ROUND TWO DEALS TO DETERMINE ULTIMATE VICTOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000114 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL CY SUBJECT: ROUND TWO DEALS TO DETERMINE ULTIMATE VICTOR ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The February 17 first round of Cypriot elections will narrow to two the list of contenders but simultaneously make the third-place party a potential kingmaker. Current polling on second round scenarios is next to worthless, since the final result will depend more on party leaders' negotiations than on rank-and-file voters' decisions. Once results are announced late February 17, the winners immediately will launch a campaign to recruit the third-place finisher's supporters into their respective camps. The third-place candidate and his collaborators must take a stance that both serves their and their parties' longer-term interests, but also resonates with their supporters, who could easily spurn the higher-ups to vote with their conscience. For the first time ever, there is an (albeit slim) prospect that two ideological enemies, right-wing DISY and Communist AKEL, will join forces to battle incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos in the February 24 second-round, should DISY-supported candidate Ioannis Kasoulides fail to advance. Papadopoulos already is taking action to foil such negotiations. End Summary. -------------- --- Losers Turn Into Kingmakers But Choices Are Hard -------------- --- ¶2. (U) The first round of the presidential elections on February 17 will send home one of the three principal presidential contenders. As soon as results emerge, however, an entirely new campaign will commence, its outcome decided both inside smoke-filled rooms and in the public domain. The excluded candidate and the party or parties nominating him ultimately may decide the victor of this race, provided they can persuade their supporters to follow their lead. In all previous Cypriot presidential elections, the choice was fairly simple: support was given to the highest bidder -- i.e., the candidate who offered the biggest share of ministerial posts in the new government, and other similar benefits in the wider public sector. In this election, the leaders' priorities will be to ensure their parties' and their own political futures. ¶3. (SBU) The 2008 race is different in another way. For the first time, there is a prospect of cooperation between right-wing DISY and left-wing AKEL, driven by their common desire to prevent Tassos Papadopoulos' reelection. Both parties emerged from Papadopoulos' five-year reign weaker and fear that his renewed mandate would push them further downhill. Moreover, the two parties share the view that the current administration's policies are leading the country to partition. Both parties face difficulties in convincing their respective memberships to abandon decades of indoctrination about the other's evilness, however. And preempting their collaboration is Papadopoulos's most-urgent second-round priority. ¶4. (SBU) Party leaders and the candidates themselves are loathe to discuss deal specifics, and speculation over how each camp might move is rife. DIKO chief Marios Karoyian told the Ambassador February 14 "it is not appropriate to start discussions now," but admitted the party already had plans developed to recruit second-round allies. Kasoulides had focused on the prospect of DISY not advancing in his day-earlier meeting with us, calling the subsequent decision to back Papadopoulos or Christofias "a party nightmare." -------------- Scenario 1: Papadopoulos vs. Christofias -------------- ¶5. (SBU) This is the most debated scenario, since most polls put the incumbent and Communist challenger 1 - 2, respectively. What will DISY do in this scenario? Various Embassy contacts revealed that party leader Nikos Anastassiades and most of the top ranks are determined to support Christofias. They are considering two options, both involving convocation of an extraordinary party congress. In Option 1, Anastassiades would lobby for a formal congress decision backing the AKEL candidate. If the party leadership considered such a move detrimental to its long-term interests, they instead would pass a "vote your conscience" motion, but work for Christofias behind the scenes. Anastassiades allegedly would receive Christofias's then-vacant House Speaker seat as payback, plus other unspecified spoils. A formal AKEL-DISY joint government is inconceivable, since its establishment would produce large defections from both parties. Of late, however, many in DISY are discussing the possibility of a "national unity" government, complete with figures across the political spectrum, as a way of disguising AKEL-DISY cooperation. ¶6. (SBU) Papadopoulos has already put in motion a plan to preempt either an overt or undercover collaboration of the two parties. To do so, he is resorting to an oft-used "weapon," his 2004 rejection of the Annan Plan reunification effort. After a right-wing trade union federation criticized possible AKEL-DISY collaboration, Papadopoulos and lieutenants let loose a misinformation barrage, alleging that the parties were conspiring to get rid of Papadopoulos in order to revive the UN plan. Close Papadopoulos confidants also claim that certain DISY officials will seek to undercut NICOSIA 00000114 002 OF 002 Anastassiades by announcing, immediately upon word that Kasoulides had failed to advance, their support for the President. -------------- Papadopoulos vs. Kasoulides -------------- ¶7. (SBU) This is Papadopoulos's favorite scenario, as most experts believe AKEL could never support a right-wing candidate. AKEL adamantly refuses to discuss what the party would do if faced with this dilemma, other than follow the prescribed procedure of calling a meeting of party leaders to consider options. An AKEL insider confessed, however, that AKEL could never back Kasoulides. Papadopoulos's camp believes that, even without official AKEL support, the majority of leftist voters will opt for a centrist candidate or not vote at all. ¶8. (SBU) Despite the apparent difficulties, DISY leaders remain optimistic that AKEL cannot accept an invitation to return to the same government it abandoned in July 2007. One insider further argued that AKEL faced difficulties convincing its rank-and-file to join forces with nationalist EUROKO, another member of Papadopoulos's coalition. More importantly, the reasons that forced AKEL to dissolve the partnership, namely the party's declining electoral fortunes and the current stalemate in the Cyprus issue, remain valid. Yet the likelihood of AKEL openly supporting a DISY candidate seems a bridge too far, even under the guise of a national unity government. -------------- Christofias vs. Kasoulides -------------- ¶9. (SBU) This would be the most straightforward race, with both winners offering the loser power-sharing arrangements. DIKO considers Papadopoulos's exclusion inconceivable, however, as nearly every poll has put him in first place; party contacts therefore have refused to discuss this eventuality with us. Opinions within AKEL and DISY vary as to what DIKO will do. AKEL believes the long history of cooperation between two parties bodes well for future cooperation. It envisages a power-sharing arrangement not unlike that which existed before July, with AKEL, DIKO, and EDEK dividing the ministries. "Only the name of the president will change," revealed one AKEL official. ¶10. (SBU) DISY officials consider AKEL's assumptions incorrect. Both DIKO and EDEK will support Kasoulides if Papadopoulos fails to advance, they argue, attributing this outcome to the current DIKO leadership's strong anti-AKEL and anti-Communist sentiments. Moreover, DISY believes that the prospect of an AKEL-dominated government, which is bound to absorb most of the leftist vote, represents EDEK's worst nightmare. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) If excluded from the runoff, AKEL and DISY will be faced with two bad choices: supporting the incumbent after several months of disparaging his Cyprus problem policy as a recipe for partition, or lending support to their respective ideological enemy and risk splitting their own parties. Finding a middle-way solution such as an agreement to form a government of national unity that will make a Cyprus solution its top priority might prove a win-win situation for the two. Cooperating with AKEL is no longer inconceivable for many in DISY, and some loyalists argue that cooperation is imperative both for electoral success and to improve chances of an eventual CyProb settlement. AKEL seems unprepared to dance to DISY's lead at this juncture, however. SCHLICHER