Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NEWDELHI3163
2008-12-16 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

EAM MUKHERJEE TELLS CODEL KERRY HE DOUBTS PAKISTAN

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV PK IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003163 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK IN
SUBJECT: EAM MUKHERJEE TELLS CODEL KERRY HE DOUBTS PAKISTAN
CAN DELIVER

REF: NEW DELHI AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003163 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK IN SUBJECT: EAM MUKHERJEE TELLS CODEL KERRY HE DOUBTS PAKISTAN CAN DELIVER REF: NEW DELHI AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On December 15 External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee reiterated to Senator Kerry his demands for the Government of Pakistan (GOP) to bring the ISI under civilian control, destroy terrorist training camps, turn over wanted criminals, and end infiltration of India by Pakistani terrorists. Mukherjee wanted action and was unconcerned whether the civilian government or the military delivered. He was skeptical about the Pakistani government's ability to crackdown on the terrorists. Mukherjee stated he believed the Pakistani army lacked the will, not the capacity to deal with the situation in western Pakistan. Mukherjee Reiterates Demands -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 15 Senator Kerry, accompanied by the Ambassador, met with EAM Mukherjee. In the meeting, Senator Kerry underlined his view that the U.S. and India faced a common fight against terrorists, whether they are from Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LET) or Al Qaeda. He said we could no longer avoid focusing on Pakistan's links to terrorism and said that the U.S. expects much from President Zardari and the Pakistani establishment. ¶3. (C) Mukherjee reiterated his demands for the Government of Pakistan (GOP) to bring the ISI under civilian control, destroy terrorist training camps, turn over wanted criminals, and end infiltration of India by Pakistani terrorists. He related that Indians are very angry about the attack on Mumbai and consequently the Indian political establishment has been the object of severe criticismand public pressure, with many cynical their government could do anything. As a result, Mukherjee stated that the Government of India (GOI) was demanding that Pakistan turn over persons who have violated Indian law or have Interpol Red Corner notices issued against them. He did not present a list of names, but repeatedly mentioned the desire to have those responsible for the attack on Parliament in 2001 and the terrorists who had been released as a result of the hijacking of IC 814 in 1999 be returned to India. And Leaves Little Wiggle Room for Pakistan -------------- ¶4. (C) In response to Senator Kerry's question whether Mukherjee believed it would be acceptable for Pakistan to take legal actio
n against these individuals rather than turning them over to India, Mukherjee replied it was the GOP's responsibility to take effective legal action (i.e. more than house arrest),and it must still hand over Indian citizens. Mukherjee added that the terrorist training camps must also be completely demolished now, or as soon as the snow melts they will be put back into operation. (Note: Mukherjee claimed he was prepared to wait until May or June to deal with terrorist camps. End note.) Kerry: But What Consequences for Zardari and Pakistan? -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Responding to Senator Kerry's concerns that acceding to these demands would be too difficult for President Zardari, Mukherjee countered that neither military nor democratic governments in Pakistan had been able to prevent terrorist attacks on India. The Senator's observation that President Zardari has dome more to counter terrorism in his three months in office than Musharraf did in seven years, did not appear to resonate with Mukherjee. He viewed the contradictions and weaknesses of Pakistani governments as inherent, and said Pakistan was stuck in a repetitive cycle between military and democratic governments. Mukherjee stressed that despite the good intentions of Pakistani NEW DELHI 00003163 002 OF 002 leaders, he doubted they could deliver the needed crackdown against terrorists and the infrastructure supporting them. He expressed great frustration that the capabilities of civilian governments in Pakistan had always been too limited to control all of its territory. Will of the Army Questioned -------------- ¶6. (C) Replying to Kerry's query whether the Pakistani army has the capacity and will to deal with extremists on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, Mukherjee commented that it is a problem of will, not capacity. He characterized the capacity, discipline, and leadership of the army as acceptable. Mukherjee viewed the border area, which has supplied many terrorist recruits, as never having been brought into the mainstream of Pakistani life and believed the issue of integration had not been accurately analyzed. By focusing only on the anti-Communist/anti-Soviet angle after the 1979 invasion, analysts missed other types of radicalism and instability (ex. Taliban, Al Qaeda) that were developing in this unruly area. ¶7. (C) Mukherjee recognized that India would benefit from peace and stability in Pakistan, and requested Senator Kerry deliver a message to General Kayani about the necessity of destroying the infrastructure of terrorism and bringing the ISI under civilian control. The Senator stated he would, and commented that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee review of the 1 billion USD aid package to Pakistan provided strong leverage. ¶8. (U) Codel Kerry did not clear this message. MULFORD

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