INDIAN AND BRITISH PM'S DISCUSS TERROR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003156 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL PK UK IN SUBJECT: INDIAN AND BRITISH PM'S DISCUSS TERROR COOPERATION; INDIAN VIOLATION OF PAKISTANI TERRITORY "INADVERTENT" REF: USDAO NEW DELHI 140656Z DEC 08 Classified By: Acting POLCOUNS Lesslie Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: One day before U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown met with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss the necessity of cooperation between India and Pakistan, two Indian air force jets flew into the Lahore and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir sectors, violating Pakistani territory on 13 December. Despite information to the contrary (reftel) India did not acknowledge the breach publicly. During his unannounced visit to New Delhi on 14 December, PM Brown asked Singh if he would allow for British police to interview the surviving terrorist suspect in the Mumbai attack. British High Commission colleagues describe the meeting between the prime ministers as "difficult." End Summary. British PM Encourages Cooperation on Mumbai Investigation -------------- ¶2. (C) Prior to meeting with Pakistan President Zardari on December 13, British Prime Minister Brown met with Prime Minister Singh earlier that day. The main focus of Brown's visit to India was to express his condolences, discuss international cooperation on the investigation into the Mumbai attacks, and encourage the sharing of information. Brown expressed interest in having British police interview Ajmal Amir Kasab, a terror suspect in the Mumbai attacks. ¶3. (C) According to a UK High Commission officer present at the meeting, PM Singh was highly dismissive of Pakistan's moves so far to address India's demands. In response to Brown's query regarding India's evaluation of Pakistan's efforts, Singh called the detention of the LeT and JUD extremists "a joke" and said that the Pakistanis must be "living in fantasy land" if they expect the Indian government to accept Pakistani actions as a serious move against terrorism. Singh compared these steps to those taken by Pakistan when it was under pressure after the 2001 attack on India's Parliament: ineffective and soon discarded. Singh said that Pakistan was invoking legislation that was aimed at political activity when it should be prosecuting terrorists and keeping them in "proper prisions." ¶4. (C) Singh also dismissed Pakistan's suggestion that it could send a high-level delegation to discuss the attacks or receive evidence. He said this would be "aggravating" and that Indian public opinion would never stand for it. In any event, according to Singh, India and Pakistan had already established a joint Anti-Terror Mechanism that was supposed to be used in terrorism cases. The Mechanism had proven completely ineffective because the Pakistanis ignored it. India's Violation of Pakistani Airspace Inadvertent -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) On the day before the Singh-Brown meeting, Indian aircraft temporarily violated Pakistani airspace, according to press reports and confirmed by the U.S. Defense Attache in New Delhi (reftel). Pakistani air force officials, quoted in the Indian press, said the Indian jets flew near two areas where the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is thought to have planned the Mumbai attacks. The Pakistani Information Minister, Sherry Rehman, described India,s violations as "inadvertent" and said there was no need for alarm. Despite the reports, the Indian Air Force denied any incursions into Pakistani territory. USDAO reports Indian air activity remains low and there are no indications the Indian Army has commenced mobilization. India Continues to Demand Pakistan Take Action -------------- - ¶6. (SBU) On the political front, on December 14 Prime NEW DELHI 00003156 002 OF 002 Minister Singh, addressing an election rally in Jammu and Kashmir, said India's silence should not be misconstrued as weakness, pointing out that India will only seek normalization of relations with Pakistan after Islamabad prevents its territory from being used to attack India. As evident from parliamentary debate on December 11 and the continuing heavy media focus on the Mumbai attacks, the GOI and the Indian public are skeptical about the Pakistani actions to date. They see Pakistan replaying its 2001 maneuver after the attack on Parliament when it placed LET and Jaish-e-Mohammad leaders under house arrest, only to release them after three months. To have any confidence in the sincerity of Pakistan, they would like to see concrete steps to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism permanently and the start of a legal process against some of the people on the list of 20 terrorists India wants Pakistan to turn over. The GOI also understands that it would suffer a political cost if it acknowledges Pakistani actions so far as positive when the Indian public deems them hollow and meaningless. MULFORD