Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08NICOSIA479 | 2008-06-26 10:46:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nicosia |
VZCZCXRO3694 PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHNC #0479/01 1781046 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 261046Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8909 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1165 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000479 |
1. (C) SUMMARY: Cyprus likely will ratify the Treaty of Lisbon on July 3, becoming the 20th European Union member state (M-S) to accept Brussels's latest effort at bureaucratic streamlining. In spite of its redefining of M-S relations with Brussels, the matter has generated little substantive debate here. What the ratification process has lain bare, however, is RoC President Demetris Christofias's political courage deficit, flip-flopping wont, and tendency to place party interests above national ones. To illustrate, in reacting to Ireland's June 12 "No" vote, Christofias first called on Europe to respect the will of the Irish people and not force them to accept the agreement unaltered, only to pronounce days later that Cyprus would honor its commitment to Brussels by ratifying the instrument. It would do so without the support of the president's AKEL party, however. Far-left and deeply Euroskeptic, AKEL announced June 23 its intention to oppose the Lisbon Treaty. Knowing full well that passage in the House seems assured, Christofias's Lisbon tack makes sense tactically, since it both satisfies his hard-left base while also allowing him to play the mature statesman internationally. Yet his desire to please all camps and avoid tough decisions that might harm his much-loved party raise fears that he could take a similar path when confronted with tough Cyprus Problem decisions, a la the Annan Plan referendum in 2004. END SUMMARY. -------------------------- -------------------------- Lisbon Treaty: Little Chance for Ireland-like Outcome -------------------------- -------------------------- 2. (SBU) Cypriots, or at least Greek Cypriots, generally support the European Union more strongly than most member-states' citizens. While EU popularity has dropped considerably from a high of 85-plus percent in the pre-accession period, support for Brussels still hovers around 70 percent according to "Eurobarometer" and other, reliable polling. In June 2005, the Republic was the first EU nation to ratify the stillborn European Constitution after France and the Netherlands earlier had rejected it. And in January 2008, having satisfied Brussels' demands for fiscal probity, Cyprus became the first of the 2004 tranche of M-S to accede to the Euro, a cause for great pride on the island. On both the Euro and the Constitution, however, AKEL, the island's strongest political force, sided with the European Left and voted "No." 3. (SBU) The Lisbon Treaty's framers left ratification processes to the member states to determine, and only Ireland demanded a public referendum. In Cyprus, passage requires but a simple majority of legislative representatives present. Evie Hadjiyianni, head of the House's International Relations Service, informed us on June 19 that treaty ratification tops the members' July 3 agenda. House Speaker Marios Karoyian has announced his intention to put it to a vote, Hadjiyianni revealed, provided a quorum exists. The date could only slip if one of the parties demands a delay at the June 26 meeting of bloc leaders, a highly unlikely development given that all have committed to debating the treaty soonest (and since summer recess commences shortly thereafter). Should the representatives vote "Yes," the treaty will be signed by Christofias and go into effect upon publication in the official government gazette. 4. (SBU) In recent months, Cyprus's political parties staked their positions on the Lisbon Treaty, and most came out in favor of ratification. Voices of support rang even louder after Ireland's June 12 "No," with opposition DISY, coalition partners DIKO and EDEK, and most of the island's smaller parties demanding Christofias resist aligning himself with the Euroskeptics. DISY even warned the president it would consider any move to oppose Lisbon a "casus belli" -- referring presumably to the party ending its hitherto cooperative relationship with Christofias. -------------------------- Government Foot Off Accelerator -------------------------- 5. (SBU) Despite the treaty's potentially oversized effects on smaller member-states -- to include replacing unanimity with qualified majority voting in certain cases, and the abolishment of the one Commissioner per M-S relationship -- the matter has generated little substantive debate here, due mostly to government inattention and/or desires to keep a NICOSIA 00000479 002 OF 003 distance from it. House members protested July 13 that a government website intended to inform Cypriots of the Lisbon Treaty's contents had never been established. There have been no televised public service messages similar to those in the run-up to the Euro's adoption. Flyers promoting the treaty were distributed at the Foreign Ministry and other government buildings, but our anecdotal observations indicate there were few takers. 6. (SBU) What little outreach that occurred in Cyprus was thanks to the EU itself. European Commission Representative Androulla Kaminara told us June 19 she was conducting multiple town-hall-type meetings per week. Most citizens, she claimed, were ill-informed but hardly Euroskeptic, and appreciated her focus on how the instrument's intent to simplify decision-making in Brussels might affect their daily lives. Less interested in Lisbon was the House, Kaminara lamented. Despite early efforts to engage the EU Affairs Committee, the Commission had gained little traction with the legislators, who recently had canceled a formal EU briefing at the last moment. European Parliament Representative Tasos Georgiou, who was to conduct the session, suspected that AKEL House leadership's "cold feet" over the Lisbon Treaty had led to a determination by all bloc chiefs to cancel it. -------------------------- What's Behind AKEL's Rejection -------------------------- 7. (SBU) Alive and well is the "democratic deficit" in Brussels, AKEL Spokesman Andros Kyprianou asserted June 19. As proof, he cited EU bureaucrats allegedly having cobbled together the Lisbon Treaty from the ashes of the European Constitution, with little regard for member states' interests. The treaty favored corporations and cartels over individuals, and its focus on capitalism and competition would prevent "socially responsible" governments like Cyprus's from intervening in the market to help the average consumer. Kyprianou also voiced disagreement with the Lisbon Treaty's purported take on fundamental human rights. Ironically -- for an East Bloc-trained politician -- he ranted how it would diminish individual freedoms while strengthening the state's hand to monitor citizens' activities through wiretapping and other forms of surveillance. Last, the AKEL official protested the Treaty for aiming to "militarize" the EU and formalize relations with NATO, an alliance whose very existence his party opposed. Kyprianou was careful not to reveal how AKEL would vote at its June 23 central committee meeting, however. 