A/S FRIED'S MESSAGE OF USG SUPPORT FOR UN-BROKERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NICOSIA 000531

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MESSAGE OF USG SUPPORT FOR UN-BROKERED
PROCESS ON CYPRUS WELL RECEIVED DURING JULY 6-7 VISIT

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons
1.4a and 1.4d

1.(C) Summary: A/S Dan Fried delivered a positive message of
USG support for Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias and
Turkish Cypriot Leader Mehmet Ali Talat in their efforts to
unite the island during his July 6-7 visit to Nicosia,
Cyprus. In meetings with Christofias, Talat, Cypriot Foreign
Minister Markos Kyprianou, and UNFICYP SRSG Taye-Brook
Zerihoun, Fried expressed the willingness of the USG to
support the UN-brokered peace process to the extent the two
leaders desired, with authorship belonging ultimately to them
- a so-called "Cypriot Solution." Although both Talat and
Christofias reaffirmed their support for the reunification of
Cyprus - they differed sharply over the efficacy of a
"Cypriot Solution." Both the Cypriot President and his FM
embraced the idea, while Talat voiced deep skepticism at a
solely home-grown solution given the intractable nature of
the most serious issues. Fried welcomed the possible early
start of full-fledged negotiations, but made clear that the
USG would not pressure the parties to set a date. SRSG
Zerihoun said the leaders had reached an understanding to
start on September 1, while President Christofias hinted they
would start "soon." For his part, Talat favors the immediate
launch of
negotiations. All sides supported naming a USG Special
Adviser to Cyprus provided that such a step was taken in
coordination with the parties and after the start of
full-fledged negotiations. Both sides expressed mutual
suspicions to Fried, with G/Cs fearing Turkish obstructionism
and T/Cs questioning Greek Cypriot motives. Bilaterally,
Fried praised Cypriot cooperation in the War on Terror and
the 2006 Lebanon evacuation and underscored the need to
eliminate CYPROB-induced friction between NATO-EU
cooperation. For his part, Christofias voiced satisfaction at
improved US-RoC relations and thanked Ambassador Schlicher
for his efforts, while Kyprianou said that an ad hoc formula
could be considered to ease the NATO-EU deadlock. Overall,
A/S Fried succeeding in delivering a largely
mutually-acceptable and credible message of USG support,
while at the same time avoiding Greek and Turkish Cypriot
pitfalls. End Summary.


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Leaders Reaffirm Support for a Reunified Cyprus through
UN-brokered negotiations
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2. (C) In all his meetings, A/S Fried voiced USG support for
the ongoing UN-brokered process while noting that the U.S.
would not impose a solution and had no "Plan B"; rather, we
would aid and facilitate the leaders, own efforts and
achievements. Fried praised both Talat and Christofias for
getting the Ledra Street crossing opened, and said that the
present time was more conducive for a solution than it had
been in years. The A/S also underscored the sui generis
nature of Kosovar independence, which will "never" be a
precedent for Cyprus or any other conflict; he also repeated
the USG policy of non-recognition of the "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus."



3. (C) President Christofias and T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat
both reaffirmed their support for a reunified Cyprus through
the on going UN-brokered negotiations. Christofias said that
reunification was his life's goal and the sole motivation for
his seeking the Presidency in 2008. He sought the restoration
of the rights of all Cypriots, of both Greek and Turkish
origin. Talat was equally passionate
and dubbed a solution a "must" for the Turkish Cypriots
because of their non-recognized status. He also rejected the
idea of two states on the island as neither "achievable nor
viable", with emphasis on the latter.


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...With G/C emphasis on Property Restoration and Right of
Return
--------------



4. (C) Both Talat and Christofias pledged support for the
three agreements, each one a hard-fought compromise, the
leaders have inked to date (March 21, May 23, July 1). Those
documents commit both sides to a bizonal, bicommunal
federation based on political equality according to relevant

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UN Resolutions and composed of two equal constituent states.
The federation will also have a single international
personality and, in principle, single citizenship and
sovereignty. A/S Fried voiced support for those agreements,
but made it clear to both leaders that the modalities and
details would have to be filled in by them, not outsiders,
not the USG.



5. (C) Each leader, not surprisingly, put his own spin on
those documents. Christofias dubbed property the "soul" of
the system and said he could not tell people that they could
not use or have access to property - a historical G/C demand,
even for a nominally-Communist president. He said, however,
that he would work to find a "balance" between human rights,
i.e., property and the right of return, and a bizonal,
bicommunal federation. The Cypriot President denied that he
had walked back from the "two constituent states" language of
the May 23 agreement, but added that the agreements had to be
taken as a "whole picture." (Note: In his July 8 press
conference, Christofias pledged support for all three
agreements and said that a federation means "two states with
equal status and equal powers"; language
on "two constituent states" had earlier, however, been
omitted from the June 5 RoC-UK MOU, and the RoC fought USG
attempts to include it in the UNFICYP roll-over resolution.
End Note.)


