G/C NEGOTIATOR TROUBLED BY TURKISH SIDE'S REFUSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000306 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2023 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: G/C NEGOTIATOR TROUBLED BY TURKISH SIDE'S REFUSAL TO DEAL Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: "They're not empowered to think or even speculate, much less negotiate," complained Greek Cypriot negotiator George Iacovou in a May 12 meeting with the Ambassador, referring to the Turkish Cypriots staffing the working groups and technical committees currently conducting preparatory discussions under the UN-brokered March 21 agreement. The T/C side's lack of autonomy and practice of consulting superiors over even the smallest points was costing the groups and committees precious time, Iacovou warned, and put into doubt whether full-fledged negotiations could commence on June 21, as stipulated in the March accord. Regardless of the paucity of progress in most bodies, T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat appeared insistent on demanding formal negotiations, which Republic of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias politically could never accept in the absence of a modicum of progress in the current process. Not all the news was gloomy, however. Iacovou revealed that working groups tackling the economy and European Union affairs had made great strides, an opinion shared by the Embassy's T/C contacts. Much more characteristic of the broader process, however, was the friction plaguing the territory, property, governance, and security/guarantees working groups, which Iacovou attributed to Turkey's indifference or outright opposition to reaching a solution. At the upcoming (May 23) leaders' meeting, Christofias would deliver a tough message to Talat: either engage fully to ensure that the committees and working group delivered measurable progress in the remaining six weeks, or risk another negotiations impasse of his own (Talat's) making. The international community should press the Turkish Cypriot leader along similar lines, Iacovou concluded. In response, the Ambassador lamented that media in both communities were preparing for a failed process and attempting to assign blame to the other. It was vital to preserve the positive momentum that had arisen with Christofias's February election, he added; as such, Iacovou should consider potential repercussions before demanding a delay and/or blaming the other side. The Ambassador ended the call by questioning whether the "Straw Rule" was still in play -- the RoC prohibition on visiting foreign dignitaries seeing Christofias if they also intended to visit Talat at the "TRNC Presidential Palace." Iacovou, seemingly pained by the inquiry, promised to provide guidance soon. END SUMMARY. -------------- G/Cs "Already" Sensitized to T/C Needs -------------- ¶2. (C) Iacovou began the 90-minute discussion by noting a major concession Greek Cypriots had made to ensure the leaders would reach agreement on March 21. "They didn't want specific mention of the July 8 (2006) Agreement, so we took it out. But implicit was the understanding that we would follow July 8's basic outline -- committees and working groups preparing the ground for full-fledged negotiations." At that time, he believed the 90-day preparatory period stipulated on March 21 would allow the sides sufficient time to make measurable progress. "I never thought it would take a full month just to determine the slate of committees and working groups and give them mutually-acceptable names," Iacovou lamented. ¶3. (C) He had clear expectations for the March 21 talks. Iacovou had understood from the outset that the sides would remain far apart on "core" Cyprus Problem components such as property restitution, territorial adjustments and security/guarantees. He only hoped to narrow these gaps slightly, and prepare the leaders with clear outlines of each community's positions in advance of full-fledged negotiations. For the "easier" issues, however, he hoped to bring the sides close to a deal. Once he and Nami and had finalized the working group slate, Iacovou assigned highest priority to economic affairs and EU matters, since these seemingly presented the greatest prospect for success. ¶4. (C) Even during the month-long delay, the G/C negotiator had attempted to put a positive spin on the process. "I don't see the other side as my adversary, but as my partner," Iacovou maintained; he had instructed his teams to think and act similarly. Early on, however, he began to temper his optimism. Continued Turkish "intransigence" was resulting in a Turkish Cypriot side leery of engagement and incapable of making quick decisions. Iacovou, in comments that track with UNFICYP's, claimed that the April 3 inauguration of much-anticipated Ledra Street Buffer Zone crossing remained in doubt until hours before its scheduled opening, owing to NICOSIA 00000306 002 OF 003 Turkish military opposition to crossing modalities. "It took Talat two hours to get the simplest of answers from the (Turkish) generals," Iacovou explained. -------------- Slow-Going in Most -------------- ¶5. (C) Ankara exercised similar control over the working groups and technical committees, he alleged. "I have an excellent working relationship with (Turkish Cypriot counterpart) Ozdil Nami. And there are some qualified, knowledgeable staff on the T/C side. But these people are not allowed to think, to brainstorm, to ponder our suggestions, which are many." Rather, Iacovou continued, the Turkish Cypriot experts read opening positions from prepared texts, take note of our positions, and engage only to inform that they must seek guidance from their superiors. One exception -- the T/C leader of the economic technical committee, who readily exchanged thoughts with his G/C other -- lasted only two meetings before he suddenly resigned from team. Iacovou attributed the Turkish Cypriot go-slow tactics to two factors. First, most team members were active "civil servants," meaning they were obligated by chain-of-command considerations to seek guidance (the G/C side, on the other hand, is populated by former politicians, retired diplomats, and academics.) And then there was the hand of Ankara. Iacovou asserted that Turkish MFA Under Secretary Ertugrul Apakan had recently paid a one-week visit to the island, during which he had given specific negotiating instructions to the Turkish Cypriot