cautioned that the West's
response must also not be disproportionate. Cutting off
high-level EU-Russia dialogue, as some of the "hard-line" EU
member states were clamoring for, seemed counter-productive,
she thought. Christodoulidou ventured that discussions at
the PSC and subsequent GAERC would approximate those at the
August 11 NATO Political Committee meeting (Ref B),with many
former East Bloc nations opting for tough language and others
preaching a more balanced approach.


3. (C) COMMENT: Cyprus finds itself between the proverbial
rock and hard place on Georgia, torn between its instinctive
support for Moscow -- which has grown more intense since
Communist AKEL party SG Demetris Christofias became president
in February -- and its equally fervent backing of
international law and smaller nations' territorial integrity.
Throw in fears that Ossetia and Abkhazia represent more
precedent for large nations to recognize the breakaway
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," and you have a recipe
for major policy indigestion in Nicosia. Our sense, however,
is that Cyprus will fall into the "balanced approach" camp of
EU member-states, supporting a statement that calls on all
parties to the dispute to end hostilities and negotiate
politically, but opposing efforts to assign blame or somehow
punish Russia.
HADLEY