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...And T/Cs Emphasizing Constituent States
--------------



6. (C) After some preliminary complaints that the
international community had not lived up to its commitments
to the T/Cs in the aftermath of their 2004 "yes" vote, Talat
voiced support for a bizonal, bicommunal federation as well,
but one comprised of two constituent states as outlined in
the May 23 Leaders, Statement - a core T/C demand and a key
element of the 2004 Annan Plan. This, he said, not only
reflected the fact of a unique Turkish Cypriot people on the
island, but also would prevent G/C "usurpation" of their
future common state. He supported a single sovereignty, but
one that emanates from both communities, a notion introduced
in the 1992 Ghali Set of Ideas and approved by both Greek and
Turkish Cypriots according to him. He claimed that the Greek
Cypriots had still not accepted the "constituent state"
language of the "May 23 Statement".


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G/Cs for "Cypriot Solution", T/Cs Leery
--------------



7. (C) A/S Fried, both at his July 7 press conference and
privately, advocated a "Cyprus Solution," the notion that the
resolution of the Cyprus Problem must lie largely in the
hands of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their two
leaders. The international community would encourage and
facilitate the efforts of both sides, but it would not cajole
or impose an outside resolution of the issue.



8. (C) President Christofias and his FM welcomed the idea of
a "Cypriot Solution." Christofias argued that more activist
efforts in the past, such as the Annan Plan, had backfired
and alienated the G/C populace. He stated that he "was happy"
that the USG accepted a "Cypriot Solution." FM
Kyprianou voiced the same sentiments, adding the "mistakes of
2004" had to be avoided to ensure that a solution was not
dictated, or perceive to be dictated.



9. (C) Talat, however, was doubtful of a solely home-grown
solution to the problem given the intractable nature of the
most serious issues. He also was against an imposed solution,
but argued that even day-to-day contacts in the Technical
Committees and Working Groups showed the two sides often came
to loggerheads over small issues. He thought that ultimately
both sides would have to agree to "a kind of arbitration" - a
tactic used during the Annan Plan and fiercely rejected today
by the G/Cs, and indeed by the UN.


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Will you take the plunge?

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10. (C) A/S Fried told both leaders that the USG supports the
start of full-fledged negotiations and considers the
atmosphere conducive for their start, but is avoiding any
language intimating pressure or timetables. He told
Christofias that, while on any given day it might be easier
not to start negotiations, a succession of such days would
lead to a "catastrophe" for the island. Fried told Talat
that it seemed as if he were "ready" for negotiations and
reassured him of USG support for the "two constituent states
language" of the May 23 statement, but said he could not
impose the details. Ultimately, it was "up to you to take
the plunge," he told Talat.



11. (C) Christofias told Fried that he hoped to start
full-fledged negotiations "soon," adding that he had to take
into account "other political forces," but had already
secured the support of the National Council on July 4.
Kyprianou added that the "populations" still had to be
moved. (Note: At his July 8 press conference, Christofias
said the basis for negotiations had been "clarified with
Talat" and that a decision whether or not to proceed to
full-fledged negotiations would be announced at the leaders'
meeting on July 25. End Note).


12.(C) For his part, Talat expressed disappointment that
Christofias was still not ready to engage in full-fledged
negotiations, though he admitted ultimately Christofias is
committed to a solution. He urged Fried to treat the sides
equally in the framework of the UN-brokered process.



13. (C) UNFICYP SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun told Fried that
full-fledged negotiations would "likely" start in September
based on an "understanding" the two leaders hammered out at
their contentious July 1 meeting. The talks would, most
likely, kick-off as a rolling start, with issues on which
there was the most convergence, such as EU or the economy,
dealt with first. Zerihoun praised both leaders for covering
"more distance" than was earlier thought possible, but
worried that public support for the process was not "deep or
wide," with many "naysayers," especially on the G/C side.
Zerihoun voiced consternation at the G/Cs walking back from
parts of the May 23 agreement, especially over the language
on "two constituent states" and feared the leaders' relations
may have been "frayed" as a result.


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All support USG CYPROB Negotiator, But at the Right Time
--------------



14. (C) Fried solicited the leaders,, Kyprianou,s, and
Zerihoun,s input on the question of whether, how, and when
the appointment of a USG Special Adviser for Cyprus would
help the process. His initial thinking, which he shared with
his interlocutors, is that an appointment should follow the
leaders, announcement of the start of full-fledged
negotiations and occur only if both men agreed that such a
post has utility. Both leaders welcomed such an appointment
in principle, with Talat urging Fried to take
the G/C lead on the issue so as to get Greek Cypriots on
board and not spook them. Christofias supported the idea of a
US adviser, but at an unnamed, later date, after the
appointment of a UN Special Adviser and with more concrete
results from the process. Both leaders seemed to favor the
appointment of a professional diplomat rather than a
political appointee.




