EAM MUKHERJEE TELLS CODEL KERRY HE DOUBTS PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003163

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK IN
SUBJECT: EAM MUKHERJEE TELLS CODEL KERRY HE DOUBTS PAKISTAN
CAN DELIVER

REF: NEW DELHI AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: On December 15 External Affairs Minister
Pranab Mukherjee reiterated to Senator Kerry his demands for
the Government of Pakistan (GOP) to bring the ISI under
civilian control, destroy terrorist training camps, turn over
wanted criminals, and end infiltration of India by Pakistani
terrorists. Mukherjee wanted action and was unconcerned
whether the civilian government or the military delivered.
He was skeptical about the Pakistani government's ability to
crackdown on the terrorists. Mukherjee stated he believed
the Pakistani army lacked the will, not the capacity to deal
with the situation in western Pakistan.

Mukherjee Reiterates Demands
--------------


2. (C) On December 15 Senator Kerry, accompanied by the
Ambassador, met with EAM Mukherjee. In the meeting, Senator
Kerry underlined his view that the U.S. and India faced a
common fight against terrorists, whether they are from
Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LET) or Al Qaeda. He said we could no
longer avoid focusing on Pakistan's links to terrorism and
said that the U.S. expects much from President Zardari and
the Pakistani establishment.


3. (C) Mukherjee reiterated his demands for the Government
of Pakistan (GOP) to bring the ISI under civilian control,
destroy terrorist training camps, turn over wanted criminals,
and end infiltration of India by Pakistani terrorists. He
related that Indians are very angry about the attack on
Mumbai and consequently the Indian political establishment
has been the object of severe criticismand public pressure,
with many cynical their government could do anything. As a
result, Mukherjee stated that the Government of India (GOI)
was demanding that Pakistan turn over persons who have
violated Indian law or have Interpol Red Corner notices
issued against them. He did not present a list of names, but
repeatedly mentioned the desire to have those responsible for
the attack on Parliament in 2001 and the terrorists who had
been released as a result of the hijacking of IC 814 in 1999
be returned to India.

And Leaves Little Wiggle Room for Pakistan
--------------


4. (C) In response to Senator Kerry's question whether
Mukherjee believed it would be acceptable for Pakistan to
take legal action against these individuals rather than
turning them over to India, Mukherjee replied it was the
GOP's responsibility to take effective legal action (i.e.
more than house arrest),and it must still hand over Indian
citizens. Mukherjee added that the terrorist training camps
must also be completely demolished now, or as soon as the
snow melts they will be put back into operation. (Note:
Mukherjee claimed he was prepared to wait until May or June
to deal with terrorist camps. End note.)

Kerry: But What Consequences for Zardari and Pakistan?
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Responding to Senator Kerry's concerns that acceding
to these demands would be too difficult for President
Zardari, Mukherjee countered that neither military nor
democratic governments in Pakistan had been able to prevent
terrorist attacks on India. The Senator's observation that
President Zardari has dome more to counter terrorism in his
three months in office than Musharraf did in seven years, did
not appear to resonate with Mukherjee. He viewed the
contradictions and weaknesses of Pakistani governments as
inherent, and said Pakistan was stuck in a repetitive cycle
between military and democratic governments. Mukherjee
stressed that despite the good intentions of Pakistani

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leaders, he doubted they could deliver the needed crackdown
against terrorists and the infrastructure supporting them. He
expressed great frustration that the capabilities of civilian
governments in Pakistan had always been too limited to
control all of its territory.

Will of the Army Questioned
--------------


6. (C) Replying to Kerry's query whether the Pakistani army
has the capacity and will to deal with extremists on
Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, Mukherjee commented that
it is a problem of will, not capacity. He characterized the
capacity, discipline, and leadership of the army as
acceptable. Mukherjee viewed the border area, which has
supplied many terrorist recruits, as never having been
brought into the mainstream of Pakistani life and believed
the issue of integration had not been accurately analyzed.
By focusing only on the anti-Communist/anti-Soviet angle
after the 1979 invasion, analysts missed other types of
radicalism and instability (ex. Taliban, Al Qaeda) that were
developing in this unruly area.


7. (C) Mukherjee recognized that India would benefit from
peace and stability in Pakistan, and requested Senator Kerry
deliver a message to General Kayani about the necessity of
destroying the infrastructure of terrorism and bringing the
ISI under civilian control. The Senator stated he would, and
commented that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee review
of the 1 billion USD aid package to Pakistan provided strong
leverage.


8. (U) Codel Kerry did not clear this message.
MULFORD