VISITING ANALYST HEARS MIXED REVIEWS OF CHRISTOFIAS

UNCLAS NICOSIA 000465 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, INR/B E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CY SUBJECT: VISITING ANALYST HEARS MIXED REVIEWS OF CHRISTOFIAS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In meetings with officials and academics, visiting INR biographical analyst Zayda Madriz heard both praise and skepticism of RoC President Demetris Christofias, in office four months. Though Greek Cypriots praised the "change in climate" that accompanied Christofias's election and expressed widespread relief at predecessor Tassos Papadopoulos's departure from power, many doubted the new president could overcome fierce loyalty to his party and show real leadership on the Cyprus Problem. Turkish Cypriots were even more Christofias-skeptic and concerned by his foot-dragging on setting a start date for negotiations. End summary. -------------- - After Papadopolous, G/C leaders welcome a thaw -------------- - ¶2. (SBU) EmbOffs and visiting biographical analyst Zayda Madriz met with G/C officials and academics on both sides of the island June 9-11 to discuss the political climate since Christofias's election and to study Christofias's behavior and background. Committee for the Protection of Competition Chairman and longtime Christofias friend Costakis Christoforou emphasized to Madriz that the president was a "people person" -- but more importantly a party person, for whom party interests were paramount. Christofias's kinder, gentler MO had palpably improved the atmosphere surrounding bi-communal dealings in the G/C community in recent months. However, Christofias' first and strongest loyalties were to his AKEL party -- would he take steps for the good of the Republic if it meant harming AKEL somehow? Boding favorably for a solution, Christoforou doubted the president would give much credence to coalition partners (but generally anti-solution) parties DIKO and EDEK, since their popularity numbers were on the decline. ¶3. (SBU) Government Spokesman Stephanos Stephanou praised Christofias's leadership on the Cyprus issue but noted that developments on the ground could complicate negotiations. Christofias was willing to do "everything possible" to reach a settlement, he claimed, but Turkey remained the main obstacle. Stephanou did not question T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat's commitment to a solution but rather, Talat's independence from Ankara. On the other hand, Christofias had moderated his rhetoric to shore up Talat's position vis--vis Turkey, for instance reducing his criticism of Turkey's military presence in the north. He also mentioned the challenge Christofias faced with his electorate, stating that G/Cs often misunderstood the content of a "federal solution" and that the government intended to remedy public misperceptions. Above all else, Christofias had run for president to solve the Cyprus problem, Stephanou asserted; for this reason he would not balk at confronting difficulties along the way. ¶4. (SBU) According to DIKO MP Nicos Cleanthous, Christofias was determined to solve the Cyprus problem but will need considerable U.S. and international support to do so. Cleanthous acknowledged "conflicting views" in DIKO over their support for Christofias's push for a solution but did not foresee DIKO leaving the government in the near future. -------------- Elsewhere in the RoC, caution and uncertainty -------------- ¶5. (SBU) DISY MP Sotiris Sampson had kind words for neither Turkey nor Christofias in his meeting with Madriz. Remarking that Christofias had DISY's support "as long as he is worth it," Sampson said the president must make progress toward "the right kind of a solution" -- in Sampson's view, a unified government for the island (Note: he likely was referring to a unified, vice federal, state.) Sampson criticized Christofias's focus on bi-communal measures; Cypriots need reunification, not a good-neighbor policy. He spoke harshly of Turkey and dismissed Christofias's talks with Talat, since Turkish PM Tayyip Erdogan wields the real power in the north. Sampson called repeatedly for the U.S. to exert its supposed influence over Turkey and contain it. ¶6. (SBU) One-time fringe presidential candidate Costas Themistocleous was cautiously optimistic on Christofias's political will. He could not predict whether the president's short-term political interests would eclipse his desire to be the architect of a settlement. How and when Christofias sets a date for full negotiations would signal how he will handle tough choices -- if Christofias delays the talks and disparages progress now, he will be unlikely to show necessary leadership later. Regarding the Christofias-Talat dynamic, Themistocleous observed that, though the two worked well enough together, the ideologically similar CTP's earlier