T/C NEGOTIATOR CLAIMS "ENOUGH" PROGRESS IN CURRENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000324

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: T/C NEGOTIATOR CLAIMS "ENOUGH" PROGRESS IN CURRENT
TALKS, WANTS FULL-FLEDGED NEGOTIATIONS BY JUNE 21

REF: NICOSIA 306

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: "When will (Cypriot President Demetris)
Christofias ever leave the harbor that (former President and
famous hard-liner) Papadopoulos built?" complained Turkish
Cypriot negotiator Ozdil Nami in a May 20 meeting with the
Ambassador. Nami, without noting his own side's unhelpful
public remarks, expressed both surprise and consternation at
public allegations by Christofias and other Greek Cypriot
leaders that little progress had been made in working groups
and technical committees currently working under the
UN-brokered March 21 agreement (Reftel). He countered that
real success had been achieved in the economy and EU working
groups--a point on which his G/C counterpart also agrees--and
cited T/C examples of flexibility in the governance group to
boot. Nami worried that Christofias was in the thrall of his
nationalist coalition partner (DIKO),which might explain his
overall negativity and attacks against Turkey. The T/C
negotiator, in response to Ambassador's question regarding
T/C reluctance publicly to endorse the now traditional
formula, reaffirmed T/C and Turkish support for a bi-zonal,
bi-communal solution in the spirit of the Annan Plan. The
Ambassador, in a message he has repeated to both sides, urged
Nami to plan for success, not failure, to avoid injecting
procedural issues when things get tough, and to refrain from
squabbling in the media. He also encouraged that both
leaders find ways to accommodate some of each other's
political needs, and, as they had done on March 21, to use
their upcoming May 23 meeting to find a mutually-agreed way
forward. Ultimately, Nami believed there was enough progress
already to go to full-fledged negotiations on June 21, and
sought international sanction of Christofias should that not
pass. End Summary.


"He should have called"
--------------


2. (C) Nami lamented that Christofias's less than stellar
assessment of the working groups and technical committees'
progress came as a surprise to him, especially given the fact
that he had met with G/C negotiator George Iacovou two days
prior to Christofias's first utterance. "If there were
serious concerns, Iacovou would have raised them with me," he
added. Nami did not mention whether he had given Iacovou a
heads-up regarding Nami's own press interview printed in
papers on May 19.


3. (C) Nami claimed that the two sides had an agreement first
to discuss friction points at the negotiator level, then bump
them up to the leaders if no redress could be found. He said
that the G/Cs clearly had not followed this protocol, to the
detriment of all involved. "Christofias should have
instructed Iacovou to call me to work on it...his public
statements against us and Turkey destroy the good
atmosphere." To prevent further dust-ups and improve
coordination of the groups and committees, Nami had suggested
to Iacovou to meet twice a week, but has still not heard back
from him. (Note: Per reftel, Iacovou also favors twice-weekly
meetings. End Note)


"We already have enough results"
--------------

4.(C) Nami told the Ambassador there were "already enough
results" to move to full-fledged negotiations on June 21,
never mind the fact that according to the March 21 agreement,
such talks should take place regardless. Iacovou had agreed
with him that the only possible scenario under which direct
negotiations would not commence on June 21 would be "no
progress" at all, which was clearly not the case. Nami
pointedly asked the Ambassador if the international community
would remain a "passive bystander" if Christofias refused to
start direct negotiations on the agreed date. The Ambassador
replied that Nami was planning for failure, when all of us
should be planning for success.


5. (C) Nami cited progress in the economic and EU working
groups--a point on which both parties actually agree--plus
T/C flexibility and movement in the governance working group.
He said that the Talat had agreed to consider G/C proposals,
instead of sticking to his initial position, on two
important areas: T/Cs' original insistence on foreign judges
in the judiciary in order to break deadlocks, and the
creation of a "Presidential Council" to wield executive

NICOSIA 00000324 002 OF 003


power, as envisaged in the 2004 Annan Plan. Talat felt
secure in doing this, Nami said, because the Greek Cypriots
respected the principle of political equality, the acceptance
of which "makes our life so much easier."


6. (C) In working groups where little progress has been
registered so far--property, territory, and security and
guarantees--Nami either blamed G/C intransigence or said that
the issues were so thorny that they could only be solved at a
later date by the leaders. On property, he rejected G/C
demands--which the G/Cs see as grounded in EU and
international law--that all original owners be free to
determine the fate of their property, favoring instead a
bi-communal property board using mutually-agreed criteria
that would take into consideration the rights of present
owners as well. The T/Cs had made three counter-proposals,
which have not yet been answered. On territory, Nami hoped
that a set of principles could be devised to govern possible
adjustments; proposed maps could be exchanged later. As to
the security working group, he hoped the sides could devise
the outline of a federal police force. Nami asserted that
Iacovou had admitted that such issues, by their complex
nature, would have to be dealt with by the leaders, and
agreed to Nami's interim goals. The Ambassador urged Nami to
find, where possible, bridging proposals if convergence could
not be achieved.


