POSSIBILITY OF PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION WEIGHS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000106 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGED PASS LINE) ANKARA PASS TO ADANA DEPT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: PRGOV PREL TU SR CY SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION WEIGHS HEAVILY ON TALAT Classified By: Amb. Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4 (a) and 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish Cypriot leader "President" Mehmet Ali Talat expressed doubt that substantive Cyprus Problem negotiations would resume in the event of a Papadopoulos re-election February 24, but assured that Turkish Cypriots were ready to start talks regardless of which Greek Cypriot prevailed. In an hour-long February 6 meeting with the Ambassador at the "Presidential" palace, Talat welcomed the deployment of a UN assessment mission and voiced support for an accelerated July 8 process leading to full CyProb negotiations. He was less welcoming regarding possible confidence building measures, however, and danced around allegations that the Turkish military's intransigence underpinned the failure so far to open the Ledra Street crossing point. Turning to other matters, he blamed European Union meddling for the Republic of Georgia's decision to pull its flag from a Turkish Cypriot ferry operating between Famagusta and coastal Syria, and accepted our offer to comment on the less-than-satisfactory "TRNC draft law" regulating casinos. Oddly -- and refreshingly -- Talat did not raise Turkish Cypriot "isolation" during the conversation. End Summary. Papadopoulos stuck on a "vision" ¶2. (C) Appearing fit and in good spirits, Talat told the Ambassador that the fate of negotiations depends on the outcome of February 17/24 Greek Cypriot (G/C) presidential elections. "There is little likelihood of progress," he warned, if RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos is reelected. He compared Papadopoulos to long-time T/C leader Rauf Denktash in his intransigent adherence to a "vision" -- in this case, G/C political domination and not political equality -- which was unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots. Talat warned that the negotiations "will face difficulties" progressing under accepted UN parameters if the G/C incumbent is re-elected, but promised the T/Cs were ready for negotiations regardless. The Ambassador urged Talat to "stay one step ahead" of the Greek Cypriots, and reiterated U.S. support for both the July 8 process and UN Secretary General's "established set of ideas". "Revitalization of July 8 or my September 5 proposal" �00A; ¶3. (C) Talat was more upbeat in the event of a win by challengers Dimitris Christofias or Ioannis Kasoulides, and quipped that he hoped his "comrade" (Christofias) emerged victorious. In the event of a Papadopoulos defeat, he believed that the July 8 Agreement could be revitalized as a time-controlled preparatory process leading to substantive negotiations -- a position he had outlined at his September 5 meeting with Papadopoulos and the UN Special Representative. The Ambassador noted that "one had to go through the July 8 process to get beyond it to substantive negotiations," to which Talat nodded. "Need New U.N. Initiative" ¶4. (C) Talat welcomed the suggestion of a U.N. assessment mission after the RoC presidential elections and called for, without further elaboration, engagement of the two sides in that process. He again expressed concern that, if reelected, Papadopoulos would work to dilute established UN settlement parameters and deny T/C political equality by demanding that all G/C refugees be allowed to return to their homes and by seeking voting rights based on residency, not native language or ethnicity. Talat added that only Annan V safeguarded T/C concerns, while under earlier versions of the Annan Plan, T/C welfare had been in danger. The Ambassador told Talat that the UN mission should focus on a narrow mandate of getting substantive negotiations started; the end-goal must remain the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution along established UN parameters. Both sides should endeavor to make the assessment mission a success and give UNSYG a positive reason to make Cyprus a higher UN priority. Both should refrain from posing conditions and preconditions to meaningful engagement. "Problem lack of fundamental agreement, not confidence" ¶5. (C) Ambassador urged Talat, along with the G/C presidential candidates, to undertake CBMs, either jointly or unilaterally, even before the assessment mission. This would better the general atmosphere for engagement, "give the assessment mission something positive to assess," and in the T/C case