CYPRUS ADOPTS WAIT-AND-SEE POSTURE ON EULEX

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000444 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/SE, IO/UNP, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2018 TAGS: PINR ECON PBTS PNAT SOCI SUBJECT: CYPRUS ADOPTS WAIT-AND-SEE POSTURE ON EULEX (C-RE8-01061) REF: SECSTATE 60548 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) In response to Reftel, PolChief on June 10 engaged ESDP officer Nikos Panayiotou, the Cypriot Foreign Ministry's action officer on the European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Panayiotou's responses are keyed in Reftel order. ¶A. Cyprus supports the concept of EULEX assuming UNMIK's responsibilities throughout Kosovo, Panayiotou noted. It would oppose a geographic division of duties (with EULEX operating in the southern, Kosovar Albanian dominated regions and UNMIK operating the Serbian-dominated north),and concurred with the U.S. that UNMIK would continue to perform residual functions in Kosovo for the foreseeable future. That said, the RoC is uncomfortable with the handover occurring in the absence of a new UN Security Council Resolution (replacing/modifying UNSCR 1244) and feels it must be "consensual" -- in other words, having Moscow and Belgrade's blessings. Based on readouts from Cyprus's PermRep in New York, Panayiotou expected some sort of formal UN confirmation of UNMIK reconfiguration to emerge on/about June 15, the date Kosovo's constitution takes effect. EU member-states likely will debate next moves on EULEX at the June 16-17 GAERC. Panayiotou surmised they would take no clear steps, however, unless the UN earlier had issued its UNMIK/EULEX roadmap. National positions were numerous, he thought, and there was little likelihood that one or a handful of member-states would be isolated. ¶B. Cyprus opposed Kosovo's February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence on precedent-setting grounds and has stated unequivocally it will never recognize Pristina, even if Belgrade does. Despite obvious heartburn, however, the RoC supported the GAERC's late-February decision to go forward with EULEX's deployment, once its concerns over legal language had been assuaged. Cyprus likely can be influenced by Quint and/or European Council Secretariat positions on EULEX modalities, but it will not cave to their demands on more "existential" matters, such as recognizing or upgrading relations with the "breakaway" Kosovar state. ¶C. Panayiotou was unable to comment on the role played in internal EULEX deliberations by International Civilian Representative/EU Representative Pieter Feith and EULEX head Yves de Kermabon. ¶D. A UN decision not to cede equipment and other assets to EULEX, forcing the latter to procure them independently, likely would cause certain member-states to rethink what is already an expensive European Union mission, Panayiotou ventured. He refused to clarify Cyprus's exact position in such a scenario, however. E, F. Questions over EULEX's forceful deployment into northern Kosovo and its ability/willingness to confront ethnic Serb hard-liners were hypothetical at this moment, Panayiotou asserted, since the UNMIK/EULEX handover was still in flux. ¶G. Like all EU member-states, Cyprus was closely watching the coalition-building process in Serbia and favored the formation of a pro-Europe (vice nationalist) administration. Should the former occur, with Tadic's Democratic Party pacting with the Socialists to create a more western-oriented government, Panayiotou thought the EU position toward Serbia could moderate somewhat. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: Cyprus enjoys warm relations with Belgrade, most recently evidenced by Serbian FM Vuk Jeremic's April 2008 visit to Nicosia in which Kosovo likely dominated discussions. Its ties with Russia are even closer, with Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou having visited Moscow June 9 and President Demetris Christofias expected to follow this fall. As such, we should not expect Cyprus to carry much pro-Kosovo water in Brussels; about the best we could expect is what has already occurred -- the RoC's decision in February not to obstruct the EULEX deployment. SCHLICHER