ERDOGAN VISIT: LIMITED CHEST-THUMPING BY THE PM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000558

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN VISIT: LIMITED CHEST-THUMPING BY THE PM,
LIMITED GROUSING BY GREEK CYPRIOTS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD L. SCHLICHER FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and 1.
4(d)

1.(C) Summary: Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan reaffirmed
support for the solution efforts of Turkish Cypriot (T/C)
leader Mehmet Ali Talat by delivering a relatively-balanced
message that neither angered dyed-in-the wool T/C solution
types nor, despite much venting, drove Greek Cypriots to the
barricades during his July 18-20 visit to commemorate the
1974 Turkish "Peace Operation." Only pro-Denktash "TRNC
Forever" types were left out in the cold by Erdogan,s lack
of chest-thumping. The Turkish PM voiced support for the
ongoing UN-brokered process -- ideally with a solution by the
end of 2008 -- to create a "new partnership state" between
two founding/constituent states based on political equality,
in the framework of the UN parameters (read Annan Plan),and
with the continuation of Turkish guarantees-- all long
established Turkish-T/C positions. For his part, T/C leader
Mehmet Ali Talat was completely on message with the Turkish
PM. Talat told the Ambassador today that the Turkish
government is considering a reshuffling of funds within
existing Turkish aid, not additional money, to cover a
yawning budget deficit that threatens the pro-solution yet
administratively inept Republican Turkish Party (CTP)
"government." Erdogan apparently also hinted to Talat that
closure of AKP may not be a done deal. Erdogan's visit
prompted a clamor of negative reactions from Greek Cypriots
(G/C),but no indication -- even from DIKO and EDEK -- that
it would trigger G/Cs to disrupt the expected announcement of
the start of full-fledged negotiations on July 25. Erdogan,s
message -- which held no real surprises -- confirms what our
T/C contacts have been telling us all along: Erdogan, even
more than Gul, is the real pro-solution locomotive in Ankara,
and the cash bail-out, should it happen, will put money
directly behind the pro-solution Talat and his CTP
"government." Absent that injection, the "Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" may have to go to early elections
later this year or early next, opening up the possibility of
stormy cohabitation between a Denktashian National Unity
Party (UBP) and Talat. End Summary.


-------------- Fanfare and a message to please most Turkish
Cypriots... --------------



2. (SBU) Accompanied by eight ministers -- most of his
cabinet -- Turkish PM Erdogan descended on the "TRNC" in a
July 18-21 three-day visit that showcased acrobatic flyovers,
joint cabinet meetings, a bevy of Turkish-financed ceremonial
openings, and, most importantly, a forceful and unequivocal
message of support for the solution efforts of T/C leader
Talat. Our contacts tell us that they have rarely seen such
pomp, noting that some Turkish PMs -- though never Erdogan --
did not even bother to visit the island to commemorate the
1974 Turkish "Peace Operation."



3. (SBU) In an oft-repeated message that a well-respected T/C
columnist dubbed his "most comprehensive to date," Erdogan
laid out his vision of a solution: a just, sustainable, and
comprehensive agreement between two founding/constituent
states based on the equality of two peoples, within the
framework of the UN parameters, and with the maintenance of
Turkish guarantees. Furthermore, the Turkish PM noted that
the solution should be based on the consensus achieved in May
23rd Leaders, Agreement, much beloved by the T/Cs for its
enshrinement of the concept of "two equal constituent states"
(which T/Cs suggest currently exist, but which G/Cs say will
exist only after implementation of a negotiated settlement).



4. (SBU) Erdogan added, though clearly not as his main focus,
that a solution had to be in line with the "principle of a
virgin birth," stating as well that the Annan Plan could not
be dismissed. He repeatedly pointed out that any solution had
to correspond to "realities" on the island--Turkish code for
the existence of "two democracies, two states, and two
economies"--language that Erdogan avoided, but that President
Gul had used during his September 2007 visit and again in a
letter presented this time to Talat.

-------------- ...by pledging support for a "Turkish Cypriot State" and
defense of T/C sovereignty --------------

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5. (C) In an ambiguous sop to hard-liners infuriated over
Talat,s agreement on July 1 to "single sovereignty and
citizenship," Erdogan added that a "Turkish Cypriot State"
would be established, but that sovereignty would "not be
bargained." Talat,s Private Secretary Asim Akansoy told us
on July 21 that Erdogan,s support for a "Turkish Cypriot
State" is, at present, clearly limited to the framework of a
UN-brokered solution. Nevertheless, should that effort
collapse, Turkey will still remain at the side of the T/Cs
and defend their "state." He added that Erdogan supports all
three agreements the two leaders have managed to hammer out
(March 21, May 23, July 1),as long as they are taken in
their entirety -- ironically, the same message that President
Christofias gave to A/S Fried regarding these three documents.


