LEADERS TO MEET MARCH 21; STILL WORK TO BE DONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000189

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: LEADERS TO MEET MARCH 21; STILL WORK TO BE DONE

REF: NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAILS OF 03/12-13/2008

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkish Cypriot negotiator Ozdil Nami and
Republic of Cyprus Presidential Commissioner George Iacovou
met March 12, the first gathering of the sides'
representatives since the February 24 RoC presidential
elections. UNFICYP chief Michael Moller subsequently
described the meeting as excellent, with Nami and Iacovou
having settled on March 21 for the "summit" between RoC
President Demetris Christofias and T/C leader Mehmet Ali
Talat. Further, the UN official claimed that agreement on
opening Ledra Street was near, and that formal recommencement
of full-fledged settlement negotiations might come sooner
than expected. Media on March 13 mostly echoed Moller's
good-news review, buoying moods here somewhat and offering a
respite from recent inter-communal sniping. Our follow-up
calls on Nami and Iacovou showed the sides still far apart on
key issues, however, primarily regarding the July 8 Agreement
and the Annan Plan (Refs). For the leaders' meeting to truly
succeed, the UN, international community, and the communities
themselves must somehow bridge these gaps. END SUMMARY.

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Sides Re-engage After Winter Break
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2. (SBU) Meetings between G/C and T/C negotiators occurred
frequently after the signing of the July 8 (2006) Agreement,
with Tasos Tzionis and Rashid Pertev engaging 52 times,
according to the UN's count. These gatherings halted in late
2007, however, in the run-up to the RoC elections. Upon
Christofias's win and his nomination of three-time former FM
Iacovou as community representative, pundits wondered when
the UN-brokered gatherings would re-commence and under what
format. They did not have to wait long. Media reported on
March 10 that Nami and Iacovou would meet in Moller's UNFICYP
offices on March 13. Topping their agenda were preparations
for a follow-on meeting between Talat and Christofias. The
negotiators' stances differed over the Ledra Street crossing,
however, with Nami initially telling media he would not
discuss it, while Iacovou insisted it was on his list.


3. (C) Immediately upon its conclusion, Moller telephoned
the Ambassador with a readout of the negotiators' "excellent"
engagement. They had set a date for the leaders' meeting --
March 21. A deal on opening Ledra Street also seemed
imminent. Moller hoped to keep the news on Ledra under
wraps, however, since "in this context, anything is liable to
unravel." A year earlier, he recalled, UNFICYP had brokered
an arrangement to begin the July 8 committee process, only to
see it unravel after a secret weekend visit to Cyprus by
Turkish MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan.


4. (C) Almost giddy, the UN diplomat speculated that
Christofias and Talat, at the end of their meeting, might
even issue a joint request for the full resumption of the
Secretary General's good offices mission. He admitted to

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some naughty pleasure that such a call by the leaders could
put UNHQ in a bureaucratic pickle, since it so far had not
even identified his successor (Note: Moller is expected to
depart Cyprus on/about March 31, since the Secretariat
declined to extend his contract. Many claim that Turkish
pressure on UNSYG Ban to make a change underpinned the
decision.)

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Sides Mostly Praise Negotiators' Work
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5. (SBU) Media generally covered the negotiators' meeting
favorably. Opposition G/C newspaper "Politis" reported March
13 that Iacovou and Nami had reached agreement on three basic
issues: the date for the leaders' meeting, the framework for
discussions therein, and the opening of Ledra Street.
Discussions on Ledra had gone into great detail over crossing
modalities, the positioning and role of both sides' security
forces, and demarcation of the buffer zone. Pro-government
"Phileleftheros," perhaps still transitioning between serving
hard-line ex-President Tassos Papadopoulos and the more
flexible Christofias, focused less on the negotiators'
meeting and more on a foreboding prediction that Talat would
float a new negotiating methodology that buried the G/Cs'
preferred July 8 process. Turkish Cypriot media, while
reporting the meeting factually and faithfully, buried their
accounts on back pages. Taking center-stage instead was news
of the same-day gathering of AKEL and CTP party leaders, who
supposedly had reached agreement on a wider range of topics,

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including the need to implement July 8 immediately.


6. (C) While cautioning us "not to read too much" into the
representatives' meeting, Turkish Cypriot negotiator Ozdil
Nami described it as "cordial, not contentious...and
positive." Both men sought to move the process forward, Nami
added, by purposefully avoiding procedural rules that could
limit the leaders' March 21 discussion and flexibility.
Ledra Street had figured high in the March 12 gathering, and
the T/C negotiator dove into details. Step I of the
agreed-on process involved demining, with teams from both
sides fanning outwards from the crossing route to ensure the
nearby area was safe for passers-by. Next, municipal workers
would shore up decrepit buildings, a process lasting 7-10
days. Military would remain nearby, but out of sight, a
voluntary move (vice a concession, Nami clarified) on the
part of the Turkish Cypriot security forces.