emergence from under AKEL's wing still irked Christofias, and he tried to remind Talat he was "the boss" sometimes. Themistocleous said Talat had been flexible on negotiation start dates to accommodate Christofias' desire for a slower pace, but that he had not offered a blank check; Talat would not accept an indefinite delay. ¶7. (SBU) When Madriz raised AKEL's 2004 Annan Plan "no" vote, Themistocleous explained that Christofias had been unwilling to sacrifice AKEL's position in the government for a solution the party had believed had no chance of success. Though unwilling to say decisively that Christofias had changed, Themistocleous noted conditions facing Christofias had; AKEL's position of power and the absence of Papadopolous might let Christofias do in 2008 what he would not in 2004. -------------- -------------- Academics, NGOs laud climate change, but see clouds ahead -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Professor Joseph Joseph of the University of Cyprus, an international relations expert and Jean Monnet Scholar, was effusive in his praise for Christofias, calling him a "visionary" who had the "openness, flexibility, and determination" to reach a solution. He said without hesitation that Christofias would sacrifice his political popularity for reunification. Professor Hubert Faustmann, also of the University of Cyprus, stated that Christofias's election had made the Turks' and T/Cs' job more difficult -- faced with a reasonable, personable counterpart, they could no longer blame everything on Papadopoulos's intransigence. He noted, however, that Christofias and the international community could not take a Turkish Cypriot "yes" on any new agreement for granted. Mainland Turkish "settlers," the Turkish Army presence, and Turkey's right of guarantee/intervention will pose the greatest challenges, and pleasing both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on any of them might be impossible. -------------- In the North, a chillier climate -------------- ¶11. (SBU) During his meeting with Madriz, Cyprus Policy Center Director and Eastern Mediterranean University Professor Ahmet Sozen was deeply skeptical of Christofias' determination to reach a settlement. Sozen argued that Turkey's domestic distractions had created a perfect window for negotiations, but Christofias was wasting that opportunity, even telling a G/C working group member to slow down the group's efforts. He noted that Christofias had undermined the Annan plan to maintain AKEL's position in 2004, and doubted that he would act otherwise now. However, neither did Christofias want to be "the man under whose watch the partition of Cyprus became permanent." Christofias's rhetoric of brotherhood and compatriotism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots actually rankled Turkish Cypriots, who would rather have civil coexistence than close familial ties with their G/C neighbors. Sozen said Christofias' training in Moscow and loyalty to AKEL concerned him; he felt the "politburo mentality" and "dogmatism" this produced had made Christofias an inflexible negotiator. ¶12. (SBU) Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) researcher Ayla Gurel considered the "climate change" in the south superficial; Papadopoulous had lost not because he failed to solve the problem, but because he ruined the RoC's image abroad. Whereas the Turkish Cypriots felt real urgency now, the Greek Cypriots thought time was on their side for a solution. With Cyprus in hand, G/Cs believed a solution involves simply "fitting the Turkish Cypriots in somewhere" -- a view which contradicts a federal solution. Gurel did not doubt that Christofias genuinely believed what he was saying, but said he failed to see the Turkish Cypriot position at the same time. In her view, the international community needed to provide not just resources but direction to the process -- Christofias' "Cypriot solution" was not feasible. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Though many Embassy contacts whom analyst Madriz met on her visit were still bullish on Christofias -- and absolutely no one longed for hard-liner Papadopoulos's return -- there were signs, especially in the T/C community, of growing uncertainty and even impatience with the president. G/C interlocutors wanted to believe Christofias had the gumption to seize the opportunity for a solution, but saw little from his past suggesting he will. Those in the north were tiring of Christofias's "goodwill" gestures and are less willing to take Christofias at his word when he says he wants a solution above all else. The president's actions this summer -- whether he sets a date for negotiations, if he makes concessions during the talks, and how he presents his actions to the public -- will give more clues to his leadership ability, all think, but they are not especially optimistic. End Comment. SCHLICHER