-------------- Turkish Funds to keep the T/C pro-solution government
afloat? --------------



6. (C) In a July 22 lunch with the Ambassador, Talat said
that the Turkish government is still considering a
CTP-"government" request to switch aid funds from
infrastructure projects to the current budget, largely to
fund salaries and social-transfer payments. He gave no
indication regarding Ankara's decision, either negative or
positive. The "government" needs such budget support to close
a deficit estimated at 165 million USD in addition to earlier
Turkish support. Barring the additional funds, T/C contacts,
including Akansoy and CTP General Secretary Omer Kalyoncu,
tell us that the pro-solution CTP "government"-- which has
stumbled from crisis to crisis, most stemming from battles
with public sector workers over failed belt-tightening
measures aimed at reining in a bloated public sector--might
very well have to go to early elections in the next six
months or so, thus opening the possibility of an election
victory by the Denktashian, right-wing National Unity Party
(UBP).



7. (C) Talat, who had a 90-minute one-on-one with Erdogan on
July 19 and a four-hour "family dinner" the same day
according to Akansoy, thought that AKP might not be closed
after all. While Talat did not directly attribute this to
Erdogan, he said that many in Turkey believed that closure of
the party would set things back, while keeping the party open
would show to the EU the independence of the judiciary and
might jump-start Turkish EU accession. In response to a
question from the Ambassador, he said AKP, if it survives the
closure case, would focus on the economy and EU accession,
not hot-button issues like headscarves.


-------------- Talat: On message with Erdogan (or vice-versa?) --------------



8. (U) In his July 19 television address, Talat tracked
Erdogan,s message, voicing strong support for the
UN-brokered process as well as gratitude for Turkish aid and
encouragement. Like Erdogan, he said that a solution
condemning the T/Cs to minority status or assimilation, or
one threatening their security, is unacceptable. His policy,
he said, is to achieve the goal approved in 2004, "a just
solution." The T/C leader expressed hope that the July 25
leaders, meeting will lead to the start of negotiations.
Talat repeated that Turkish Cypriots will never give up
Turkish guarantorship, and that the presence of
Turkish troops on the island is the result, not the cause, of
the present problem. Talat called for an end of the "unjust"
isolation of the T/Cs and demanded that the international
community, and especially the EU, keep its promises.


-------------- Most T/Cs happy with Visit --------------



9. (C) At the July 22 lunch with Ambassador, Talat said he
was very pleased with the Erdogan visit and the public show
of support, but did not go into great detail. Akansoy, his
private secretary, told us that the T/C leader was extremely
pleased with the show of Turkish government support, as it
clears up any Greek Cypriot doubt regarding Erdogan,s true

NICOSIA 00000558 003 OF 003


intentions towards Talat. He also pointed out that Erdogan,
by and large, never went beyond Talat,s basic pro-solution
talking points, a fact not lost on many T/C columnists, who
noted the absence of "TRNC Forever" language-- a staple of
previous Turkish PMs. Even those on the pro-solution left
critical of the Turkish "big brother," such as Mehmet Cakici
of the Social Democratic Party (TDP),told us the Erdogan
visit was overall neither positive nor negative. The
right-wing nationalist crowd was split. Some nationalist
columnists were thankful for Erdogan,s support of a "Turkish
Cypriot State," interpreting it, most likely, as support for
independence or a loose confederation, while others lamented
his abandonment of the "TRNC."


-------------- Greek Cypriots vent, but nothing worse --------------



10. (SBU) Greek Cypriots were vexed, not only by the timing
of the visit -- coming a mere week before the crucial July 25
Christofias-Talat meeting, but also by Erdogan's statements
regarding "two founding states," "two equal peoples" and a
"new partnership." President Christofias said that Erdogan,
through his statements, "proves his credentials to the
Turkish deep state." He, however, quickly added that
Erdogan,s maximalism will not change the G/C commitment to
basic principles or their good will. DIKO and EDEK, which are
coalition partners in the government but take a more suspect
view on starting full-fledged negotiations, voiced harsher
criticism than DISY and AKEL. Nevertheless, their anger did
not rise to a level that should jeopardize what is expected
to be an announcement of the start of full-fledged
negotiations on July 25.



11. (C) Comment: Erdogan,s visit could have been much worse,
but probably could not have been much better barring Turkish
abandonment of basic negotiating positions like guarantorship
and a "new partnership state." While the Turkish lion did not
lay down with the Greek Cypriot lamb, Erdogan ditched the
typical rhetoric of past PMs and clearly upset those who want
a continuation of the "TRNC"-- not a small group, truth be
told. More importantly, he did not pull any surprises, and
his pledge not to give up "Turkish Cypriot Sovereignty" was
rhetorical payback for what most T/Cs, including Talat, view
as Christofias,s insistence on July 1 to get T/C agreement
to that notion, even if only "in principle." We will also
continue to "follow the money": additional Turkish budgetary
support, if approved, is further proof of Erdogan's
realization that his best partner for a solution, despite
inept management and its perpetually outstretched hand, is
the present CTP "government." The Greek Cypriots, especially
President Christofias, showed calm and maturity by making the
requisite noises of outrage, without, however, going
overboard and threatening the likely announcement of the
start of full-fledged negotiations on July 25. End Comment.
SCHLICHER