negotiators, and posted extra diplomats in the Turkish "Embassy" to "help" the T/C side. ¶6. (C) The half-way point of the 90-day process already had passed, yet significant progress had occurred only in two of six working groups, Iacovou reckoned. And even in the EU and economy groups, the T/Cs were sticking to unrealistic positions, such as a demand for permanent Acquis derogations over competition -- "the heart of the European Union project," he blasted. Turkish Cypriots' lines were even harder and their tactics more robotic in the territory group, where they insisted only on "a better deal than Annan gave us" and refused even to consider Greek Cypriot suggestions. In the governance group, T/Cs continued to demand a place for foreign judges on the Cypriot Supreme Court. "Can you imagine? In a EU state in 2008?" Iacovou chided. -------------- Righting the Ship on May 23 -------------- ¶7. (C) Christofias and Talat will meet under UN auspices May 23, their first formal gathering since hammering out the March 21 arrangement. "Worried" barely describes the Greek Cypriot leader over the state of the current process, Iacovou related. Christofias was convinced that full-fledged negotiations would quickly stall were they to commence without sufficient preparation. Further, the President questioned why Talat did not feel the same. Instead, Iacovou continued, Talat seems set on demanding formal negotiations regardless of the prospects for progress, and if he does not get them, he will blame the G/C side. It appeared as if the T/C leader was convinced he had the international community's support for his position. The Ambassador quickly interjected, noting that neither he nor anyone from the Embassy had taken that stance. What we have said is that we look forward to the two sides' agreement to resume full-fledged negotiations. Apparently satisfied with the response, Iacovou argued that the local P-5 should focus their efforts where truly needed: on convincing Turkey to allow Talat to engage. ¶8. (C) Iacovou considered the May 23 meeting an opportunity for the leaders to take stock of the ongoing process. "If your side won't engage in the working groups," Christofias would question, "why should I believe you'll do more in face-to-face talks?" Both men knew they were incapable of resolving differences on complex themes outside their areas of expertise, whether economics, EU matters, or the environment, Iacovou insisted. As such, the working groups and technical committees had real roles, and they must be allowed to carry out substantive discussions. Iacovou favored increasing the frequency of their meetings, from the current twice-per-week to a M-W-F arrangement. "With more time to meet and more progress, we'll serve the leaders better," he contended. -------------- NICOSIA 00000306 003 OF 003 Maintain the Momentum is our Message -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador praised Iacovou and Christofias's efforts to re-energized Cyprus Problem negotiations after a near-four year impasse. Like the G/C side, the U.S. hoped Turkey would give Talat free rein for give-and-take, and understood Nicosia's need for a modicum of progress in the preparatory process. Media on both sides of the island weren't exactly helping, he fretted. Outlets like leading daily "Phileleftheros" were poisoning the climate with repeated warnings that failure was imminent. A self-fulfilling prophecy must be avoided, the Ambassador reckoned. ¶10. (C) He counseled Iacovou to exercise caution when considering the G/C approach toward the coming deadline. "There is an international aspect to the talks," the Ambassador noted, "and you're best served by keeping the (UN) Secretary General focused and contributing to the process." Implicit in his message was that, should the sides fail to agree either to call for full-fledged negotiations or request a short extension of the preparatory period, the SYG might determine that the communities' political will was insufficient to merit continued, high-level UN attention. ¶11. (C) On the U.S. side, however, there was growing interest in Cyprus, the Ambassador confided. While he still could not offer dates, a high-level DoS official planned to visit the island by mid-June. He would want to call on both Christofias and Talat to encourage progress in the process. Was the "Straw Rule" governing high-level visitors' access to the President still in force? the Ambassador queried. Iacovou responded by revealing he had asked the Foreign Ministry for a formal opinion. Pressed, he clarified that, were the Secretary of State to visit Cyprus, the prohibition would remain in force. (Note: we inferred that the Cypriots would in fact waive the rule for lower-level officials, as they had two weeks ago for Deputy Russian FM Vladimir Titov. We will continue to follow up, however.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) It comes as no surprise that this latest "era of good feelings" on Cyprus is petering out somewhat -- despite good personal relations between Christofias and Talat, and between Iacovou and Nami, the sides remain miles apart on most core CyProb elements, and engagement on substance was bound to cause friction and name-calling. Nor are we surprised that the Greek Cypriot negotiator -- like President Christofias, in a days-earlier meeting with local P-5 representatives -- laid blame squarely on the Turkish Cypriots for the working groups/technical committees' perceived lack of progress. Yet we're not prepared to swallow Iacovou's story whole. In the past ten days, Embassy staff have engaged four different UNFICYP facilitators with first-hand knowledge of the groups' workings and activities. Their observations differ on details, but in general support Iacovou's claim that G/C participants are more experienced and have a "deeper bench," while T/C staff request guidance from their superiors more than their Greek-origin counterparts do. But by no means do Turkish Cypriots alone deserve the title of "intransigent party," our UN colleagues argue -- the sides have alternated being stubborn and accommodating. Further, when the Ambassador sees Ozdil Nami on May 20, we expect to hear an exact-opposite account from the T/C negotiator. In such a scenario, maintaining momentum entails urging both sides to remain engaged while refraining from visceral blame-game urges. We will continue to look for opportunities to pass this message both publicly and privately. SCHLICHER