SOYER SUPPORTS SOLUTION PROCESS AT APRIL 4 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000226

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TY CY
SUBJECT: SOYER SUPPORTS SOLUTION PROCESS AT APRIL 4 MEETING
WITH AMBASSADOR


Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Schlicher for reasons 1.4(a) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: "Prime Minister" and head of the "governing"
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) Ferdi Sabit Soyer was upbeat,
if a bit harried, during a forty-five minute meeting with
Ambassador Schlicher on April 4. He voiced strong support
for keeping the Ledra Street crossing open and blamed the
security forces on both sides, as well as Republic of Cyprus
Parliamentary Speaker (and then-acting President) Marios
Karoyian, for the April 3 closing of Ledra. Soyer said that
working groups and technical committees to be set up under
the March 21 agreement must start work as soon as possible,
but claimed that Greek Cypriot (G/C) demands limiting their
terms of reference (TOR) to the 1977-79 high level agreements
may delay the process. Soyer said that Turkish PM Erdogan
was fully behind a Cyprus solution, but sought a quid pro
quo--an easing of Turkish Cypriot (T/C) isolation before
Turkey made a reciprocal gesture to G/Cs, such as opening a
Turkish port to their ships -- to jump-start Turkey's EU
accession process. Soyer assured the Ambassador that Chief
of Turkish General Staff (TGS) Yasar Buyukkanit, whose recent
visit to the island was seen as a needlessly provocative
gesture in the south, was still on board with a solution.
Lastly, Soyer promised to investigate "government" delays
plaguing a prominent USAID project and look at ways of
improving a deficient international property rights (IPR)
draft "law" currently under consideration. End Summary.

Ledra: Police on both sides to blame


2. (C) Soyer said that the T/Cs remain fully committed to
keeping Ledra open and agreed with the Ambassador that its
teething pains must be dealt with at the technical level,
with UNFICYP, before they escalate into political problems.
He reported that, just 12 hours after its April 3
inauguration, he personally had taken control of the
situation on the T/C side to prevent a crisis. After
initially defending T/C police for having stopped
placard-wielding Greek Cypriot protesters -- which G/C police
cited as reason to close the crossing for three hours --
Soyer blamed the security forces on both sides for their
tactics, adding that neither institution actually favored a
solution. Soyer also alleged that acting RoC President
Karoyian had intentionally aggravated the situation for
political gain.


3. (C) Soyer pleaded that, should similar incidents unfold
in the future, UNFICYP should immediately contact the
civilian authorities of both sides and not depend on the
local military/police authorities or others to pass the
message up in a timely manner. The Ambassador agreed and
promised to pass this message on to the acting head of
UNFICYP, Elizabeth Spehar.

Technical Committees and Working Groups: Differences with
G/Cs over terms of reference


4. (C) Soyer agreed with the Ambassador's statement on the
importance of starting the work of the technical committees
and working groups as soon as possible, so that the leaders
could begin comprehensive negotiations on schedule. He
complained, however, that G/C negotiator George Iacovou had
sought to include in the terms of reference the 1977-1979
High Level Agreements, which was unacceptable to the T/Cs.
They want broad TORs, including references to bizonality and
bicommunality, as well as to the entire "UN Body of Work."
(Comment: Local diplomatic missions are rather puzzled by the
T/Cs newfound problem with the inclusion of the High-Level
Agreements in the TOR, since the Agreements actually put the
bizonal, bicommunal formula into play on the UN track after
Makarios and Denktash agreed to it. UNFICYP officials on
April 7 claimed that Iacovou not only wanted the 1977-79
agreements noted specifically, but other UN negotiating
efforts as well. Iacovou and Nami met on April 8; the last
meeting before that was April 1. End Comment)


5. (C) The Ambassador told Soyer that the "labeling" of a
basic engagement need not be controversial, and that a
solution could be achieved if the parties focused on
substance, not terminology, and negotiated in good faith. As
proof, he pointed to the March 21 agreement between Talat and
Christofias, which finessed a similar "labelling" issue
regarding the July 8 agreement. The Embassy intended to
support the process whenever and however possible, the
Ambassador added; U.S. assistance funds already had been

NICOSIA 00000226 002.2 OF 003


committed to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to
assist the work of the committees and working groups.