help them to get back to a "one step ahead" posture. Talat, however, was largely pessimistic about the efficacy of confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs "were not helpful," he argued, because the problem between the Cypriot communities was not a lack of confidence, but rather a lack of agreement on fundamentals, namely "political equality." That said, he appeared willing to seek further CBMs and told us that the UN recently had approached him to start talks on military de-confrontation measures. The UN had wanted to commence these discussions before broader settlement talks resumed, but Talat favored conducting the two concurrently, out of fear that wider talks would be stalled forever if the CBM discussions went nowhere. He then added - somewhat sheepishly - that focusing solely on military-related CBMs might portray the CyProb as solely a matter of Turkey's military presence on the island. The Ambassador again urged Talat to deliver on CBMs after the elections but before the start of a U.N. assessment mission, and the T/C leader nodded in response. ¶6. (C) Talat voiced bewilderment as to why the Ledra Street crossing had not yet opened, attributing the delay to G/C pressures on the UN over demarcation of the Buffer Zone (BZ). In his only agitated moment during the meeting, he asked why demarcation had been mentioned in the last UNSC resolution on Cyprus, implying that it reflected badly on the TC/Turkish side. Talat brushed off a question regarding the role of the Turkish military on Cyprus and rhetorically asked the Ambassador, "What is the Turkish military doing? Nothing more than before." He claimed that simple brush-cutting in the BZ by Turkish forces in 2007 was "being used against us to this day" by falsely showing the T/Cs wanted to extend their control further south. Ultimately, he asserted, Papadopoulos did not want Ledra opened, period. The Ambassador replied that the UN had not mentioned any G/C pressure regarding BZ demarcation at Ledra and urged the T/C leader to take measures, even unilaterally if necessary, to open it soonest after the G/C elections. G/C Pressure EU on Ferry to Syria ¶7. (C) Talat was certain that EU pressure had forced the Government of Georgia to de-flag a T/C ferry that sporadically has made trips between Famagusta and Latakia, Syria. The EU's office in Georgia had lobbied Tbilisi hard, he asserted, a "fact" he had decided to keep from the Turkish Cypriot population. (Note: On February 12, "TRNC Foreign Minister" Turgay Avci announced that the ferry service will recommence shortly, with the boats flying Turkish flags. The route is heavily subsidized by "TRNC" authorities and has served as a conduit for illegal migration.) Willing to Listen on Casino Law Draft ¶8. (C) Though joint US/UK pressure is one big reason that Talat and his CTP addressed the issue to begin with, Talat knew little of a much-awaited "bill" to regulate Turkish Cypriot casinos, currently under committee study in "Parliament." (Note: International observers claim the "bill" does little to introduce mechanisms necessary to monitor flows of money and audit casino operators.) Talat admitted that he had "lost the opportunity" to stop the establishment and spread of casinos years earlier, but asked for our help in improving the "bill" and promised to work with the head of the "parliamentary committee" -- an old friend -- to that end (Post is working through a USAID contractor to provide detailed commentary). Little talk of "TRNC Isolation" ¶9. (C) Oddly, Talat did not directly bring up the issue of "TRNC isolation" or seek direct U.S.-to-Ercan Airport flights, a frequent but unrealistic T/C request. He listened eagerly, however, when the Ambassador told him that that T/C "isolation" had to be addressed by the EU, and that a 2004 European Commission decision on direct trade should not be allowed to "wither and die" simply because the Greek Cypriots did not favor the idea. Talat also welcomed the Ambassador's suggestion that the internationally-recognized T/C Chamber of Commerce engage the French Embassy (as France will occupy the EU Presidency in the second half of 2008) on implementing the Direct Trade Regulation. ¶10. (C) Comment: Like many pro-solution Turkish Cypriots we have engaged of late, Talat is troubled by the prospect of a Papadopoulos re-election and its potentially negative effect on Cyprus Problem negotiations. We can empathize. That said, we have attempted to impress upon him that, regardless of who wins February 24, Turkish Cypriots must be prepared for real and immediate negotiations with their G/C counterparts and the UN, and not continue with the stalling tactics which gave Papadopoulos a significant tactical and public-relations advantage throughout 2007. End Comment. SCHLICHER