GOC PRESIDENT CHRISTOFIAS PREPARES THE GROUND FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000529

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: GOC PRESIDENT CHRISTOFIAS PREPARES THE GROUND FOR
ANNOUNCEMENT OF DIRECT TALKS


1. (SBU) Summary: In a July 8 press conference, President
Christofias stated that his three meetings with Turkish Cypriot
leader Talat have fully clarified the basis for full-fledged
negotiations - a lingering concern for the G/C leader. He also
argued that the Working Groups and Technical Committees (WGs and
TCs) have achieved progress and convergence on many important
issues. His statements were largely interpreted as an indirect
announcement of the commencement of full-fledged negotiations, an
assumption, however, denied by the Government spokesman. Christofias
outlined his strategy for success, and, no less importantly,
explained to the largely-uninformed G/C public what they could
expect from a federation: two states with equal status and powers
and a federal republic co-governed by the two communities. The
press conference satisfied the two major parties, governing AKEL and
opposition DISY, which fully supports Christofias's solution
efforts. Christofias's partners in the government, DIKO and EDEK,
however, disagreed that the basis of the talks has been clarified
and the WGs have made progress. Turkish Cypriot attention focused
mainly on his analysis of the federal system; reaction was mixed but
largely negative, with fears of T/Cs being subsumed in a
G/C-dominated federation holding sway. End Summary.

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CHRISTOFIAS: BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN AGREED UPON
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2. In a July 8 press conference--ostensibly to take stock of his
first 120 days in office but really focused on CyProb
issues--Cypriot President Demetris Christofias confidently declared
that his three meetings with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat
had produced a clear basis for the direct talks: an agreement that a
solution will be based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation, with
political equality, single international personality, single
sovereignty and single citizenship as explained in the leaders'
three agreements of March 21, May 23, and July 1. Christofias
rejected claims that there has been no progress in the Working
Groups and Technical Committees, stating that there in fact had been
progress and convergence on many important points. He expected more
progress in the next 15 days before his July 25 meeting with Talat
when, he said, the two leaders will make a final assessment and
decide to start direct talks or not. Christofias said that on July
25 he will address the Greek Cypriots to explain his views on that
decision.

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EXPLAINING HOW TO SUCCEED...
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3. Christofias reiterated that the top priority of his presidency
is a Cyprus settlement to reunite the country, its people and the
economy through a bizonal, bicommunal federation. His strategy for
achieving this goal was cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot
community and the revival of international interest in the Cyprus
problem. His meeting with Talat on March 21--and the consequent
decision to open Ledra Street--was the starting point of this
journey, he said. It brought the two communities closer and sent
the message to the international community that the two leaders
sought reunification.


4. Reversing the negative international climate and enlisting the
collective support of the UN Security Council and the EU were
crucial for the success of the settlement efforts, according to
Christofias. He thought there were already good indications that
the climate was becoming more positive, citing the recent UNSC
resolution on Cyprus, the statement of the President of the UNSC,
and the speech of EU Commission President Barroso before the Turkish
Grand National Assembly, where he called on Turkey to meet its
obligations towards Cyprus and cooperate for a Cyprus solution. He
said the signing of the June 5 UK-Cyprus MOU restored and deepened
relations "with an important partner" that had turned sour last year
after the signing of a similar MOU between the UK and Turkey.
[Note: The UK-Cyprus MOU omitted language from the May 23 leaders'
statement on "two equal constituent states" and caused neuralgia
among T/Cs. End Note.] He thought it was important that the UN and
all other interested parties accepted that a solution will be found
by the Cypriots for the Cypriots.


5. Despite the optimism that generally dominated his press
conference, Christofias was careful to point out that reaching a
solution will be difficult and would require time and relentless
effort. He said setting a timeline for conclusion of the talks was
out of the question, given the distance separating the two sides on
certain issues. He also ruled out arbitration, saying that it
proved a "catastrophe" in 2004. [Note: Both sides had agreed to
arbitration during the Annan Process. End Note] Asked how he planned
to proceed if the two leaders were unable to announce the start of
direct talks on July 25, Christofias clearly responded that he had
no Plan B, but rather would just keep on trying to create the
conditions for the start of direct negotiations.


