RELIANCE SLOWING DOWN ITS RETAIL ROLLOUT?

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000095 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS USDA PASS FAS/OCRA/HIGGISTON STATE FOR SCA/INS JASHWORTH AND SCA/RA MURENA DEPT PASS TO USTR - CLILIENFELD/AADLER DEPT PASS TO TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF SOUTH ASIA - ABAUKOL USDOC FOR 4530/ITA/MAC/OSA/LDROKER/ASTERN TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: BTIO EAGR ECON EINV IN ETRD EFIN PREL SUBJECT: RELIANCE SLOWING DOWN ITS RETAIL ROLLOUT? REF: A) 07 NEW DELHI 4801 B) 07 CHENNAI 438 NEW DELHI 00000095 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Reliance has ambitious plans to develop a comprehensive "farm to fork" supply chain that will support its front-end organized retail venture, but establishing solid backward linkages to the agricultural sector will take time and recent protests against it may require the company to proceed more cautiously than it had anticipated. Reliance Retail's chief executive of operations in New Delhi was optimistic about the company's prospects and longer-term goals in its grocery business, which as of the October 2006 launch included multi-year investments of up to $6 billion and a planned rollout of 1,000 stores by year-end 2007. However, a visit to a Reliance collection center and central distribution center outside of New Delhi demonstrated the fairly modest back-end operations to date of one of the largest players in organized retail and suggests a slow pace at which the private sector is reaching Indian agriculture. ¶2. (SBU) This cable is the first in a series that will address the potential impact of organized retail on the agricultural sector. Although the front end of the "retail revolution" has attracted considerable attention through new stores and shopping formats, these cables will focus on the back end of the supply chain and examine a few of the business models being used by the private sector to engage India's farmers. END SUMMARY. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Organized retail currently accounts for only 3 percent of India's retail industry but is expected to grow to 16 percent by 2015, according to TechnoPak Advisors, a Delhi-based retail consulting company, due to rising consumer incomes, more women entering the workforce, and greater availability of credit for consumer durables, among other drivers. A number of private companies are venturing into organized retail, particularly in the under-tapped and highly profitable food and grocery segment. Food and grocery is the largest category in India's total retail market, with a share of 54 percent or over $150 billion in current market size, but at 1 percent has the lowest organized retail penetration of all categories, according to a December 2007 FICCI/Ernst and Young study. ¶4. (SBU) Private sector investments in infrastructure such as cold chains and warehouses, new farming technologies, and contract farming for new crops could revitalize the lagging agricultural sector and potentially offer farmers an opportunity to participate in a "retail revolution" that would cater to the Indian consumer's growing taste for high-value agriculture (HVA),or fresh fruits and vegetables. The Ministry of Agriculture, among other GOI ministries, supports such private participation (reftel A) although foreign direct investment in agriculture-related industries is still minimal. ¶5. (SBU) However, highly-publicized protests from small vegetable vendors, middlemen that extract considerable commissions from the currently inefficient food procurement and distribution system, and political opportunists at the state level since early 2007 have slowed progress and forced companies to re-evaluate their strategies. Reliance in particular has faced considerable heat at its Reliance Fresh stores, being forced to shutter them in Uttar Pradesh and scale down expansion plans in other states such as West Bengal and Kerala. RELIANCE HAS HIGH HOPES FOR FULL SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) ECONOFFs met on December 14 with Mr. Navneet Saluja, Reliance Retail's chief executive of operations for New Delhi and surrounding areas. He emphasized Reliance's long-term goal of developing a full supply chain for HVA, which would eliminate middlemen and offer both lower prices to the Indian consumer and higher prices to the Indian farmer. Saluja highlighted Reliance's vision of developing a two-way business stream between the company and the farmer. Reliance would provide farmers with seeds, NEW DELHI 00000095 002.2 OF 003 technology, training and microfinance to grow the types of produce it sells in its Reliance Fresh stores. In return, Reliance envisions that farmers would receive fully transparent and higher prices for their produce, develop a comprehensive business relationship with the company, and have a guaranteed buyer of produce over the long-term to help eliminate seasonal uncertainties. Saluja noted that Reliance eventually plans to set up cold chain infrastructure, including warehouses and trucks, which will allow the company to develop longer supply chains, reach smaller farmers, and reduce the potential for waste if produce does not reach outlets immediately. ¶7. (SBU) However, Saluja acknowledged that Reliance is in the initial stages of this business model. Although the company has set up a number of collection centers near its Reliance Fresh stores, Reliance procures only about 60-70 percent of its requirements directly from the farmer while procuring the rest through imports or from local mandis, the government-regulated marketing yards that were designed to consolidate the supply chain but have created middlemen who cut into farmers' incomes. (Note: Private companies must ask for state permission to source directly from the farmer, and most states have amended their laws to allow this type of interaction. End note.) Saluja estimated that farmers who sell to Reliance generally receive prices that are approximately 15-25 percent higher than the mandi prices, depending on their ability to meet specifications laid out ahead of time by the company's representatives in the farming communities. Such specifications, along with guidance on which brands of seeds and inputs to use, and optimal timing of planting and irrigation, form a kind of informal extension service to the farmers in Reliance's