CYPRUS SUPPORTS SUBSTANCE OF P5+1 PACKAGE, BUT MAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000461 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR ROLAND MCKAY, ISN/RA RICHARD NEPHEW, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS SUPPORTS SUBSTANCE OF P5+1 PACKAGE, BUT MAY NOT LOBBY HARD REF: SECSTATE 64530 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador on June 19 delivered reftel points and contents of P5 1 Iran Package to Cypriot MFA Political Director (P equivalent) Euripides Evriviades. Ambassador emphasized the package's generous and wide-ranging nature, building as it did on an already-robust 2006 offer. Should Iran's leaders truly want to develop nuclear capabilities for civilian, peaceful purposes, they ought to accept the latest pitch pronto. Tailoring the demarche specifically for Cyprus, he highlighted for Evriviades how Tehran's recent efforts in Lebanon and elsewhere had emboldened the radical regime, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the region. Boding poorly for Cyprus, the area's other powers, specifically Turkey and Egypt, might react to Iran developing nuclear weapons by launching their own programs. Cyprus thus benefited greatly by international efforts to prevent Tehran from getting the bomb, and should lobby strongly in that direction, both bilaterally and in Brussels. ¶2. (C) Evriviades agreed that the P5 1 proposal looked attractive. It was encouraging that not only the EU and U.S., but also the Russians and Chinese, were united behind the effort. Yet he doubted the Iranians would accept the package despite its obvious benefits. First, they were unlikely to suspend uranium enrichment as a precondition for talks, even if the Secretary were a participant. Evriviades also believed that Tehran intended to wait out the current U.S. administration, believing "better treatment" could await them under a Democratic regime. As a compromise, he focused on the adjective "formal" (as in "discussions") in the package text -- perhaps "informal" talks could occur before enrichment ended, giving Tehran a little political room to maneuver? Despite his belief that Iran would push back, Evriviades promised that Cyprus would urge Iran, both in Nicosia and via its embassy in Tehran, to accept the deal. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador next turned to EU autonomous sanctions against Iran, noting our understanding that designations against Iranian institutions such as Bank Melli might commence in Brussels on May 23. Evriviades was unaware of this development. According to his sources, the Iranians had taken legal measures against designation of the bank, a tack that likely would delay formal actions many months. As such, he thought unilateral EU sanctions against Iran had been delegated to the back burner. "Besides," he concluded, "it's best not to tip the scales too soon, before Tehran has responded formally to the P5 1 package." ¶4. (C) COMMENT: Evriviades's body language betrayed his pronouncement that the RoC would lobby the Iranians hard. In prior meetings, he has confided that, as a small nation in a tough neighborhood, Cyprus "had to accept sleeping with strange bedfellows," a reference to its not-cold relations with Syria and Iran. We'd therefore be surprised if Nicosia made anything but perfunctory efforts in support of the P5 1 package. SCHLICHER