NICOSIA 00000529 002 OF 003


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...AND THE BASICS OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM
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6. In an unusually straightforward manner, Christofias spelled out
to the Greek Cypriot public the basics of the federal system. "It
is about time we digest that we will have a federation ... a
bizonal, bicommunal federation and this means two states with equal
status and equal powers," said Christofias. He rejected, though,
the understanding of the the Turkish Cypriot position that the
federal state will be formed through the merger of the ROC and the
"TRNC." He said the ROC belongs to both communities and "the
objective is to reintegrate the two communities into it, to
co-govern the ROC, which will be turned into a federal, bizonal,
bicommunal republic." Christofias criticized those who pay lip
service to a bizonal, bicommunal federation while all the while
adopting positions that are compatible only with a unitary state.
Christofias also defended the much-disputed term "partnership,"
language used in the May 23 leaders' agreement for which he faced
much criticism from G/C naysayers, including in his own coalition.
He said the two communities formed a partnership in 1960 and the
goal now was to renew this partnership "having in mind that we, the
Greek Cypriots, i.e., the (Greek) junta and EOKA B, bear a huge
responsibility for the catastrophe that followed."

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G/C POLITICAL PARTY REACTION
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7. Political party reaction played out along predictable lines.
Christofias's party, AKEL, and opposition Democratic Rally (DISY)
expressed satisfaction with the President's handling of the Cyprus
issue and agreed with the President that the basis of the talks has
been clarified and that the WGs and TCs had made progress. DISY
stated that it was looking forward to the July 25 Christofias-Talat
meeting and hoped that the evaluation of work to date would allow
the start of direct talks. DISY added that the difficult issues
could be tackled only by the two leaders. However, AKEL's partners
in the Government, centrist Democratic Party (DIKO) and socialist
EDEK, did not fully agree with Christofias. Both parties thought
that the basis for the full-fledged negotiations has yet to be
adequately clarified, and argued that the WGs have not as yet made
substantive progress in bridging differences. Nevertheless, they
both expressed support for the President's efforts and hoped that
enough progress could be made to allow the start of negotiations.


8. The majority of the Greek Cypriot press interpreted
Christofias's remarks as an indirect announcement of the start of
direct talks. The reports prompted Government spokesman Stephanou
to issue a denial on July 9 and say that the final decision depends
entirely on the July 25 assessment of the work of the WGs and TCs.

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TURKISH CYPRIOTS REACT WITH DISTRUST
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9. Turkish Cypriot reaction to Christofias's remarks was varied but
mostly negative. Even though major circulation KIBRIS and
pro-"ruling" CTP YENIDUZEN appeared satisfied with Christofias's
statement that the federation will consist of two equal states, CTP
General Secretary Omer Kalyoncu, a seasoned and pro-solution
politician, told Pol LES that he was deeply worried over
Christofias's intentions. He said what Christofias is talking about
is, in reality, a unitary state, a slightly-modified old ROC with
the Turkish Cypriots returning to it. What he described, argued
Kalyoncu, is a federal government that will control everything,
while the two "constituent states" will be denied the right to
"sovereignly" exercise the powers vested in them, quoting the
language of the Annan plan that the T/Cs want dearly. He also
remarked that Christofias's thinking "sounds worse than
Papadopoulos's." Similar views were expressed by conservative
academic Ata Atun in an article in KIBRIS. He charged that
Christofias really wants to alter superficially the 1960 ROC
constitution and to have the Turkish Cypriots return under Greek
Cypriot sovereignty but never as equal or sovereign partners.


10. The majority of the Turkish Cypriot papers were also annoyed by
Christofias's statement that the key to a solution lies in Ankara.
His statement that one of his primary goals was to end the
occupation of Cyprus also did not go down well with the Turkish
Cypriot press.

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COMMENT
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10. (SBU)Undoubtedly Christofias's optimism was meant not only to
prepare the public for the announcement of the start of direct
talks, but, and probably more importantly, to undercut the
anticipated negative reaction of his partners in the government, the

NICOSIA 00000529 003 OF 003


largely anti-solution EDEK and DIKO. Reactions to the press
conference were a preview of likely actions in coming months G/C
Party: support from AKEL-DISY, and lame opposition from DIKO and
EDEK in the hope that they can continue to advocate hard-line
positions while remaining in the government. The most hard-line of
the lot, though, including former President Papadopoulos and his
closest followers, can be expected to step up the tone of their
criticism once the direct talks are announced. We will report septel
with a more in-depth analysis of T/C reactions.
SCHLICHER