THINK-TANKERS MULL WAYS TO CURB NAXALITE INSURGENCY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000641 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, S/CT/ALLAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC PREL KTFN KCRM IN SUBJECT: THINK-TANKERS MULL WAYS TO CURB NAXALITE INSURGENCY REF: A. KOLKATA 65/9 ¶B. 07 KOLKATA 386/327/325/324/218/196/191/144 ¶C. 07 CHENNAI 569/559/500/385/83 NEW DELHI 00000641 001.2 OF 003 Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) The challenges for India in confronting the Naxalite/Maoist threat were highlighted in a seminar at the Indian think-tank Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS),an independent well-respected Delhi-based institution. The discusants agreed: the primary driver of the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency is the poor socio-economic environment; the insurgency is strongest in remote and isolated areas; the modus operandi of the insurgency is to inflict small, localized attacks on personnel and facilities of state government; the response of state governments has been largely ineffective; the response of the central government has been mostly absent; and the approach needed is to "plan centrally and act locally." We forward the views presented by the seminar participants as part of an overall reporting campaign on the Naxalites/Maoists. These views track closely with those presented in previous mission reporting (reftels). End Summary. The Driving Force Behind the Naxalite/Maoist Insurgency -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) D.M. Mitra, an official in the Ministry of Home Affairs and a leading expert on Indian left-wing extremism, was the featured speaker at a February 22 IPCS seminar that lasted for approximately three hours and was attended by former Indian governors, government secretaries, generals and several Delhi-based diplomats. Mitra set the stage by describing the socio-economic factors behind the Naxalite/Maoist movement and how these factors drive ideology and recruitment. Naxalites and their supporters come from remote villages and usually represent the poorest members of society, those who are not represented in the official state structure. Modern economic activity does not reach these remote villages and the populations remain isolated. There is significant fragmentation within these villages, based on class and wealth with no common unifying force to bring the village together. The lack of a unifying force results from the absence of government or institutions of state and civil society such as schools. The Naxalite/Maoists enter such villages, promise political representation and are soon given tacit support by the villagers. The Naxalite/Maoists are the only force that is able to unify the village and its people. While some of the support is based on fear, much of it is inspired by the promise of political change brought by the Naxalite/Maoists. Villagers have tried to seek the help of government officials before, but their attempts mostly end in vain and are left helpless. The only time government officials attempt to help these remote areas is during elections, but this interest quickly fades. The villagers are left with few options but to throw their allegiance to the insurgents. Goals, Modus Operandi and Strategic Positioning -------------- -- ¶3. (U) According to the Mitra, the Naxalite/Maoists believe that elections in the current environment support a bourgeoisie structure instead of representing the poor. Government programs for the benefit of the remote rural populations are rare and those that are implemented generally fail. The Naxalite/Maoists ride the villagers' natural impulse for a better life for themselves and their children. They preach to the villagers that the most effective way of achieving their objective is through violence directed at the state. The violence is targeted narrowly -- a majority of Naxalite/Maoist attacks are directed at police stations. Such attacks on police stations are systematic and highly visible to the villagers. All in all these attacks have been extremely successful. The Naxalite/Maoists have decided to stick with what works -- isolated incidents on smaller targets instead of high profile targets that generate national and international responses. This strategy limits NEW DELHI 00000641 002.2 OF 003 central and state government response to a minimum and keeps negative public opinion at bay. ¶4. (U) The areas which the Naxalite/Maoists control coincide with the major forested and mountainous areas of India. These highly inaccessible areas are usually remote border areas. The remoteness of these regions creates a natural advantage for the Naxalite/Maoists as it provides a ripe recruiting ground as well as ready-made forest-based defense. These forested areas also contain some of India's most important natural resources. Some Naxalite/Maoist strongholds are near coal and iron ore mines in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Government Response -------------- ¶5. (U) The participants concluded that the current central and state government response to the insurgency has been wholly inadequate. Although Prime Minister Singh has publicly called it the most serious internal security threat to the nation, the central government has yet to devise a comprehensive plan. The response is limited to the state governments, which have neither the expertise nor the resources to mount an effective effort. Since the attacks occur in remote areas, the police stations which are attacked are ill-prepared and ill-equipped to counter any threat. These remote police stations are not properly fortified, their power supplies are intermittent, vehicles to patrol or seek help in the case of an attack are insufficient, and telephone connections are either spotty or non-existent. These remote police stations are an easy target for Naxalite/Maoists, whose forest-based attacks are perfect considering most of these stations border the woods. Local and state governments have not addressed many of the problems which have left these police stations vulnerable to attacks. ¶6. (SBU) The only major success stories have come from Andhra Pradesh and the establishment of elite anti-Naxalite/Maoist police units, known as "greyhounds". These greyhound units are very small, comprised of locals who speak the local dialect, are familiar with the terrain, carry minimal supplies and can stay out for five days at a time. These highly-mobile units have become very effective in countering the Naxalite/Maoist threat, or at least in pushing the Naxalites into neighboring states. Many other state governments have been using a traditional military approach of large and cumbersome units which are slow and ineffective in these particular circumstances. What is Required -------------- ¶7. (U) The general consensus at the seminar was that to counter the Naxalite/Maoist threat the state needs to "plan centrally and act locally." Because of the growing insurgency, the central government needs to create a strategic, long-term plan to counter the Naxalite/Maoist threat and empower the state and local authorities to counter specific threats within their regions. The participants also generally agreed that both security and development plans are needed to address the strength and growth of the insurgency. They disagree on whether or not security should be first followed by development or whether they should be implemented together. One retired military general commented on the use of military construction units that should be used to open up accessibility to the region through road construction. Once these areas are been made more accessible, development and security operations can be conducted together. ¶8. (U) Several guests highlighted other areas which need to be addressed as well, including staffing gaps at police stations. Infrastructure at the police stattions also needs to be upgraded. Even minor fixes for some police stations will create a better security environment. The stations that have increased defensive measures have been successful in thwarting attacks. More groups like the Andhra Pradesh-based greyhound units need to be created. These units have shown remarkable skill in countering the Naxalite/Maoist threat, NEW DELHI 00000641 003.2 OF 003 while traditional large military units have been largely ineffective. Other areas that were stressed were the need for an increase in local ground intelligence and the quick dissemination to indigenous units who can react on a moments notice. Comment: Naxalites in the Forefront -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Naxalite/Maoist activity has received increased media attention in the past year. There are several reasons for this new-found media interest in the long-running Naxalite/Maoist insurgency: although still local and small-scale in its ambition, it is increasing in breadth and intensity resulting in lurid press coverage of massacres; PM Singh has drawn attention to it by calling it the most serious internal security threat to India; and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has made terrorism an important part of its election campaign and loudly faulted the Indian National Congress for its failure to address the Naxalite/Maoist threat. End Comment. MULFORD