"Is Christofias Ready?"
--------------


7. (C) Nami complained, in a refrain the T/C leadership often
repeats, that they had expected "more" from Christofias. It
seemed as if the G/C leader regretted the March 21 agreement
and was not ready for real progress. Further, the Greek
Cypriot leader's constant attacks against Ankara were not
helpful. He asked the Ambassador point-blank if Christofias
was involved in a power struggle with his DIKO coalition
partners and FM Markos Kyprianou. Nami worried that the
Greek Cypriots would use "delaying tactics" to push the
solution process into 2009 and thereby gain concessions from
Turkey, whose EU accession bid will be up for review then.


8. (C) The Ambassador noted that distrust unfortunately
existed on both sides, hence the need for each party to help
the other politically as much as possible. In his analysis,
Christofias was clearly in control, and the RoC is not trying
to use Turkey's 2009 accession review as a means of avoiding
decisions in the current UN process; Papadopoulos had tried
such a strategy in the 2006 review to disastrous effect for
the RoC. Rather, despite the political obstacles,
Christofias still wanted to find a way forward.


(When Pressed) "We remain committed to bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation"
--------------


9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry, Nami assured
that both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey remained committed to a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that consisted of two
constituent states and preserved the "essence" of the Annan
Plan. Furthermore, the new state would not have to reapply
to the UN or the EU (Note: In comments to Turkish media
earlier this year, Talat had raised the necessity that the
new state reapply, a point one of his close advisers repeated
to us recently. End Note). This was the very "partnership
state" that the T/Cs and Turkey envision when referring to a
post-solution Cyprus. Nami also refuted G/C claims that the
Turkish Cypriots now rejected the 1977 and 1979 High-level
Agreements, and charged that the Greek Cypriots had refused
to consider the Annan Plan and would not even agree to
mention of "UN Body of Work" in the committee/working groups'
terms of reference.


10. (C) The Ambassador noted that it would serve the
interests of both sides to get past "labeling" and work
concretely on moving forward. He told Nami that, while he
accepts Nami's assurances over T/C intentions regarding a
bi-zonal, bi-communal solution, certain Turkish
pronouncements, most recently an April Turkish National
Security Council press release that omitted mention of
bi-communality, raised doubts and fears among Greek Cypriots.
Nevertheless, he noted that he had urged the G/Cs to forget
their doubts and "prove the proposition one way or the other"
by engaging substantively with the other side.

Dual Track Approach out of May 23?

NICOSIA 00000324 003 OF 003


--------------

11. (C) Nami seemed to hint that a dual-track approach might
be an option to break the current quasi-impasse. Separately,
he and Iacovou had rated the work of all the technical
committees and working groups and would give those lists to
the two leaders for their May 23 meeting. They in turn would
prioritize the lists, and once full-fledged negotiations had
commenced, would tackle first the areas where the most
convergence had been achieved. The working groups and
technical committees would continue to work on a parallel
track, either feeding information to the two leaders or
continuing work on areas where there was little convergence.
The Ambassador told Nami that both leaders on May 23 had to
"clear the air" and meet--at least at a minimal level--the
political needs of the other to keep the process moving
forward.
--------------
Comment:
--------------

12. (C) There has been some real progress and some real
stumbling in the work of the technical committees and working
groups; both sides seemingly deserve an equal measure of
praise and blame. Luckily, Nami and Iacovou have been able
to maintain their good relations despite the turbulence. The
main culprit at present, more than the "how much progress"
issue itself, seems to be the vicious circle of mutual
distrust between the communities. Christofias's fears of
Turkey's intentions, at least regarding Deep State-types and
the military, is warranted to a degree. But his public
broadsides only weaken the hands of the pro-solution Talat
and his main ally in Ankara, Prime Minister Erdogan, while
strengthening the very forces that think that no-solution is
the best solution. Talat is then forced to publicly defend
Turkey, which only proves and reinforces Greek Cypriot
suspicions. We hope that both leaders will clear the air on
May 23 and start planning for success, not failure. We will
continue to push both sides, at all levels, in this
direction, and give them no reason to think that they can
avoid decisions now since the USG would take their side in
the "blame game" that would follow some breakdown in the
process.
SCHLICHER