Kyprianou to blame for continued G/C cases against Financial
Aid Tenders


6. (C) Soyer was angry that the Greek Cypriots had not only
NOT withdrawn court cases blocking the implementation of
Financial Aid Regulation tenders, but had filed two more in
the period since Christofias's election. Such actions soured
T/C public opinion against the EU. Soyer added that he did
not believe that RoC Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou really
wanted to withdraw the cases. The Ambassador noted that
Kyprianou had indeed told him that he was looking for a way
to make the cases disappear; he promised to raise the matter
at his next meeting with the FM. The Ambassador added that,
as he saw it, the G/Cs should drop the cases since they could
not sustain two wildly-divergent policies in Brussels --
trying to improve Cyprus-EU relations after the low point
reached during the Papadopoulos era, while concurrently
defying the will of the Commission with lawsuits.


Erdogan Fully Supports Solution and wants Quid Pro Quo on
Cyprus


7. (C) Soyer said that Turkish PM Erdogan had voiced full
support for a Cyprus solution during a meeting the two had
had in Ankara in late March. Soyer added that Erdogan wants
a quid pro quo on Cyprus: the international community should
"do something" regarding Turkish Cypriot isolation so that
Erdogan in turn could "give something" to the Greek Cypriots,
likely the opening up Turkish airspace and ports to G/C
traffic. This mutual action would jump-start Turkey,s EU
accession process. Soyer added that Turkish Deputy PM Cemil
Cicek had seconded Erdogan's support--and desire to move on
the EU front--during a phone call to congratulate him on
Ledra Street.


8. (C) Soyer dodged the Ambassador's question regarding
fallout in Cyprus from the AKP closure case; rather, he
listed a number of reasons why Erdogan had stumbled
(incursion into Northern Iraq/alliance with MHP over
headscarves) and what he could do to get out of the present
predicament (more democratic reforms). (Note: Many T/Cs
believe that the solution process will grind to a halt if
Erdogan is removed. End Note)

Buyukkanit Still on board


9. (C) Soyer claimed that TGS Chief Buyukkanit still
supported a solution on Cyprus along the lines of a bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation based on political equality--the same
deal Buyukkanit reportedly blessed when he met "TRNC
President" Mehmet Ali Talat's in Ankara in January. He
attempted to soft-pedal statements that Buyukkanit had made
during his March visit to the "TRNC" that Turkish troops
would not immediately leave after a solution, arguing that
even Christofias had admitted that a small number of Turkish
troops would remain after a solution. (Note: Most CTP
insiders see the Buyukkanit visit as generally positive when
compared with those of former TGS chiefs. They blame the
general's more dissonant tone near the end of the visit on
Rauf Denktash's deleterious influence.)

Soyer promises to look into IPR "law" and USAID project


10. (C) The Ambassador urged Soyer to pass an intellectual
property "law" that was in line with best practices and
international standards and advised him to utilize available
EU technical assistance to this end. The Ambassador pointed
out that a present draft "IPR law" was woefully inadequate
and would send the wrong signal to the world, i.e., that
Turkish Cypriot authorities tolerate intellectual piracy. He
also promised that the Embassy would continue to work with
the T/C business community and Chamber of Commerce to fight
counterfeit goods. Soyer pledged to investigate the IPR
draft and provide us an update. (Note: Departing the meeting,
Soyer's assistant confided that the draft was indeed bad.)


11. (C) The Ambassador also asked Soyer to investigate why
certain "state" agencies had not provided a USAID implementer
with information to commence the next phase of the
Geographical Information System, a computerized project on
land use planning and management. Without this information,
the next stage of GIS, a project the T/Cs had pushed for,

NICOSIA 00000226 003 OF 003


cannot go forward. Again, Soyer promised to look into the
matter.


12. (C) The April 3 temporary closing of Ledra--and Soyer's
displeasure with the actions of the Turkish Forces-controlled
T/C police--underscore the complicated position that Soyer,
Talat, and the other pro-solution Turkish Cypriots find
themselves. Turkish Cypriots often point out that they must
manage not only the Greek Cypriots, but also a hydra-headed
Turkey with common and opposing interests. The Turkish
military is one very important element of that relationship,
and while Soyer might have spun the Buyukkanit visit a bit,
we agree with him that overall it did not go badly, and
actually could have been much worse given the past relations
between Talat and the Turkish military. Soyer's anxiety to
get the technical committees and working groups started and
move to negotiations as soon as possible is not surprising,
given his "government's" shrinking popularity and its raison
d'tre -- delivering a Cyprus solution. To move seriously
toward this end, however, the T/Cs and G/Cs will have to come
to agreement very soon on a mutually-agreed way publicly to
discuss the basis of their re-engagement. End Comment
SCHLICHER