INDIAN AND BRITISH PM'S DISCUSS TERROR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003156

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL PK UK IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN AND BRITISH PM'S DISCUSS TERROR
COOPERATION; INDIAN VIOLATION OF PAKISTANI TERRITORY
"INADVERTENT"

REF: USDAO NEW DELHI 140656Z DEC 08

Classified By: Acting POLCOUNS Lesslie Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: One day before U.K. Prime Minister Gordon
Brown met with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to
discuss the necessity of cooperation between India and
Pakistan, two Indian AIR FORCE jets flew into the Lahore and
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir sectors, violating Pakistani
territory on 13 December. Despite information to the
contrary (reftel) India did not acknowledge the breach
publicly. During his unannounced visit to New Delhi on 14
December, PM Brown asked Singh if he would allow for British
police to interview the surviving terrorist suspect in the
Mumbai attack. British High Commission colleagues describe
the meeting between the prime ministers as "difficult." End
Summary.

British PM Encourages Cooperation on Mumbai Investigation
--------------


2. (C) Prior to meeting with Pakistan President Zardari on
December 13, British Prime Minister Brown met with Prime
Minister Singh earlier that day. The main focus of Brown's
visit to India was to express his condolences, discuss
international cooperation on the investigation into the
Mumbai attacks, and encourage the sharing of information.
Brown expressed interest in having British police interview
Ajmal Amir Kasab, a terror suspect in the Mumbai attacks.


3. (C) According to a UK High Commission officer present at
the meeting, PM Singh was highly dismissive of Pakistan's
moves so far to address India's demands. In response to
Brown's query regarding India's evaluation of Pakistan's
efforts, Singh called the detention of the LeT and JUD
extremists "a joke" and said that the Pakistanis must be
"living in fantasy land" if they expect the Indian government
to accept Pakistani actions as a serious move against
terrorism. Singh compared these steps to those taken by
Pakistan when it was under pressure after the 2001 attack on
India's Parliament: ineffective and soon discarded. Singh
said that Pakistan was invoking legislation that was aimed at
political activity when it should be prosecuting terrorists
and keeping them in "proper prisions."


4. (C) Singh also dismissed Pakistan's suggestion that it
could send a high-level delegation to discuss the attacks or
receive evidence. He said this would be "aggravating" and
that Indian public opinion would never stand for it. In any
event, according to Singh, India and Pakistan had already
established a joint Anti-Terror Mechanism that was supposed
to be used in terrorism cases. The Mechanism had proven
completely ineffective because the Pakistanis ignored it.

India's Violation of Pakistani Airspace Inadvertent
-------------- --------------


5. (S) On the day before the Singh-Brown meeting, Indian
aircraft temporarily violated Pakistani airspace, according
to press reports and confirmed by the U.S. Defense Attache in
New Delhi (reftel). Pakistani AIR FORCE officials, quoted in
the Indian press, said the Indian jets flew near two areas
where the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is thought to
have planned the Mumbai attacks. The Pakistani Information
Minister, Sherry Rehman, described India,s violations as
"inadvertent" and said there was no need for alarm. Despite
the reports, the Indian AIR FORCE denied any incursions into
Pakistani territory. USDAO reports Indian AIR activity
remains low and there are no indications the Indian Army has
commenced mobilization.

India Continues to Demand Pakistan Take Action
-------------- -


6. (SBU) On the political front, on December 14 Prime

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Minister Singh, addressing an election rally in Jammu and
Kashmir, said India's silence should not be misconstrued as
weakness, pointing out that India will only seek
normalization of relations with Pakistan after Islamabad
prevents its territory from being used to attack India. As
evident from parliamentary debate on December 11 and the
continuing heavy media focus on the Mumbai attacks, the GOI
and the Indian public are skeptical about the Pakistani
actions to date. They see Pakistan replaying its 2001
maneuver after the attack on Parliament when it placed LET
and Jaish-e-Mohammad leaders under house arrest, only to
release them after three months. To have any confidence in
the sincerity of Pakistan, they would like to see concrete
steps to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism
permanently and the start of a legal process against some of
the people on the list of 20 terrorists India wants Pakistan
to turn over. The GOI also understands that it would suffer
a political cost if it acknowledges Pakistani actions so far
as positive when the Indian public deems them hollow and
meaningless.
MULFORD