network. ¶8. (SBU) Overall, Saluja believes that developing a long-term relationship with the farmer, rather than offering consistently higher prices, is the best business model for agricultural retail. Because prices are sometimes better at the mandi than what Reliance can offer, the company has to provide additional incentives to win dedicated producers. He noted that Reliance at this time does not want to enter into contractual farming relationships (another business model to be discussed septel) because of a lack of enforceability of such contracts and the small, fragmented nature of most Indian farms. Indian government statistics cite the average farmer's holdings at 0.8 hectares of land, or about two acres, which suggests that companies would have to contract with hundreds of farmers to procure adequate volumes of produce. GROUND REALITY SUGGESTS LONGER TIMELINE, SHORTER REACH -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Following the meeting with Saluja, ECONOFFs on December 28 toured a Reliance collection center and distribution center in Haryana, about an hour outside of New Delhi. Two Reliance managers first showed one of their Ranger Farms collection centers, a small concrete holding area that consisted of two ten by ten rooms. Farmers dropped off produce and were paid cash on the spot for goods that met Reliance's specifications; this particular center collected leafy greens, such as spinach, but had no cold storage capacity. Reliance workers collected the produce for one or two hours and then shipped the goods via truck to the nearby distribution center. Regional manager Mr. Verma noted that this collection center receives about three tons of fresh vegetables per day. ¶10. (SBU) The collection center manager Mr. Rameshwar explained that the facility, which buys from roughly 100 farmers in a 20-kilometer radius, is closer for some farmers than the local mandi, allowing them to save money on transportation. In addition, the company's "field officers" - local representatives in nearby villages - inform farmers of the company's procurement needs a day in advance, often via mobile phones, and ensure an ongoing relationship with the farmers. The field officers also communicate Reliance's produce specifications and offer farmers techniques to minimize rejections - currently at about one percent of all produce at this center - due to defects, hygiene issues, or size. The officials did imply, though, that each collection center works a little differently in terms of communicating with farmers and offering incentives. NEW DELHI 00000095 003.2 OF 003 ¶11. (SBU) Verma relayed that Reliance's farmers tend to own just 0.1 to 0.2 hectares of land, or up to half an acre, which would place them among India's marginal farmers. Critics of organized retail have charged that the private sector will likely work with only larger farmers because of their consolidated landholdings and ability to produce needed quantities, creating an economic divide within agricultural communities and disadvantaging smaller, poorer farmers who could potentially gain the most from the retail revolution. However, Reliance's stated willingness to forge relationships with any farmer that meets their specifications could help alleviate this issue. ¶12. (SBU) ECONOFFs then visited the central distribution center about 15 kilometers away, which cleans, sorts, and packages the goods before shipping them to local Reliance Fresh stores. The center collects 100 tons of produce daily from the eight collection centers in the Delhi area and ships them to about 80 Reliance Fresh stores in the vicinity. The 20-acre lot included a cold storage area, in which workers in below-zero temperatures cut and packaged fresh vegetables for shipment. Despite the size of the warehouse, technology was still minimal and most work was done by hand. Verma noted that the labor was mostly local and that the distribution center employed about 750 people. ¶13. (SBU) End to end, Reliance's supply chain surrounding Delhi is fairly short and limited to the 150-kilometer area immediately around the city. None of the trucks had cold storage capacity, and produce had to be moved daily and in short distances to reach Reliance Fresh stores in time. Even for longer hauls of produce that is not locally available, Verma indicated that, for right now at least, Reliance is using third-party cold chain transport companies rather than establishing its own fleet of refrigerated trucks. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Although Reliance is beginning to establish backward linkages to farmers, the company is proceeding slowly on the ground - a stark contrast to its speedy rollout of front-end retail shops, which now number about 430 nation-wide. This suggests that Reliance does not yet have a defined procurement strategy - either using government-regulated mandis, dealing with farmers directly, or an optimal mix of both - and may be experimenting with several options before settling on one that works best. A brief conversation with a farmer who sold produce directly at the collection center during the visit revealed his wariness about whether Reliance will last in this business. He further noted that he does not want to engage fully with just one buyer lest he lose his relationships with others. These trust issues suggest that Reliance will need to form solid relationships with farmers to establish support on the ground, at least in northern states, where the issue has been more volatile than in southern states (ref B). ¶15. (SBU) In addition, Reliance's infrastructure development for agricultural retail is still rudimentary and does not extend much beyond major cities. Reliance has yet to develop cold storage capacity - except for processed or imported goods - which at the moment leaves many Indian farmers too physically distant to do business with the company. In developing the infrastructure for a full supply chain, Reliance would be taking the majority of the risk through considerable time and investment, with no guarantee that farmers will deliver the produce it requires at the front end. Although such a business model would help Reliance reach smaller farmers and establish the desired vertical integration, the recent political backlash in some areas over its foray into organized retail may be prompting the company to rethink at least the pace of its long-term plans. MULFORD