15. (C) For his part, Zerihoun dodged Fried,s question
regarding the value-added and timing of appointing a USG
Special Cyprus Adviser, quipping that we should "sovereignly
decide." Nevertheless, the UN would favor such an appointment
as an indicator of our support for, and interest in, the
process. He urged coordination with other countries that
might also name envoys and urged an "external" role, i.e.,
mostly off-island, to insure a coherent international
strategy. He said that UN would know for certain regarding
the appointment of the former Australian FM Downer as the SG
Special Adviser by Wednesday, July 9. Downer, however, would
not get to the island until the September timeframe and then,

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at least until the end of the year, only work part-time.


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Mutual Suspicions Continue Despite Improved Climate
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16. (C) While both leaders agree that the climate has
improved markedly since the departure of Papadopoulos, mutual
distrust continues. Both Kyprianou and Christofias voiced
concern over what they see as Turkey,s negative role and
possible hindrance of a solution or its implementation, while
at the same time voicing support for Talat. Christofias
blamed the Turkish military, though he voiced strong support
and sympathy for Turkish President Gul and PM Erdogan.
Kyprianou warned that it would be hard to
convince the G/C populace to support a solution since Turkey,
in his words, had done nothing positive to support the peace
process since 2004. He also said it was becoming increasingly
difficult to approve opening EU accession chapters for Turkey
since all the simpler, technical ones had already been
opened. He sought a good-will gesture, such as letting
Cypriot-registered airlines use Turkish airspace.



17. (C) A/S Fried told Christofias that he could not forecast
the outcome of the AKP-closure case and its fall-out, but
that the best answer to his fears was to shape the context on
the island in which Turkey operates by moving forward with
the peace process. He promised Christofias that he would
encourage Turkish officials to play a constructive role. The
A/S also told both Christofias and Kyprianou the crucial
importance of unblocking EU-NATO military cooperation stymied
by CYPROB enmity between Turkey and Cyprus. He assured
Kyprianou that such "flexibility" would not be used against
Cyprus. Kyprianou said that an "ad hoc agreement" might be
found to ameliorate the situation, depending on what Cyprus
got in
return. He claimed to have tried to set up a back-channel to
Turkey while serving as EU Commissioner, though without great
success.



18. (C) Talat worried that Christofias, given the RoC's
international status and robust economy, had "no incentive"
to share power with the Turkish Cypriots, and might simply be
playing for time. He claimed that Christofias was ready to
walk out of the July 1 meeting and was not influenced in the
least by the possible negative consequences. Ambassador
Schlicher asked Talat whether he believed that Christofias
ideologically was committed to a solution, to which Talat
replied positively.


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Bilateral Relations Better than Ever
--------------



19. (C) A/S Fried thanked President Christofias for the
support the RoC has given to the USG, including the 2006
Lebanon Evacuation, signing on to PSI, and, although it
vehemently opposes Kosovar independence, not blocking ESDP
activity in Kosovo. He also told the President that Kosovo is
not a model for resolution of any other dispute, and conveyed
Talat's opinion to the same effect. Christofias thanked Fried
and said that, together with Ambassador Schlicher, the RoC
had developed "frank and friendly
relations", and he would do his "utmost" to build upon them.
A/S Fried told the President, in a message he delivered
earlier to Kyprianou, that he could see the utility of a
meeting between Secretary Rice and Kyprianou in the United
States after the start of negotiations so that the USG side
could learn first-hand how it could be helpful.



20. (C) Comment: A/S Fried conveyed a constructive USG
message of non-intrusive support for the UN-brokered process
without getting dragged by either of the two sides into a
partisan blame game - a sport at which both Turkish and Greek
Cypriots are gold medalists. Furthermore, in an usually nasty
media environment, press coverage was largely positive, with
the exception of one major G/C paper. Fried,s message of a
"Cypriot Solution" clearly had a calming effect on President
Christofias, and although we cannot, of course, prove a
connection, at his July 8 press conference Christofias
announced that the basis for negotiations with Talat had been

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clarified, removing a major obstacle for the G/C leader to
start negotiations. While Mr. Talat refutes the concept of a
largely home-grown solution, both his need and desire for a
solution are genuine; he wants to be at the center of his
side of the process. We think those two factors will keep
him in the game and flexible, as evidenced by his performance
at the July 1 leaders, meeting, where his acceptance of G/C
demands for a statement on single sovereignty and citizenship
kept things on track. And although political developments in
Turkey--and their possible influence on the process
here--remain the biggest wild card, we will continue to push
A/S Fried,s message of shaping the context for Turkey on the
island by moving forward at the negotiating table. End
Comment.
SCHLICHER