FM TAKING HARD LINE OVER GAERC'S KOSOVO CONCLUSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000115 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EU UNMIK YI SUBJECT: FM TAKING HARD LINE OVER GAERC'S KOSOVO CONCLUSIONS REF: A. STATE 15648 ¶B. STATE 15111 ¶C. STATE 14284 ¶D. STATE 13716 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: RoC Foreign Minister Erato Marcoullis informed the Ambassador February 15 that Cyprus opposed GAERC conclusions that suggested a common EU platform to recognize Kosovo's independence declaration and thereby flout UNSCR ¶1244. END SUMMARY. -------------- Demarching at the Highest Levels -------------- ¶2. (C) The Embassy this week had sought to engage working-level MFA contacts and Political Director Euripides Evriviades on Kosovo-related demarches (Reftels). On February 14, however, the Ministry canceled these calls and summoned the Ambassador for a meeting with Marcoullis (subsequently, we learned the Foreign Minister had also summoned EU chiefs of mission, the Russian ambassador, and other local diplomats for similar discussions). ¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the February 15 call by asking for confirmation of what he'd earlier heard from Evriviades and others -- that the RoC was not yet prepared to engage with EU counterparts in order to reach consensus on Council conclusions in the February 18 GAERC. Marcoullis replied affirmatively; moreover, she claimed that all 27 member-states had not seen a text to consider. The British had been playing a "dirty game" by circulating language only to some of the 27, she charged. That text was replete with language suggesting the EU as a common platform for the recognition of Kosovo, which Cyprus and the others could never accept. It also went well beyond the understandings hammered out earlier in the development and approval of the Ops Plan for the ESDP mission; Marcoullis made clear that USG representations on the ESDP issue had been an important part of RoC calculations in that negotiation. Cyprus already had made an important compromise in not blocking the ESDP mission -- which was a "totally done and undo-able deal" -- but would never countenance an effort to revisit the idea of a common platform to recognize Kosovo's UDI/CDI and thereby flout UNSCR 1244. -------------- Don't Isolate Yourselves, We Urge -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador urged Marcoullis to reconsider Cyprus's positions. By staking out such a hard-line position both on recognition and on possible GAERC conclusions, he argued, Cyprus was isolating itself within the EU, stoking tendencies on the ground in Serbia and Kosovo which could destabilize the region, and harming everyone's interest. Cyprus's policy had even parted company with Athens, he added. Repeatedly the U.S. and its allies had noted that Kosovo was sui generis, and that the only state suggesting a comparison with Cyprus was -- ironically enough -- Russia. This was the gratitude Cyprus had earned for staking out a Kosovo position so far from the European mainstream. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador regretted that, just as it appeared there was a real chance to get the UN Cyprus negotiating track moving again, it appeared that RoC attention might be diverted to a Kosovo issue that most thought had no bearing on Cyprus. The ROC would be much better served to focus on its real interests. He therefore urged Marcoullis to adopt a flexible GAERC stance that would permit the adoption of conclusions with language all member-states could accept. -------------- Flexibility, But Only a Bit -------------- ¶6. (C) Marcoullis replied that Cyprus might be amenable to drafting efforts in this direction, but would not use the &British crypto-text8 that London had circulated to some but not all member-states. She was certain Cyprus would not be isolated at the GAERC, however. Perhaps five states -- at a minimum, Spain and Romania -- would support the Cypriot position. She also mentioned Cyprus's upcoming (February 17 and 24) elections as a factor in the RoC's hard line, believing the precedent value of recognizing secessionist entities a hugely important electoral issue. NICOSIA 00000115 002 OF 002 -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Cypriots are deeply dug in on any issue or language that smacks of Kosovo recognition, and are fully prepared to be isolated in the GAERC, though they do not think they will be. This equation might change if a combination of "motherland" Greece, Spain and Romania take a softer line and work toward a text which, like the Ops Plan, explicitly leaves the recognition determination to member-states. SCHLICHER