CHRISTOFIAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000628 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2023 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: CHRISTOFIAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS REF: A. SCHLICHER-FRIED EMAIL OF JULY 31 ¶B. NICOSIA 531 ¶C. NICOSIA 558 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: If he and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat could not reunite Cyprus, then who could? RoC President Demetris Christofias told the Ambassador during the latter's farewell call July 31. President Christofias, while pleased with the outcome of the March-July preparatory phase and subsequent leaders' decision to commence full-fledged negotiations in September, recognized that areas of disagreement still exceeded points of convergence in the sides' positions on many fundamental issues. Making the settlement track more difficult still was Talat's tenuous political situation in the north, although the decision in the AKP closure case and ally Turkish PM Erdogan's survival spelled some relief for the T/C leader. Christofias confidently claimed he enjoyed greater maneuvering room, with even hard-liners like the Archbishop now publicly supporting the drive for a solution. Regarding appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy for Cyprus, the RoC president felt the time not yet right, but did not oppose the move in theory. END SUMMARY. -------------- Moving Forward, But Challenges Remain -------------- ¶2. (C) Archbishop Chrysostomos II only minutes before had departed the Presidential Palace. "I received his 'blessing' for my negotiating efforts," the long-time Communist chuckled, "since he thinks I'm doing my utmost to protect Greek Cypriot interests. He even had accepted the notion of a federal solution, as long as it had the appropriate content." Benediction aside, Christofias considered the hard-line, camera-hungry Primate a political threat capable of withdrawing his support at a moment's notice. Unsurprisingly, the President voiced his intention to keep the Church out of politics while at the same time maintaining close relationships with more friendly members of the Holy Synod. ¶3. (C) Christofias turned next to the latest gathering of the leaders, held July 25. "I'm satisfied, both with the meeting and the statement that emerged," he informed the Ambassador. Full-fledged negotiations commencing next month would begin with a protocolary meeting that the President ;hoped would be low-key, despite the presence of new UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer. The leaders and their representatives would begin work in earnest on September 11, and Job 1 would entail setting the ground rules for the negotiations. Once per week Talat and Christofias would meet; Talat had wanted an increased frequency, the President revealed, but the staffwork such a schedule demanded would have proven excessive. ¶4. (C) "Reservedly optimistic" described Christofias's outlook vis-a-vis the process. "If old comrades like Mehmet Ali (Talat) and I cannot succeed, then who can?" he reasoned. That said, the President recognized that points of convergence during the preparatory, working groups/technical committees exercise occurred mainly on non-controversial matters. Tougher issues -- property returns, territorial adjustments, and security/guarantees, inter alia -- the leaders had put off, in order to build confidence between the negotiating teams. Christofias even doubted that Talat had Ankara's permission to negotiate on particularly sensitive topics like Turkish troop withdrawals. ¶5. (C) The T/C leader felt constrained not only by Ankara, but by his opposition at home as well, Christofias asserted. Nationalist parties DP and UBP saw electoral benefits in a failed process and would oppose Talat at every opportunity. When the T/C leader had agreed on July 1 to mention of the unified Cypriot state's single sovereignty and citizenship, DP and UBP quickly trumpeted that Talat had violated his "oath of office" mandating he protect the "TRNC" and uphold its "constitution." Talat had shown a willingness to take on the Deep Staters before, the President continued, such as when he announced that no federal state worldwide maintained multiple international personalities and citizenship. He would need to exhibit continued political courage if the negotiations were to succeed, Christofias thought. Buoying Talat somewhat was the recent Turkish court decision that spared AKP and PM Tayyip Erdogan, the T/C leader's ally in NICOSIA 00000628 002 OF 003 Ankara. "Talat even told me he'd asked Erdogan to come to Cyprus to help him politically, Christofias revealed (Ref C). While the Deep State would continue to oppose good-faith Cyprus negotiations, the President thought Erdogan had regained the upper hand. "Now he's got to let Talat negotiate," he argued. ¶6. (C) Christofias faced weaker opponents and had more room to maneuver, he ventured. DISY leadership supported his Cyprus Problem stance which, combined with support from AKEL, meant he enjoyed the backing of 65 percent of Cypriot voters. DIKO President Marios Karoyian had succeeded in delivering that party's support, although it remained tenuous. Even EDEK and leader Yiannakis Omirou had toned down its anti-federal solution rhetoric. "Let's rest a bit in August and then move forward," he ended, confidently. -------------- Maintaining Momentum on U.S.-Cyprus Relations -------------- ¶7. (C) Changing subjects, Christofias welcomed that relations between his government and Washington had steadily improved since their nadir in the wake of the failed April 2004 Annan Plan referendum. "Many of the old suspicions, much of the unpleasantness, is gone now," he explained. Critics, especially those opposed to the solution effort, were even claiming he was "under the Americans' and British thumbs," the President chuckled, an allusion to his AKEL party's anti-imperialist, anti-American bent. Christofias hoped Cypriots could overcome their perceived slights at the hands of the United States and move on. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador agreed the course of bilateral relations pointed upward. On a wealth of bilateral and multilateral fronts the United States enjoyed close cooperation with the RoC, and he was certain his successor aimed for even greater cooperation. The healthier relationship augured well for Cyprus Problem negotiations as well, the Ambassador reasoned, leaving the United States in a better position to support the process. In that vein, he lambasted recent efforts by a DC-based Greek Cypriot journalist, Michael Ignatiou, whose recent columns alleged that the possible naming of a U.S. Cyprus envoy was driving Washington and Nicosia apart (Ref A). What was the President's opinion regarding the position? ¶9. (C) Christofias, who knew Ignatiou well, promised to contact the journalist to follow up; he was unsure what had motivated the misinformation campaign. The President was not against a US envoy in theory, but did not believe the time was right. "Let's wait a bit, to see how things are going," Christofias offered, claiming he had said the same to visiting EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried on July 7 (Ref B). He was in no position to oppose the nomination anyway, he explained. Probing further, the Ambassador inquired whether a "regional" U.S. envoy, who would include the Cyprus portfolio in addition to other confict-resolution responsibilities, was preferable to a dedicated one. After musing a minute, he responded that he favored a "Tom Weston-type appointment." Christofias insisted, however, that it was vital the Cypriots themselves maintain ownership of the current process, since the &imposition8 of the 2004 Annan Plan had caused his community great harm. ¶10. (C) Christofias last offered his opinion on how the international community might best support upcoming negotiations. Unsurprisingly, he asked that the USG concentrate its efforts in Turkey. A behind-the-scenes, steady effort to convince PM Erdogan and other power players to allow Talat freedom to negotiate constituted the most valuable U.S. contribution to the process, the President avowed. If "left alone," Talat would negotiate in good faith and work toward a solution, he was certain. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Christofias seemed unusually candid and care-free July 31, perhaps the product of carrying an 85 percent approval rating into the August vacation period. His observations on the difficulty of upcoming negotiations jibe closely with ours and the UN's, however -- one UNFICYP official claimed differences in the sides positions on core issues outnumbered convergences 10 to 1. Getting to "Yes" will require great compromises from both sides, and NICOSIA 00000628 003 OF 003 Christofias, in working hard to ensure that even firebrands like the Archbishop and DIKO at least nominally back him, has taken an excellent first step. As the President rightly noted, though, Talat's hand looks far weaker against his opponents, both home-grown and in Turkey. If the current effort to achieve a solution to the Cyprus Problem is to succeed, the T/C leader will have to enjoy active support, or at a bare minimum avoid vetoes, from both the civilian leadership in Ankara and the generals. SCHLICHER