8. (SBU) Jean Monnet Scholar and EU expert J. Joseph chuckled over Kyprianou's spurious analysis of the Lisbon Treaty's contents, doubting whether anyone in AKEL actually had read the voluminous treaty or even an executive summary. Instead, the party's heartburn stemmed from its outdated ideology and links to other European leftist parties which also opposed Brussels. President Christofias looked trapped by AKEL's position, Joseph thought, and faced a tough choice: to side with his party, which had served him well since childhood, or with his EU allies, whose favor he was desperately courting for Cyprus Problem reasons. He thought the President would seek to assuage both camps by ordering AKEL to abstain in the July 3 House vote. -------------------------- Irish "No" Spurs Two Separate Tacks -------------------------- 9. (U) One day after the Irish vote, Government Spokesman Stephanos Stephanou expressed formal RoC support for the "expression of the democratic will of the people of that country." Further, Cyprus expected that the EU, "without hasty moves or reactions," would take into consideration views expressed through member-states' democratic procedures. Christofias, before departing for the June 19 European Council meeting, expressed hope that Brussels would not attempt to isolate the Irish leadership and thereby pressure them for an immediate re-vote on unchanged treaty text. "For the Irish people, the Lisbon Treaty did not differ substantively from the Constitution, which many states rejected via referendums," the president reasoned. His decision brought an immediate, negative response from DISY, which urged Christofias to join the European mainstream and support Lisbon. Commentators here inferred that Christofias intended to lobby for changes in Brussels. 10. (C) It would appear they were incorrect. Embassy sources claim Christofias had assured fellow chiefs of NICOSIA 00000479 003 OF 003 state/government and EU officials that Cyprus would ratify the Lisbon Treaty on July 3, a message the president repeated publicly upon his return from the Council. Rather than voicing support for the treaty's substance or taking ownership for the decision, Christofias pledged only to honor the commitment of predecessor President Tassos Papadopoulos, who signed the treaty in December 2007. -------------------------- Unanimously, AKEL Decides to Oppose -------------------------- 11. (SBU) Having delayed the central committee meeting until Christofias returned to Cyprus, AKEL leaders finally gathered on June 23 to determine the party's official Lisbon Treaty stance. Weeks before, many observers had believed the gathering would be contentious, with "No" voters squared off against those favoring abstention. Emboldened by the Irish rejection and undeterred by the president's pledge to honor Papadopoulos's signature, however, AKEL took a unanimous decision to oppose the treaty. Bloc spokesman Nikos Katsourides employed familiar, "left-vs-right" language in explaining the vote, claiming the treaty did not serve European peoples, especially the working class. Cypriots would participate actively in EU decision-making, Katsourides continued, not meekly accept orders from Brussels bureaucrats and larger member-states. 12. (SBU) Ostensibly to avoid a conflict of interest, Christofias, as party secretary general the leader of the central committee, recused himself from the vote. Katsourides explained his boss's absence by referring back to Christofias's public commitment to support Lisbon, while also emphasizing that "the president governs based on his political program (not AKEL's). Again, jeers went up from the opposition, claiming Christofias had taken the easy way out and would be pilloried in EU circles for not delivering his own party's support. -------------------------- Comment -------------------------- 13. (C) We'll leave it to our Brussels-based colleagues to determine whether AKEL's Lisbon Treaty "No" and the president's lackluster support for it creates negative consequences for Cyprus within the Union. We don't see them from our perch, however. In fact, member-state diplomats consulted June 23 believe all will be forgotten once the House ratifies the treaty July 3; Christofias apparently even poked fun at the hard-line communists still peppering AKEL's ranks at a days-earlier meeting with European ambassadors. Of greater concern to us is what the treaty debate says about the leadership qualities of Demetris Christofias, a politician whom detractors call a "party man" to the core, politically wobbly, and wont to constant flip-flopping. His stewardship over Lisbon did not prove the naysayers wrong. Had he wanted to bend the party to his stated wish "to honor his predecessor's commitment," for example, he easily could have convinced the central committee to vote "Yes" or abstain. Yet he chose the easier (and electorally beneficial) path of letting his hard-left base vote "No" while he recused himself, essentially abdicating responsibility over an issue his European allies consider almost existential. This invokes the specterQ 2004, when Christofias, an early supporter of the failed April 2004 Annan Plan, became a no-voter late in the process, explained his tune change by claiming cryptically that "AKEL's 'No' could later cement the 'Yes,'" and supposedly even feigned illness to avoid calls from then-Secretary of State Powell in the final days before the Annan referendum (Cypriot media jokingly claimed Christofias had caught a "diplomatic bug.") 14. (C) President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat are scheduled to meet July 1; topping the agenda is the determination whether and when to commence full-fledged Cyprus Problem negotiations. At their last meeting on May 23, the leaders issued a joint statement laying out their vision of a unified Cyprus. Within days, however, and upon receiving criticism from Papadopoulos and other hard-liners, Christofias, rather then defending the statement, began backtracking and setting preconditions, putting in doubt whether he will concede to starting formal talks. For the good of the process, we hope his backbone stiffens between now and then. SCHLICHER |