7. (C) The meeting was not free from friction. Iacovou had
continued to press for a final demarcation of the crossing
route that favored Greek Cypriots, citing the most recent UN
Security Council resolution for support. Moller prevented
that discussion from going forward, however. Nami also
blasted Iacovou for having spoken to media immediately
following their meeting, breaking the gag rule that aimed to
prevent such counter-productive grandstanding. Nonetheless,
the T/C representative was plainly pleased with the Iacovou
get-together, and looked forward to even greater progress
from the leaders' meeting. And, like Moller, Nami thought
the two men, at the conclusion of the tete-a-tete, could
issue a joint call for the UN to restart comprehensive Cyprus
Problem negotiations.

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Iacovou: Progress, Yes, But...
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8. (C) The veteran G/C negotiator, 30 years Nami's senior,
also considered Ledra's opening a near-done deal. "We've
overcome most sticking points and hope to open it by April
15," Iacovou informed the Ambassador March 13. In a show of
good faith, the Greek Cypriots had not conditioned progress
on Ledra with similar movement towards opening Limnitis
crossing in northwest Cyprus, he explained, but would expect
Talat to pursue Limnitis vigorously. The creation of
additional crossing points and similar CBMs could not take
the place of progress on the settlement track, however.
Ominously, Iacovou suggested the RoC might even "stall" on
Ledra if continuing Turkish/Turkish Cypriot "intransigence"
left the current stalemate in place.


9. (C) Nami's inability and/or unwillingness to discuss July
8 had left Iacovou frustrated. The agreement -- "one of only
four the two sides have managed to reach in 35 years" --
constituted the only basis for restarting settlement talks.
Greek Cypriots would never permit their counterparts to
"sneak the Annan Plan through the back door," Iacovou
asserted. Yet with Talat's recent letter to UNSYG Ban,
followed by a similar missive from Turkish PM Erdogan, the
opposite side was attempting just that. Rubbishing July 8
would set Cyprus negotiations back months, if not years.
Iacovou indicated that he and Christofias did not want to use
the July 8 procedure as a means of avoiding substantive
engagement, and suggested that the leaders meet again after a
given period to review progress made; however, the G/C side
will not let Talat get away from his July 8 commitments,
especially in a context where they suspect that the Turks are
trying to paint them as the intransigent party with the
revival of the Annan Plan. Iacovou asked the Ambassador to
convey this firm message to Turkey and the T/Cs.


10. (C) Iacovou expressed similar worries over the imminent
UN Assessment Mission. The New York-based team would find
UNFICYP headless, owing to Moller's expected March 31
departure -- a "disastrous" development, he lamented.
Secretariat technocrat Lynn Pascoe, not a recognized

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political figure, would lead the mission, downgrading it in
many eyes. Finally, their schedule seemed overly ambitious
for such a short (three working days) stay. Regardless, the
G/C community would ensure Pascoe saw its requisite political
will to move the process forward, Iacovou promised.

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Comment
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11. (C) The positive spin that the Iacovou-Nami meeting
generated was welcome and the timing fortuitous. Days
earlier, the goodwill and rising expectations that

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Christofias's election had spawned was morphing into more
familiar cross-communal sniping. Talat and the Turkish side
had drawn first blood with their letter-writing
misadventures. By insisting on the Annan Plan as the basis
for future negotiations -- a clear non-starter south of the
Green Line -- it was certain Christofias would have to react
within his community's own red lines. With news of an
impending leaders' meeting, however, bickering has subsided
somewhat and an AIR of guarded optimism has returned to
Nicosia.


12. (C) Ledra Street represents the negotiators' low-hanging
fruit; they and the UN are right to focus attention there.
Yet real progress on the settlement track remains threatened
by the sides' rhetorical positions on the July 8 Agreement
and Annan Plan. There clearly is room to bridge the
rhetorical gaps if the political will exists in Nicosia,
Lefkosa, and Ankara, though the presence of such will is not
clear. Much as Talat might like, he signed July 8 and cannot
repudiate it without significant political cost, nor can he
realistically expect that comprehensive negotiations commence
based solely and specifically on a document already rejected
by the other side. Similarly, Christofias can continue to
toe the G/C line regarding the "imposed" Annan Plan, but he
knows that July 8 is procedural in nature and not a
substitute for substance, and that much of Annan's content
will reappear in any conceivable settlement plan. Moller and
the leaders must narrow these differences to ensure a
successful meeting on March 21. One compromise arrangement
would entail allowing the July 8 Agreement's committees and
working groups to form and operate, but only for a limited
time and with an express mission to utilize the UN's previous
body of work -- not the Annan Plan specifically -- in
reaching a new basis for talks.
SCHLICHER